Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozin, originally published in TASS:
[ColonelCassad] My article for TASS discusses the shortage of air defense missiles in the US and Israel and Iran's strategy for a war of attrition.
"MISSILE SHORTAGE."
As the war in the Middle East unfolds, the issue of the resources expended by both sides to maintain the pace and scale of mutual attacks is increasingly being discussed. After all, the expenditure of weapons in the US and Israeli operation against Iran also impacts other regions, particularly supplies.
Key Variables: In this regard, it should be taken into account that the number of hypersonic, ballistic, cruise missiles, drones, and air defense missiles at the beginning of the war, as well as their current daily production rates, are critical.
Currently, of course, there is no precise and reliable data on how many missiles of various types and UAVs Iran had at the start of the war on February 28, 2026. It is also unknown what volume of industrial production of these strike weapons Tehran was able to maintain after 24 days of hostilities. Similarly, there is no publicly available information on the number of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and air defense systems, or various strike weapons, available to the US and Israel at the start of their joint operation.
Their production volumes are also unknown. Essentially, these are the key variables that prevent a highly accurate assessment of how the war of attrition between the two sides is actually unfolding. It is important to note that, when launching Operation Epic Fury, the US and Israel clearly counted on a blitzkrieg, a decapitating strike against the Iranian leadership, an internal uprising, and a general Iranian capitulation. This led to the excessive expenditure of strike weapons and anti-aircraft missiles in the first week of the war, especially in the Persian Gulf countries.
This approach, although seemingly excessive, is considered "acceptable" tactically in the event of a quick victory that would "write off" everything. However, the US and Israel failed to achieve their overall objectives.
Iran, from the very beginning, was betting on disrupting the aggressors' blitzkrieg plan and forcing them into a course of attrition, whereby the resource and cost factors would outweigh the attackers' technological advantage. Tehran made no secret of the fact that in the initial days, it was primarily launching older missiles from its 2010-2014 stockpiles (Fattah-1, Fattah-2, and Ghadr). This was done, in part, to force the use of expensive interceptor missiles stockpiled in the region to shoot them down, having expended most of its cheaper missiles. It also ensured the freedom to employ more powerful and modern weapons as the enemy's stockpiles dwindled and the consolidated US and Israeli air defenses began prioritizing what to shoot down and what not.
According to initial estimates, the aggressors were expected to reach exhaustion within 10-12 days of the war's onset, with a high rate of missile and drone launches and their subsequent exchange for air defense and missile defense missiles. The situation for the US and Israel was further exacerbated by the fact that the Gulf states' armies were not shy about spending millions of dollars' worth of air defense missiles on conventional Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, which cost no more than $20,000—an utter disaster from an economic perspective.
Iran was undoubtedly drawing on the experience of the summer of 2025, when, after massive strikes during Operation True Promise 3, Israel began to experience problems intercepting even individual missiles on the seventh or eighth day due to the rapid depletion of its anti-missile stockpiles. As a result, by the end of that period of escalation, Iran was launching significantly fewer missiles than at its outset, but was achieving significant success, striking valuable strategic targets in Israel that had previously been considered inaccessible due to its multilayered air defense system. Naturally, learning from this experience, both sides drew their own conclusions while simultaneously increasing their ammunition stockpiles.
Israel and the United States not only stockpiled air and missile defense missiles for systems such as THAAD, Patriot PAC-3, Arrow 2 and Arrow 3 (Hetz), and SM-3, but also placed significant emphasis on destroying Iran's launchers and "missile cities" in the first days of aggression, in order to reduce Tehran's ability to wage a war of attrition. Subsequent events have shown that this strategy failed to disrupt Iran's missile potential, which continues not only to intensively strike targets in the region but also to employ increasingly sophisticated missiles like the Nasrallah and the modernized Khorramshahr-4.
Iran apparently moved some production underground, using the infrastructure of its "missile cities," creating a massive number of decoys. Moreover, in addition to relying on a prolonged campaign of missile and drone strikes, Iran was preparing, if necessary, to attack key US radars in the region to reduce the aggressors' ability to detect and intercept their ballistic missiles early. In the first days, key US radars in Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq were destroyed. Incidentally, this included the AN/FPS-132 radar in Qatar, which could track launches in Russia and China, among other areas. Several radars for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, as well as various short- and medium-range radars, were also destroyed. This partially blinded US and Israeli air defenses, allowing Iran to achieve high effectiveness in destroying their targets even while intensively depleting interceptor missiles.
