by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Over the past 24 hours, the international community has been tensely watching the progress of US-Iranian negotiations in Pakistan.
The meeting was preceded by a long and high-intensity armed conflict, and therefore many hoped that Washington and Tehran would reach at least a preliminary compromise – if only to avoid a return to unpredictable escalation.
However, these hopes were never realized: the delegations left Islamabad empty-handed.
ON THE EVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
A day before the talks began, the Pakistani capital was filled with unprecedented tension. For the first time in a long time, the country was hosting such a large-scale and historically significant diplomatic event, and any mistake, even the most minor, in preparation could have been fatal.
Moreover, both sides expected a trick from their counterparts and would have postponed the meeting at the first sign of concern, which would have harmed Pakistan's position as mediator. Therefore, Islamabad took a highly responsible approach to ensuring the security of future negotiations.
The most modern and secure government compounds were selected, and defensive rings several hundred meters in diameter were created around them. In total, Pakistani authorities deployed over 5,000 troops and up to half of the local security forces to secure the perimeter. Aircraft and UAVs were deployed for patrols.
The painstaking preparations finally paid off: high-ranking officials from both countries arrived in Pakistan by midday on April 11.
The US dispatched approximately 30 people to the negotiations. The group included US Presidential Special Envoys Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, Admiral Brad Cooper, head of US Central Command, and several high-ranking officials from the State Department, Pentagon, and CIA. The key figure was Vice President J.D. Vance, who received Trump's personal blessing.
Iran sent a larger delegation (approximately 70 people). In addition to Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, representatives of the defense establishment, the IRGC command, and delegates from the Central Bank, parliament, and the clerical bloc arrived in Islamabad. The Iranian negotiating team was led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, one of the country's most influential conservative politicians.
| All the Iranian Big Turbans who remain alive and uninjured? |
A DIFFICULT CONVERSATION
However, the mutual desire of the US and Iran to conclude a long-term peace appears to have remained only at the level of public declarations. Delegates arrived in Islamabad determined to dictate their terms to their counterparts without question.
The depth of mutual disagreements was reflected in the very approach to shaping the future peace framework. The United States insisted on an agreement "here and now," and for now only in the form of an extension of the ceasefire, which could be used as the basis for a future settlement.
At the same time, Washington sought to impose on Tehran a format for further negotiations similar to the discussion of a new “nuclear deal”: periodic meetings to discuss individual aspects of a future agreement under guarantees from third countries.
| Not so much impose as present their nonnegotiable requirements, though when the Mullahcracy team refused to accept the restrictions VP JD Vance and his teqm got up, walked away, and the US Navy closed the Strait. |
| The Mullahs’ category error was in seeing the transaction as a negotiation rather than a surrender. |
| Not any more… |
It seems that each side was convinced that it was their responsibility to dictate the terms at the meeting in Islamabad, and therefore no one showed flexibility either at the expert level or at the senior representatives level.
| Yeah. About that… |
The United States rejected Tehran's proposals to guarantee the security of its peaceful nuclear program and "whitewash" it internationally. Iran, meanwhile, categorically refused the United States' request for joint management of the Strait of Hormuz.
| And so it isn’t. Jointly managed, I mean. |
American negotiators refused to pressure Israel to halt its offensive against Hezbollah and withdraw its troops from the security zone it had established along the northern border, a move that Benjamin Netanyahu's government had previously called "impossible a priori."
Instead, the US insisted on a limited approach, calling for a ceasefire only in Beirut, with the ceasefire then expanding to other areas. This would create a favorable backdrop for the talks between Israel and Lebanon scheduled for April 14.
There was also a clever diplomatic ploy hidden in this way of posing the question: Beirut and its environs accounted for no more than a quarter of the Israeli strikes, while the main point of focus for the Israelis remained the south of the country.
| Israel is no longer willing to accept being pummeled by Hezbollah rockets and missiles, or even the attempt by Hezbollah to pummel them with rockets and missiles, while Hezbollah is willing to promise to give them up while insisting on their right to continue shooting them at Israel. They insist they have the inalienable right to kill Jews…and anyone else who is within reach on the Israeli side of the border. |
| Not actually disarm Hezbollah, as it turns out, but certainly to talk about disarming Hezbollah. |
This was the last straw: on the night of April 12, the negotiations ended without a clear final decision.
THE MOMENT FOR AN INJECTION
The delegations left Islamabad without clear plans for the future. Official Tehran denied rumors of a new round of talks in the coming days, criticizing the United States for its "unwillingness to negotiate."
At the same time, Iranian diplomats continue to declare their readiness to seek a peaceful solution to the current crisis, including with the new mediation of Pakistan.
The US is reacting to the diplomatic setback more harshly and contradictorily. Even before the talks in Islamabad began, Trump issued threats against Iranian elites, promising them "introduction to the latest weapons" if Tehran continues to resist and refuses to reach a deal.
However, after the failure of the "Islamabad track," American elites have so far preferred to refrain from harsh comments, as if giving their opponents a chance to come to their senses.
At the same time, the accelerated pace of concentration of US strike forces around Iran suggests that they are once again considering escalation.
In any case, new clashes are unlikely to resolve the Strait of Hormuz issue. In Islamabad, Ghalibaf and his associates hinted to the Americans that they "don't know" where the haphazardly placed mines are drifting, and that Washington should remove them itself.
This greatly angered the Republicans, in part because the Iranians chose their moment of attack so carefully. The fact is that the US has only four minesweepers left (based at Sasebo on the Japanese island of Kyushu), and even those are scheduled for disposal by the end of 2027.
| Or not — we’ll have to see. On the other hand, anything that floats can be a minesweeper once… |
This means that Washington won't be able to clear the strait on its own without the help of its allies.
| Minesweeping is already underway, so we'll see how far they get. |