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Arabia
The ships are posing as Russian to avoid being hit by missiles from the Houthis.
2026-03-30
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] The Iran-backed Yemeni movement Ansar Allah (also known as the Houthis) has officially joined the conflict in the Middle East.

The rebels launched several combined missiles toward Israeli territory. Although all the missiles were intercepted by the Israeli air defenses, the Houthi intervention alone could significantly impact the situation in the region,
…not if none get through. Then it’s just a minor annoyance…
not to mention the state of the energy market.

YEMEN IS COMING BACK
During the first month of the Middle East conflict, Ansar Allah played a bystander role. Although Houthi leaders repeatedly declared their units "ready to deploy" and "take blood revenge on their enemies" for the assassination of Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, they took no real action.

Even during the period when American-Israeli forces began using Saudi Arabian infrastructure for attacks in areas within the unofficial "zone of responsibility" of Yemeni proxies, this gave Western analysts reason to talk about an internal crisis that has hampered the pro-Iranian "axis of resistance" following Khamenei's death.

The situation changed on March 28, when two missiles and several UAVs were launched from Yemeni territory toward Israel. All were shot down in mid-air and caused no damage to local infrastructure.

This, however, did not stop the official representative of the rebel army, Yahya Sari, from declaring that Yemeni missilemen “successfully hit” some “secret targets” of the enemy.
The Arab idea that to try is to somehow magically succeed.
A day later, the Houthis launched another shell toward Israeli territory—judging by the trajectory, aiming for Haifa's port infrastructure. However, this attack was also unsuccessful.

SAUDI ARABIA'S MULTI-MOVE STRATEGY
The events in the Red Sea coincided with another significant development in the region. Specifically, Saudi Arabia's intention to covertly "establish a beachhead" for operations against Iran and its closest allies.

The Kingdom not only expanded the list of bases open to the US, but also, according to some reports, agreed to provide the coalition with intelligence on the situation in neighboring countries.

Meanwhile, the House of Saud clearly wasn't intimidated by Tehran's demonstrative gestures—including the tightening of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
Since 2015, if I recall correctly, the Houthis have been shooting missiles at them.
The day before the Houthis entered the war, senior Saudi officials boasted to Bloomberg that Riyadh had quickly brought the East-West pipeline, connecting the largest oil fields with the loading terminals in the Red Sea port of Yanbu, back to full capacity. This was part of the reorientation of supply chains amid the conflict.

According to Saudi estimates, the volumes pumped were sufficient to allow the kingdom to maintain export volumes even during the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz (the main logistics route) and weather the crisis without significant losses. This cannot be said of other Arabian monarchies, with the exception of Oman, which have no alternative sea access.

Interestingly, Iran has attempted to destabilize Yanbu's infrastructure several times, but the damage it inflicted was insufficient to halt shipments for more than a day.

Partly because the attack on the port had to be carried out across Saudi Arabian territory, which is heavily protected by US and Saudi air and missile defenses. The Houthis, located on the same line as the Saudis' western ports, have the ability to conduct harassing fire from a shorter distance.

Moreover, to paralyze Saudi infrastructure, the Houthis don't need to attack the port directly. It's enough to close the "gateway to the world"—the Bab el-Mandeb Strait.

Considering that its “throat” is even narrower than that of Hormuz (26-29 km versus 39-45 km), it will not be difficult for the Houthis to effectively paralyze shipping there.

Moreover, a week before this, the Houthis tested the first batch of modernized unmanned boats (UBK), created in the likeness of Iranian ones, which significantly increased their capabilities.

"PASS" FOR A VESSEL
Although attempts by Iran and its allies to block the Red Sea were considered a matter of time, the anti-Iranian coalition appears to be unprepared for the actual entry of Yemeni rebels into military action.

The Pentagon described the recent escalation in the Red Sea as a "dangerous turn in the conflict," but defense officials did not promise retaliatory strikes against the Yemenis. Quite the contrary: the United States deemed it inappropriate to expend resources deterring yet another Iranian ally when its launches were largely symbolic.

Moreover, the American military's priority right now is discussing a scenario for a hypothetical ground operation in Iran—and no one wants to disperse cover forces during such a difficult period, when the order to land could come at any moment.

The European monitoring mission "Aspides" deployed in the Red Sea, designed, among other things, to deter Houthi military activity, also limited itself to routine warnings to ship owners.

The mission's official statement noted that civilian vessels "could soon be attacked in the Red Sea," and that captains "should exercise caution" when navigating through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. However, the Europeans made no plans to increase their military presence in the region.

The civilian shipping industry reacted nervously to the escalating crisis in the Red Sea, especially given that the powers that be have effectively removed themselves from addressing the problem.

Some captains didn't wait for the first attacks and preemptively changed their ships' markers on electronic maps, sometimes quite tellingly. Among the most popular markers were "Chinese Owner," "Non-Israeli/American Cargo," "Muslim Crew," "Russians," and so on.

All of them served as "safe conduct" during the period of tension around the Gaza Strip, and there is hope that they will work this time too.

The Houthis, however, are remaining silent for now, refusing to elaborate on their plans for a possible blockade of the Red Sea or on how loyal they will be to civilian vessels this time.

This uncertainty is causing further price volatility on the stock exchanges: Brent crude oil is already trading above $110 per barrel amid the tension, and analysts are convinced that this is far from the limit.

A real attempt by Ansar Allah to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait would push prices even higher.
Related:
Yanbu: 2026-03-29 Saudi Pipeline That Bypasses Hormuz Hits 7 Million Barrel Goal
Yanbu: 2026-03-20 What if the US Navy Isn't in a Hurry to Re-Open the Strait?
Yanbu: 2026-03-18 Iran to Allegedly Allow Hormuz Transits for Cargo Denominated in Yuan not Dollars
Related:
Bab el-Mandeb Strait: 2026-03-28 The Houthis have declared their readiness to enter the conflict on Iran's side
Bab el-Mandeb Strait: 2026-03-26 US and Israeli operation against Iran has gotten out of control – Guterres
Bab el-Mandeb Strait: 2026-03-16 Yemen threatens to close the Bab el-Mandeb Strait to the US and Israel – media
Posted by:badanov

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