by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] In mid-April, the US concluded its mission in Syria and withdrew its last military personnel from the Arab country. This was confirmed by Central Command spokesman Tim Hawkins, who noted that the Pentagon would be prepared to "return again" if the operational situation required it.
The end of the Syrian campaign is, in many ways, a turning point in the history of US missions in the Middle East. And, predictably, debates about the "legacy" Americans are leaving behind began almost immediately.
LONG PRESENCE
The American military presence in Syria lasted for almost 12 years, since September 2014, when Washington and its close European allies formed a coalition to fight the local terrorist underground.
However, even after its defeat in 2018, the Pentagon was in no hurry to withdraw troops, using Syrian facilities as leverage against the Bashar al-Assad regime and its allied players in the Middle East—primarily Iran.
During this time, the contingent's size changed at least several times—at peak moments, the Pentagon kept more than 6,500 fighters at bases in the republic (not counting more than 50,000 loyalists from among the Kurdish and Arab militias).
The process of "complete withdrawal" of forces, initiated back in 2018, dragged on for nearly eight years. During this time, Washington increased its ground force at least several times and changed its missions. This included using Syrian facilities to curb Iran's regional expansion.
The story came to a close only in mid-April, when American specialists left the Kasrak airbase in the northeast – the last major stronghold on Syrian territory.
Interestingly, the Americans withdrew through Jordan (and not through Iraq, as originally planned), and some of the equipment and ammunition that didn't fit into the main "train" or were beyond repair were destroyed on the spot. Furthermore, the initial footage from the scene, captured by Syrian soldiers, hints at the haste with which the contingent was dispersed from their established positions.
All this suggests that the accelerated withdrawal of forces was largely provoked from outside, including fears of massive strikes on Syrian territory from Iran.
THE SYRIAN ACCOUNT
As soon as the last American soldier left Syria, gossip began in the United States about the cost of this campaign.
The Pentagon did not maintain a separate "Syria account," including expenditures on this area either in the statistics of the global war on terrorism or in the military presence in the Middle East, and therefore responded to the public inquiry in an extremely vague manner, hinting at the opportunity that this campaign is not even among the five most expensive missions in US history.
Preliminary estimates are indeed quite modest. Over the past dozen years, Washington has spent between $15 and $25 billion on Syria, with over $11 billion of that spent in the first two years.
By comparison, the current campaign against Iran surpassed the indicated price mark by the middle of the second week.
On the other hand, the cost of a campaign is measured not only by its costs but also by its gains. And here, the United States faces a much more complex situation. Of course, they achieved all their stated goals—both public (defeating terrorist forces) and hidden (undermining Iranian influence in Damascus, changing the local regime). This allowed them to consider the campaign a success and eliminate the need for a permanent presence in Syria.
At the same time, the US had nothing left behind – in its apparatus games, the White House was forced to sacrifice Kurdish loyalists, refuse support for local Arab tribal militias, ignore the problems of local minorities (which deepened Syria's internal divisions), and cede control of key oil fields to new elites.
External control over the new Syrian government is not as strong as American strategists would like. Although Damascus heeds signals from Washington, it acts at its own discretion. This includes avoiding attempts to "forcefully ally" it with Israel and create a bridgehead in the border area to increase pressure on Iran. Most of the American advisers' instructions have been implemented by the Syrians only formally.
TIME FOR CHANGE
The US withdrawal from Syria created conditions for a shift in the balance of power. In particular, Israel now has greater room to maneuver.
His forces had previously had no intention of leaving the “buffer territories” in the Druze Mountains region, citing national security interests and the “lack of sustainable guarantees” from official Damascus – although until recently they had to take the American deterrent factor into account.
Now, with Washington distancing itself, it will be easier to justify creeping expansion, and its pace will likely accelerate. Moreover, Syria's proximity to Lebanon opens up additional opportunities to draw down the forces of the pro-Iranian "Axis of Resistance," which the Netanyahu government will not fail to exploit.
Turkey will also have more opportunities, becoming an official "senior partner" for Damascus after the withdrawal of US troops and will participate more actively in local domestic political processes.
The Arabian monarchies (primarily Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia) will also try to seize some of the "laurels," but for them, political benefits and influence in Syria will be distributed more on a residual basis and under active control from Ankara.
Iran also does not see the ongoing changes as a sign of a return to its former influence in Syria, although it interprets the accelerated exodus of Americans as one of the “convincing results” of the recent regional war.
It is possible that Tehran will try to test the waters in the near future and lay the foundations for new groups for the "Axis of Resistance" (especially since there are still plenty of people dissatisfied with the current status quo in Syria), but this process will take longer than it did in the early 2010s.
As for Russia and China, Washington's refusal to play on the "Syrian board" will not yield significant dividends for them. Especially since the rivalry is gradually shifting toward North Africa, specifically Libya, where American interests are persistently trying to prevent Moscow and Beijing from gaining a foothold.
And although the main battles in these places are taking place mostly in secret, their effects could become public in the near future.