[TASS] Europe is banking on escalating drone warfare
On April 15, the Russian Ministry of Defense reported that some NATO countries, in support of the proxy war against Russia in Ukraine, had decided to increase the production of drones and components for delivery to Ukraine. The decision was approved on March 26, 2026. Europe has made no secret of its hopes of scaling up production to increase the number of long-range drone launches over Russian territory, inflicting additional military and economic damage on our country.
Increased Drone Production for Ukraine. The Russian Ministry of Defense's infographic indicates that joint ventures are already operating and preparing to operate for Ukraine in the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Spain, Italy, Turkey, and Israel.
Similar production facilities are also underway in Norway (for which, according to Volodymyr Zelenskyy, $500 million has been allocated) and other countries. In April, the French arms manufacturer MABDA reportedly signed an agreement with the Ukrainian company Fire Point to modernize and upgrade Flamingo missiles used against Russia.
Also, following a recent meeting of the Rammstein contact group, it was announced that EU countries will allocate $1.5 billion for drone production for Ukraine alone. Part of the funds will be spent within the European Union (EU) as part of the ongoing production.
For Ukraine, this represents a way to shift some of its necessary production to NATO countries, where they are not subject to strikes by the Russian Armed Forces. In Ukraine itself, UAV and component production facilities are periodically hit by Russian missiles of various types and drones. This also allows for closer integration of Ukraine's military-industrial complex with that of NATO countries, including through the exchange of expertise in drone production and modernization.
With the US significantly cutting funding for the conflict in Ukraine and continuing to shift the financial burden onto other NATO countries, the option of increasing drone production is seen by NATO leadership as a low-cost way to compensate for the reduction in arms supplies to Ukraine, which Washington now offers to buy at market price rather than simply transfer to Kyiv.
PROJECT GOALS
Ukraine and NATO's strategy is to further intensify long-range drone and missile strikes against military-industrial facilities deep within Russian territory, relying on US and NATO intelligence. Between 2024 and 2025, there was a systematic increase in the number of long-range drones of various types deployed, as well as an enhancement of their combat performance through improved communications systems, flight control, and changes in operational tactics.
A further increase in the number of drones launched is expected in 2026, a significant portion of which will be manufactured outside of Ukraine.
According to Western data, Ukraine was producing up to 2.4 million drones of various types annually by mid-2025. And it was expected to produce up to 4 million by early 2026. More ambitious plans to produce 8-12 million drones were also voiced, but were hampered by a lack of funding and production capacity. This problem is currently being partially addressed by using enterprises in third countries.
It's easy to see that this trend clearly indicates that both the European Union and NATO are pursuing a course toward further escalation of relations with Russia, increasing the risk of direct confrontation. The reasons are obvious. Europe believes that the implementation of the Anchorage deal between US and Russian Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin will lead to an end to the conflict in which Ukraine and Europe will emerge as the main losers. At the same time, Europe is being kept out of the negotiating table between the US and Russia.
Given current trends on the front, the EU needs to escalate the conflict, as the inertial scenarios clearly point to the inevitable defeat of Ukraine and the Europe that backs it.
To avoid these inertial scenarios, Europe is attempting to replace the US as the main arms supplier, helping to relocate some weapons production to its territory, condoning the Kyiv regime's terrorist tactics, and supporting the forced mobilization of Ukrainians both in Ukraine and in Europe.
By acting in this way, Europe hopes to harm Russia and secure participation in negotiations on Ukraine's fate, appearing as an independent player.
RISKS OF DIRECT MILITARY CONFLICT.
Meanwhile, the risks of a direct conflict between Russia and NATO continue to increase, as the Russian Ministry of Defense has once again emphasized. However, in public rhetoric, the alliance pretends not to be alarmed by this, and is openly preparing for a direct war with Russia between 2027 and 2030. Such preparatory activities have already been repeatedly exposed by the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).
Deputy Chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev stated in this regard that the Russian Ministry of Defense's statements regarding joint Ukrainian-NATO enterprises in Europe should be taken literally. All of these are potential legitimate military targets for Russia. The transition from a potential threat to a practical implementation (i.e., missile strikes) will depend on how the current situation develops.
Thus, Russia is shifting the situation regarding strikes on Ukrainian and NATO enterprises from hypothetical to potential. It is worth noting that such warnings were previously voiced regarding NATO plans to deploy military contingents in Western Ukraine and Poland's plans to annex Western Ukraine.
It is worth noting that the Persian Gulf War clearly demonstrated that the presence of part of a party's military infrastructure on the territory of a third country does not protect against attacks. During the military operations of March 2026, Iran launched targeted strikes against US military infrastructure in the territories of countries it deemed necessary to target. And these countries ultimately did not dare escalate to open warfare against Tehran. And we're considering a situation where a non-nuclear power attacks the infrastructure of a nuclear power on the territory of third countries.
In the case of a potential conflict between Russia and NATO, we're talking about a probable clash between a nuclear power and a military bloc possessing nuclear weapons, making potential conflict scenarios close to terminal.
The line between war and "non-war" in Russia-NATO relations is becoming increasingly elusive.
NATO assumes that Russia will not be the first to escalate nuclear warfare, and that the Overton window can be gradually opened by transferring part of Ukraine's military-industrial complex to Europe, while attempting to maintain the conflict at a conventional level. NATO
COUNTERMEASURES
Countermeasures lead to a significant increase in the number of drones launched by the enemy, and in the event of a purely defensive response in the form of strengthening air defenses, increasing the number of mobile fire groups (MFGs), and ramping up the production of anti-aircraft missiles and anti-aircraft drones, the cost of drone warfare will grow exponentially. Moreover, Russia is also ramping up drone production, forcing its adversary to do the same. Following the meeting of the Ramstein Contact Group, Germany alone will allocate up to $4 billion to counter Russian drones, as well as provide additional IRIS-T air defense systems and missiles.
Regardless of the strategic response to NATO's actions, we must now develop our air defense forces to account for the potential growth of the unmanned aerial threat. The number of aerial targets will increase, and the threat to our infrastructure will grow. In addition to the number of drones, we can expect their further improvement with the introduction of new communications systems, neural networks, swarm-based operating principles, and specific, specialized modifications.
We must significantly increase the number of mobile fire teams in border regions, and create regional counter-drone groups in European Russia. These groups should be integrated into a single network and equipped with effective small arms and short-range detection systems for low-flying targets, including interceptor drones. This will be significantly cheaper than repairing damaged industrial facilities and infrastructure. Bureaucratic obstacles hindering the deployment of such units must be removed.
We also need to develop systems for the comprehensive early detection of swarms of low-flying enemy drones and proactively deploy mobile groups to support air defense assets. It is necessary to increase the number of launchers with small anti-aircraft missiles, anti-aircraft machine guns, and automatic rifles, as well as the widespread introduction of advanced combat lasers, which are no longer science fiction and are already being used on the front lines, such as in the Belgorod Region.
The success of the spring-summer and fall campaigns of 2026, where the country's military-political leadership has set very ambitious goals to achieve the overall objectives of the special military operation, depends on how effectively our army and military-industrial complex can respond to the unmanned aerial vehicle challenge from Ukraine and NATO. We must prepare for this challenge today.