by Mark Leshkevich
[REGNUM] Eighty years ago, on May 3, 1946, the trial of Japan's top military and political leaders opened in Tokyo. The International Tribunal, sitting in the Ichigai Palace—the former headquarters of the Imperial Army—was called upon to determine the degree of guilt of Hitler's main allies in World War II.
There are events in 20th-century history that have become proper names. Say "Nuremberg" and it's immediately clear: the trial of Nazism, retribution for the global carnage, humanity's attempt to legally define evil as evil.
The Tokyo Trials remain in the shadows. Yet, in terms of scale, the number of victims, and the consequences for the Chinese, Soviet, and Korean peoples, as well as for the people of Southeast Asia, it was one of the key processes of the post-war world.
It was here that the mass murder of civilians in Nanjing (where more than 200,000 people died) and Manila (at least 100,000 victims), the reprisals against prisoners of war, and the violation of the rules of war were recognized as crimes against humanity.
But one of the main crimes of Hitler's allies remained "in the shadows" - outside the scope of the Tokyo Tribunal.
Evidence of the Japanese leadership's guilt began to be collected during the war—just as evidence of Nazi crimes in the occupied territories was collected for the future Nuremberg trials.
Thus, the Allies learned details of the "death march" in the Philippines. After the surrender of the American forces on the Bataan Peninsula (on the northern Philippine island of Luzon, near Manila) in April 1942, approximately 78,000 soldiers were captured by the Japanese. Most of them were wounded, sick, and exhausted.
The prisoners of war were formed into columns and forced to walk more than 100 kilometers to the place of imprisonment.
During the march, people were denied even the most basic necessities, even a sip of water. Those who became weakened or simply displeased the guards were killed on the spot. Around 18,000 prisoners never reached their destination. The United States and Great Britain, through neutral countries, warned Tokyo that the Bataan Death March would not be forgotten.
"Fighting France" warned of the future responsibility of the Japanese for crimes in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (Indochina remained de jure a French possession). Thus, the Japanese export of food from Tonkin—Northern Vietnam—coupled with natural disasters (the consequences of which the occupiers failed to combat) triggered a famine by the spring of 1945, which claimed the lives of 2 million people.
In China, Kuomintang and Communist leaders documented the consequences of the Japanese policy of "sanko sekusen"—"three alls." This involved "pacifying" occupied territories based on the principle of "kill everything, burn everything, loot everything."
The Japanese burned the houses of those suspected of collaborating with the partisans (entire villages were set on fire) and destroyed grain and rice that they could not export.
By order of the commander of the troops in Northern China, Yasuji Okamura, the entire male population from 15 to 60 years old in the “pacified” areas was to be exterminated “on suspicion of complicity.”
Modern Japanese historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta and a number of other authors admit that “the tactics of the three ‘alls’ led to the death of 2.7 million Chinese civilians.
Japan heeded these Allied warnings. But war crimes continued even after the defeat of the Third Reich.
The entry of the USSR into the war, which destroyed the Kwantung Army in less than a month in August 1945, forced the empire to capitulate. World War II ended on September 2.
On December 6, 1945, an Allied prosecution team led by US Representative Joseph Keenan arrived in Japan.
THE TRIBUNAL IS NOT ONLY IN TOKYO
Preparations for the Tokyo Tribunal were as meticulous as those for Nuremberg. As with the Nazis, the condemnation was not limited to a single trial.
A distinctive feature of the condemnation of Japanese militarism was that war crimes trials were heard not only in Tokyo and neighboring Yokohama. Trials were held in Khabarovsk, Batavia (now Jakarta), Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Nanjing.
Eleven countries participated in the investigation of the crimes. From 1945 to 1951, 920 Japanese were sentenced to death and approximately 3,000 to prison terms across the Far East.
In the capital of Japan, those considered the main architects of the war were tried: prime ministers, ministers, generals, diplomats.
THE STATE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CRIME
In Tokyo, the main question was being decided: could political and military leaders be held personally responsible for starting the war?
Before Nuremberg and Tokyo, international law looked different. War could be considered unjust and cruel, but it long remained an instrument of state policy. In 1946, aggressive war was declared a crime for which specific individuals must be held accountable.
This position was formulated in a speech by the USSR prosecutor Sergei Golunsky:
“The state mechanism itself was transformed into an instrument of crime… This apparatus was the same weapon as a knife or a revolver in the hands of an ordinary murderer or bandit.
The only difference was that only a few would die from a knife in the hands of a bandit, whereas millions died from the monstrous instrument of crime that these people had made the Japanese state apparatus into.”
The tribunal's chief prosecutor, Joseph Keenan, said the same : "Planning and commencing the destruction of the lives of a million people is no less criminal than planning and commencing the murder of one person."