PRODUCTION CRISIS
In such a situation, the ability of the parties to produce drones and missiles becomes critical, as the war could last for several months.
While Iranian figures are simply unknown, the West is increasingly raising the issue of depleting current stockpiles of interceptor missiles in the Middle East theater of operations (TOO), which affects both the US Army and the IDF (which conceals production volumes for Arrow-2 and Arrow-3 missiles—according to the IRGC, they are insufficient), as well as the armies of the Persian Gulf monarchies. Nevertheless, back in 2024, the Netanyahu government allocated additional funds for the production of interceptor missiles for the Arrow-3 system as a key element in the fight against Iranian ballistic and hypersonic missiles.
As of early 2026, the American defense industry corporation Lockheed Martin reported that the US annually produces 620 missiles for the Patriot PAC-3 air defense system. The company plans to increase missile production to 2,000 units per year by 2033. The average price of a single missile ranges from $4 million to $5 million.
The situation with missiles for the THAAD missile defense system is even worse. According to Lockheed Martin, only 96 interceptors are being produced annually as of early 2026. By 2033, production is planned to increase to 400 per year. It's worth noting that the US already used up a significant portion of its stockpiles during the escalation in the summer of 2025, and the 2026 war is raging with significantly greater intensity. Therefore, I conclude that such a production level truly cannot meet demand (not even considering the high cost of these missiles—one THAAD costs $12.77 million).
Problems have also arisen with the high consumption of SM-3 sea-based anti-aircraft missiles. At early 2026, only 96 were being produced annually, but now plans call for up to 360 by 2033. Significantly, during the 12 days of the June 2025 war, the US fired, according to official figures, 80 SM-3 missiles—essentially a year's worth of production. Similar problems persist with SM-2 and SM-6 anti-aircraft missiles, of which 268 and 280 were used in the wars against Yemen and Iran from October 2023 to June 2025, respectively.
Following the onset of the current aggression against Iran and the failure of initial plans, the White House administration demanded that the largest US defense companies quadruple their production of weapons and ammunition as quickly as possible. Washington's arsenals were depleted by the excessive expenditure of various missiles in the war against Iran, as well as by the previous deliveries of ammunition to Kyiv.
Later, the Pentagon, according to media reports, announced the need to allocate an additional $200 billion for the war in the Middle East. Part of this is planned to be spent on urgent procurement of cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as air and missile defense systems, and on ramping up production ahead of previously planned dates. However, production and reimbursement take time, and the missiles are needed now.
DELAYED CONSEQUENCES
Ultimately, the US has apparently found itself in a situation where it is forced to resort to redeploying resources from the Indo-Pacific region. For example, from the priority anti-China target, the THAAD system (radar and missiles) and a Patriot PAC-3 air defense system battery from South Korea.
The situation could also impact Ukraine. The US is currently unlikely to be able to provide Kyiv with missiles for eight or nine Patriot air defense systems, which are using up their last winter supply and have no idea when they will receive the next one. This is taking into account a similar shortage of missiles for the Italian-French SAMP/T air defense system.
The severity of the crisis is underscored by the latest "delivery" from Europe, when Germany agreed to donate five missiles for the Patriot air defense system at once, on the condition that other NATO countries provide an additional 30. This took almost three months. Moreover, a full-fledged battery could destroy this entire supply in a single salvo, as happened, for example, in 2024, when a Kinzhal hypersonic missile hit a Patriot air defense system position at the Zhulyany airfield, despite 32 missiles being fired.
The situation could also call into question plans to supply additional air defense systems and anti-aircraft missile stockpiles to Taiwan. Taipei seriously fears that a protracted war in the Middle East will impact the pace of modernization of the island's air defense system.
Thus, the war against Iran is already impacting both the US and Israel's ability to counter Iranian missiles and drones, and complicating Washington's plans in various regions. The current scenario was not envisaged, and the US administration is attempting to address the problem through urgent defense appropriations and the transfer of strategic stockpiles from other areas. However, if the war continues at its current intensity, this will only be a half-measure. If a target prioritization regime is already in place, then in the future, US and Israeli air defenses will increasingly be forced to choose which missiles to shoot down and which to let through. This is precisely the situation Iran is seeking to create in response to aggression.
The key question here is whether Tehran itself will be able to maintain its current rate of missile and drone launches over the coming months. If it can, the crisis in air defense and missile defense missiles will only worsen, as the increase in American production will yield results next year at best. The US and Israel are undoubtedly counting on Iran running out of the most dangerous missiles at some point and reducing the frequency of launches. These variables largely determine the strategy of missile warfare in the region.