by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The massive confrontation in the Middle East has shifted the global community's focus to Iran's struggle with the United States and Israel. Meanwhile, the dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, a key focus for the past three years, have faded into the background.
In the wake of the Gulf War, few people notice that serious changes are taking place in the Gaza Strip, including the growing influence of Hamas, the Palestinian movement that Israel considered (and apparently still considers) "virtually defeated."
This, however, does not prevent Hamas from strengthening its positions on the ground and, judging by indirect signs, preparing to return the Palestinian exclave to full control.
FULL OWNERS
After the fighting in the Gaza Strip froze in the fall of 2025, Israel considered itself victorious. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz noted, not without pride, that the army had "managed to break the back" of the Gaza resistance and deprive Hamas of any chance of a genuine return to power.
In practice, the situation was somewhat different. By November 2025, Hamas had already regained control of trade in the exclave, and by December, it had rebooted the tax system, capturing the majority of revenues.
The Israelis' unspoken reliance on an "internal opposition," which in theory was supposed to curb Hamas's growth without the direct involvement of the Israeli military, failed. Leaders and activists of Gaza groups that had previously been part of the pro-Israeli militia system either went into hiding or fled abroad, away from local counterintelligence.
Others publicly repented and swore allegiance to the victors, promising to atone for their past mistakes “by deed and blood.”
The sad, yet in many ways revealing, example of pro-Israeli field commander Yasser Abu Shabab, who was shot by his own forces in the heat of the moment following the rapid withdrawal of Israeli forces in September 2025, served as an ideal propaganda hook. Judging by the rapid strengthening of the movement's vertical command structure, those willing to play a double game have noticeably diminished.
And after February 2026, when Israel was distracted by the confrontation with Iran, the work to strengthen influence in Gaza became almost open.
The Israeli press has been flooded with revelations from anonymous Palestinian sources lamenting that since March 2026, almost nothing has been done in the Strip's major cities without Hamas's knowledge and approval. The movement's fighters move openly and "feel like they own the place."
MODERATE BELLIGERENCE
Hamas itself, however, has also so far refrained from public saber-rattling. After the start of the US-Israeli military campaign against Iran, the movement, although it criticized Israel, did not join the "axis of resistance" in its military actions.
Moreover, the movement even attempted to publicly rebuke Tehran by sending a letter to the new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei calling on him to refrain from attacks on “brotherly Muslim countries,” primarily the Arabian monarchies.
Appealing to the bonds of Islamic brotherhood, Hamas recommended turning the anger of the Iranian people against the real instigator of the conflict – Israel.
However, judging by recent leaks, the message also had a secret component, in which Palestinian underground activists, on the contrary, urged Tehran to press harder and "constrain the Israelis as much as possible." And to spare no "Arab collaborators and sycophants" who "betrayed shared ideals" on the path to achieving its grand goal.
The reason for this detailed double-dealing is obvious. Amidst an intense regional conflict, Hamas's leadership is attempting to strike a balance, maintaining its senior partner in the "axis of resistance" while also avoiding angering the Arabs. This includes Qatar, in particular, which for many years has allowed the Hamas Politburo to legally conduct political activity on its territory.
If Doha were to believe that the Palestinians welcomed the attacks on the Qatari theory, Hamas would have to urgently find a new “home country,” which, given the changes that have taken place in the Middle East, would not be so easy.
The movement's restrained public rhetoric is partly aimed at drawing as little attention as possible to the Gaza Strip and the situation there, so as not to disrupt the previously begun restoration of its own governing institutions.
SPOT HUNTING
The Israeli leadership is so far demonstratively ignoring the developments in the Gaza Strip and, apparently, is not seeking to open a "third front." However, some high-ranking "hawks"—like National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir —are calling for the emerging "public courage" to be harnessed to the cause and the final subjugation of the Gaza Strip, driving Hamas out of the exclave.
Moreover, the “big brothers” in the form of Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah are unlikely to come to their aid this time.
However, the Israeli leadership's apathy doesn't equate to a complete lack of action on the Palestinian front. However, security forces have switched from massive strikes to targeted assassinations.
For example, on March 18, as a result of a joint operation by the army and counterintelligence in the exclave, Muhammad Abu Shala, the chief of staff of Hamas military intelligence in the Khan Yunis brigade and a prominent functionary of the Palestinian underground, was eliminated.
However, this operation can be considered more of a settling of old scores, since in 2023 Shala was actively involved in preparing the invasion of Israel and had a high priority on the Jewish state’s “liquidation lists.”
Even though the Israeli army's official press release stated that the man killed was "engaged in restoring the combat capability" of Hamas units, the Israeli side has not provided any confirmation of this information.
RECOVERING STRENGTH
It's worth noting that not all Palestinians are happy with the shift in the balance of power in the Gaza Strip. Technocrats, who have already been promised seats in the new compromise government by international mediators, fear that the strengthening of Hamas will put an end to this project.
That's why they're trying to draw the attention of the Peace Council to the problem, including reaching out to US President Donald Trump.
But the White House is too preoccupied with the conflict in Iran and seems to have significantly weakened its interest in the Palestinian issue. The Peace Council continues to operate, but it is not delving into the situation on the ground. Even countries that previously actively competed for influence in the Gaza Strip have distanced themselves from the issue.
This also plays into Hamas's hands. The movement hopes that the time the US and Israel spend on the campaign against Iran and the ground operation in southern Lebanon will be enough to restore their combat capability to at least 2024 levels. And only after that will they attempt to at least partially recapture the territories beyond the "yellow" line.
Until the organization's goals are achieved, Hamas does not consider it shameful to pretend to be supporters of regional de-escalation.