In practice, the prosecution in Tokyo, as at Nuremberg, used the categories of class A, B, and C crimes.
Class "A" meant planning, preparation, initiation, and waging of aggressive war. Class "B" concerned murder. Class "C" covered ordinary war crimes and crimes against humanity.
On April 29, 1946, Allied prosecutors indicted 28 Japanese.
Among them: Hideki Tojo, Prime Minister at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor, Koki Hirota, former Foreign Minister and Prime Minister, Colonial Minister Shigenori Togo, military commanders Iwane Matsui and Shunroku Hata.
WHO THE US SAVED FROM RETRIBUTION
The Tokyo Trials had a flaw, particularly obvious when compared to the Nuremberg Tribunal, and it is worth remembering it even now.
At Nuremberg, responsibility was shared by the four victorious powers: the USSR, the USA, Great Britain, and France. National justice systems prevailed in the "minor trials" against Japanese militarists—in Khabarovsk, Nanjing, and Manila.
But at the main trial in Tokyo, the United States played a key role. It had single-handedly occupied Japan. Tokyo had one chief prosecutor, American Joseph Keenan, and ten assistant prosecutors from other countries. Therefore, the composition of the "defendant's dock" essentially depended on the United States.
The most egregious example of such selective justice involved Unit 731, which developed biological weapons and conducted inhumane experiments on humans. Unit commander Shiro Ishii and his henchmen received immunity from the Americans in exchange for research data.
The leaders of the zaibatsu—the monopolies that contributed to the war—were also not brought to trial. Supposedly, insufficient evidence was found against them. The head of the aggressor state, Emperor Hirohito, who was by no means a "reigning, but not ruling, monarch," also remained free.
But, as American Judge William Webb stated, "the Emperor's immunity, when compared with his role in bringing about the Pacific War, must be taken into account in determining the penalties."
Occupation commander Douglas MacArthur believed the Emperor's power should be limited (Hirohito, among other things, had declared his renunciation of divine origin), but he was certain that condemning the Mikado would lead to increased resistance in Japan. The Americans, however, needed to maintain control.
THE ARGUMENT AGAINST THE TRICK
Soviet prosecutor Golunsky, in a foreign-field situation, took an important step by emphasizing the culpability of the Japanese leadership in the long and deliberate preparation for aggression. Golunsky recalled: The Japanese Empire was the first to start the war with Russia in 1904–1905, followed by the annexation of Korea in 1910.
From the late 1920s to the early 1940s, Tokyo was already preparing for global aggression. The occupation of Manchuria in 1931, the Sino-Japanese War from 1937, the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (effectively a local war with the USSR and Mongolia) in 1939—all of this chronologically preceded World War II, but in essence constituted its first episodes.
At the same time, during the same period, from 1920 to 1939, international agreements were adopted declaring the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. These included the Geneva Protocols of 1925 and 1929, as well as the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which was signed by 63 states, including Japan.
If the war, according to these documents, was considered aggressive and unlawful, then the deaths caused by it must be considered murder. This argument was used to counter the defense's argument that the concept of aggressive war and crimes against humanity emerged only "here and now," in 1946, and could not be applied retroactively.
THE MARQUIS'S DIARY AND THE EMPEROR'S INTERROGATION
It was evidence of crimes against humanity that formed the basis of the indictments in Tokyo. Nearly 700 eyewitnesses testified to the abuse of camp prisoners and the extermination of civilians.
The world was presented with documents incriminating the Japanese army in "traditional" war crimes—violations of the rules of war. Among them was a March 1943 order from the Supreme Headquarters ordering submarine commanders to eliminate the crews of sunken ships.
An important piece of evidence was the diary of Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, who recorded all the "secrets of the court," including the discussion of the attack on Pearl Harbor.
But the Soviet side presented "living proof"—Pu Yi, the former head of the puppet state of Manchukuo. At the Khabarovsk trial, this key witness testified that Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria was aimed at the political, economic, and religious subjugation of China and the preparation of aggression against the USSR.
Pu Yi was handed over to the chief prosecutor, Keenan, and the ex-emperor's testimony largely undermined his former masters. The trial lasted a long time—925 days. For comparison, Nuremberg lasted 316 days.
On November 12, 1948, the reading of the 1,000-page verdict began. It was based on the Soviet side's argument that the defendants should answer for their country's aggressive actions from the late 1920s to 1945.
All 25 defendants remaining at the time of the verdict were found guilty. Seven people, including Tojo and Hirota, received death sentences, and 16 were sentenced to life imprisonment. On December 23, 1948, the seven defendants were hanged in Sugamo Prison.