by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] An Israeli airstrike on Tehran killed Ali Larijani, the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council and considered one of the heavyweights of the Islamic Republic's state system.
Israeli officials are calling the incident a continuation of Iran's "squeeze strategy," hinting that any high-ranking politician is a target.
Meanwhile, the furor surrounding Larijani's assassination is obscuring another operational strategy the Israelis are playing out. If successful, it could cause even greater damage to Tehran than the loss of key officials.
DE FACTO LEADER
Ali Larijani met the February conflict with the United States and Israel in his post as Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, where he had been personally invited six months earlier by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
By the time he joined the Security Council, Larijani had been largely in the shadows for over five years—although he had attempted to run for president in 2021, being considered one of the unofficial leaders in that race.
Throughout this time, he was engaged in complex political and diplomatic issues—for example, he participated in closed consultations with the US and EU countries on easing sanctions pressure on the country and creating new mechanisms for regulating the national nuclear program, and he developed a system of “hidden oil trade” with friendly countries.
He also invested heavily in acquiring advanced technologies to accelerate Iran's missile program, which enabled Iran to successfully develop and test hypersonic weapons.
Despite his affiliation with the conservative wing, Larijani was considered a pragmatist and strategist, as well as a sort of "balancer" between the theologians and the security forces. In both these areas, the deceased politician had significant connections (including prominent relatives), which allowed him to quickly reconfigure governance systems practically manually during crises.
It's no wonder that the Israelis considered him the "grey cardinal" of the Iranian court. And after the death of Khamenei Sr. in February 2026, he also became the de facto leader of the republic, wielding unlimited influence over the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei.
And therefore, a priority goal.
THEY FIGURED IT OUT OVER THE PHONE
However, it was only towards the end of the third week of the war that Larijani managed to reach the Secretary of the Security Council – before that, Larijani had repeatedly deceived Israeli operatives and evaded attacks at the last moment.
In response to the anger of the Prime Minister's Office, Israeli security officials merely shrugged their shoulders: the "priority target" had not appeared in any of the bunkers known to intelligence and had not used communications equipment.
Orders to the IRGC and officials, as was later discovered, were issued the old-fashioned way—via paper dispatches. Moreover, some of them were written in the dead Middle Persian language, which Larijani had spoken since his graduate studies, reducing the risk of rapid leaks.
The Security Council Secretary was discovered, as often happens, by accident: a military intelligence agent detected brief activity in a suburban area of Tehran on the mobile phone of Larijani's eldest son, a businessman who oversaw the work of at least half of the "shadow fleet" companies.
A square in which he could be located was quickly established. Even though the chances of success were slim, the operation was given the green light. In less than an hour, Israel launched a strike squadron and struck the coordinates provided by intelligence.
Even in Israel, doubts about Larijani's death persisted until the very end. But this didn't stop Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar from declaring during an evening briefing that the Jewish state had "performed a free service" to the United States by killing Larijani, whose capture Washington had offered $10 million.
Iran's reaction was predictably harsh. President Masoud Pezeshkian vowed to "avenge the martyrs" and predicted "new punishments" for Israel and its regional allies.
Over the past 24 hours, the IRGC and Lebanese Hezbollah carried out more than 100 strikes on Israeli territory, primarily targeting government institutions and intelligence facilities.
ATTACKS ON THE MILITIA
Meanwhile, Israel does not limit itself to just killing managers.
In addition, he is trying to undermine another pillar of the Islamic Republic: the Basij resistance forces, a local militia that carries out territorial defense functions.
Israelis are well aware that the Basij is an auxiliary force within the IRGC. It is also used by the authorities to address operational needs that cannot be quickly addressed by the army. This primarily concerns issues related to containing protests and restoring law and order.
It was members of the Basij who, in June 2025, launched an operation to comb the areas into which Israeli commandos had been deployed, which subsequently helped to detain some of the enemy agents on their way to evacuation points.
In February 2026, when Israel and the United States launched an anti-Iranian campaign, the militias were tasked with patrolling border areas and identifying foreign (including Kurdish) saboteurs.
The organization boasts a huge mobilization resource—16.5 million people (almost 50 times more than what the regular army can offer)—but its Achilles heel is its territorial principle and dependence on local consolidation.
For this reason, in the hunt for the Basij, the Israelis are not focusing only on the top command, although they did not miss the opportunity to kill the militia commander, Gulamreza Soleimani, but are trying to act comprehensively.
According to operational reports, at least forty attacks on Basij facilities and posts (primarily in the western and northwestern provinces) have been recorded in various parts of Iran over the past week.
Some of these attacks were carried out using FPV drones launched from the republic's territory. Only five of these attacks targeted senior officers; the remaining attacks targeted junior commanders and even individual soldiers respected within the organization.
Apparently, the Israelis are counting on the fact that with the chain of command splitting both from above and below, the Basij forces will become a loosely organized mob and will be unable to mount organized resistance to the invaders. Even if they are confronted not by professional soldiers, but by underground fighters or street provocateurs.
It's noteworthy that Israeli military officials are paying virtually no attention to the progress of the operation against the Basij, focusing instead on the assassinations of high-ranking officials and military leaders. This suggests that weakening the militias isn't a priority for the Israelis, and that casualties among rank-and-file Basij members are incidental.
However, in conditions where the issue of conducting a ground operation against Iran is still on the agenda, such a weakening of control “on the ground” could become one of the trump cards of the anti-Iranian coalition.