by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] By March 15, 2026, the war between the US-Israel coalition and the Islamic Republic of Iran was no longer a regional conflict – it had hit the pockets of consumers around the world in full force.
And so they should, after benefitting from lower oil prices because Iran was selling discounted oil, and both oil and money are fungible.Economists at the UN and the International Energy Agency are sounding the alarm: the world is facing the largest disruption in crude oil supplies since the oil market began in 1973. The blockage of the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted supplies of nearly 15% of the world's oil, halting half of production and refining in the key Persian Gulf region.
| America will be fine — we can just pump more. And we can sell more to our friends, too. Then there’s Venezuela. You’re welcome. |
By the end of the second week of the war, oil prices had consolidated above $103 per barrel—an increase of more than 40% since February 28 and the highest closing level in four years. Gasoline prices in the US rose 20% in the first 11 days of the conflict, comparable to the 2022 crisis.
Jet fuel prices have skyrocketed two and a half times in Europe and three times in Singapore. Economy class flights from Sydney to London have nearly doubled, and from Singapore to London, they've tripled.
But the main blow is yet to come. The UN is warning of a food crisis: a third of the world's fertilizer supplies were shipped through conflict zones, and the poorest countries—Sudan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and Pakistan—are under attack.
Washington's temporary easing of sanctions against Russian oil has freed up around 100 million barrels—but that's only 0.6% of global exports, and it's only likely to calm the market for a few days.
The only real way to stop the price storm is to end the fighting. But by mid-March, the prospects for peace look bleaker than ever. This is the price for the mistakes made by the United States, which was drawn into this war by Israel.
Although the original plan for the campaign was conceived as something completely different, “lightning-fast and decapitating,” which would have been followed by a rapid collapse of Iran’s current system of power.
THE BIRTH OF A TOUGHER IRAN
The death of 86-year-old Ali Khamenei on the very first day of the conflict was widely believed to be the beginning of the end for the Islamic Republic. The system, which had been sustained for decades by the authority of one man, was expected to collapse under the weight of internal contradictions as soon as the Rahbar left the scene.
However, two weeks later, the reality turned out to be completely different for both Washington and Tel Aviv.
And now the White House is frantically trying to find a new solution, whether military or peaceful.
| Sure it will. People said the same thing after the Twelve Day War, and yet here we are. |
| The Russian said “quagmire” after two weeks — who is going to explain it to him? |
Ali Khamenei's death was undoubtedly a devastating blow, but the succession mechanism was activated in an emergency. According to the Iranian constitution, powers were quickly transferred to a three-member interim leadership council: President Masoud Pezeshkian, head of the judiciary Gholam Hossein Mohseni-Ejei, and cleric Alireza Arafi, appointed by the Guardian Council.
A key event was the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei, the son of the deceased Rahbar, as the new Supreme Leader. Initial reports of his death were later denied, although reports of his injury were confirmed.
This step strengthened the continuity and dispelled any illusions Iran's enemies had about an impending power struggle. Power centers across the Islamic Republic—political factions, security institutions, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and religious authorities—quickly pledged allegiance to him. In the face of war, the elites chose consolidation and unity over ambition.
The appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei, who, unlike his father, did not have the formal religious status of Grand Ayatollah, but had extensive experience in coordinating security forces (in particular, suppressing rebellions by coordinating the work of the Basij structures), signals an important transformation: power is finally shifting towards “securitization.”
As experts note, even before Khamenei's death, a shift in the center of real power toward the IRGC was evident. The new leader is a protégé of this very "hawkish" wing of the security forces, which only promises a tougher line.
Despite severe blows to military, oil, and government infrastructure, fuel shortages, rising prices, and logistical disruptions, the state remained governable. The authorities activated pre-developed military contingency plans.
External pressure, as often happens in history, acted as a catalyst for national mobilization. Patriotism and institutional loyalty consolidate support for the state, even among many Iranians critical of the government but uniting in the face of external aggression. The long-term prospects of this trend should be of even greater concern in the West.
Constant military pressure and economic decline could push the Islamic Republic toward further securitization, strengthening its religious foundations, increasing its reliance on the IRGC, and tightening its political system. The death of Ali Khamenei proved not to be a harbinger of collapse, but a transition to the next, more severe stage.
ARITHMETIC OF RESOURCES
After two weeks of conflict, the current phase is increasingly being described as a war of attrition, where the focus is less on operational successes than on ammunition reserves and the ability of the parties to maintain the current pace of combat.
According to the Financial Times, even before the strikes began, Israeli intelligence assumed that the US was capable of conducting an intensive air campaign against Iran for no more than four to five days, or about a week at reduced intensity – even taking into account the arrival of the aircraft carrier Gerald R. Ford.
| Whoever said that clearly didn’t know what they were talking about or, possibly, it was a deliberate lie to fool the Mullahs into thinking they only had to survive for a few days. It’s clear that Bibi and The Donald have repeatedly worked very carefully to shape false expectations to make each coming blow even more devastating. |
| Indeed. First military targets, then governing and manufacturing targets, and now soldiers and Basij are walking away from their posts, while missile launchers and missile factories are toast. Iranian salvos are down by 90%, while the pace of Israeli and American manufacturing has increased. The quagmire is not trapping Israel and America… |
However, according to leaks from the Pentagon, the military's assessments were much more conservative: they were talking about operational reserves for one to two weeks of active operations, after which the question of transferring arsenals from other regions would inevitably arise.
| What if those leaks were deliberate? |
However, this horizon is more of a declarative nature and has not been technically confirmed: military experts agree that the bottleneck is precisely the high-tech air defense systems and interceptor missiles, and not the mass-produced ammunition for strike aircraft.
A comparison of these data suggests that, if the current intensity of military operations continues, US stockpiles could last another 7-10 days. This timeframe is derived from a combination of initial estimates: Israeli intelligence forecasts (4-5 days of intensive strikes) have long since passed, Pentagon leaks estimated the operational reserve at 1-2 weeks, and Trump's policy framework of 4-5 weeks presupposes the activation of global reserves, which has already begun but will take time.
There are also numerous indications that the US has already been forced to reduce the intensity of attacks to conserve resources. Therefore, the next week and a half will be a critical point.
Once this resource is exhausted, Washington will face a stark dilemma: either exit the conflict with minimal political costs, or move on to a new round of escalation—to an even higher and riskier level of intensity, which will require the use of strategic arsenals, a transition to a ground phase, and could lead to unpredictable consequences.
Forecasts for Israel are tightly tied to US support. Several experts in the English-language press point out that Israel is theoretically capable of waging a high-intensity war against Iran for four to eight weeks before the need to replenish its precision-guided munitions becomes urgent.
If we count from February 28, then by March 15, under an optimistic scenario, Israel is only at the beginning of this corridor and can continue the campaign until the end of April without critical depletion of its arsenals.
But if we take the lower limit of 4 weeks as a basis, then we get roughly the same timeframe as the US – about two more weeks of attacks, after which a pause should inevitably follow.
However, as experts emphasize, Israel is waging war on more than one front: operations in the Gaza Strip continue, and most importantly, a war is flaring up in the north with the participation of Hezbollah.
| I realize I’m not qualified to judge, but that looks more like a forlorn hope to me. |
Under these conditions, Israel's autonomous resource of 4-8 weeks is only feasible in practice if the US continues to provide a strategic umbrella (air defense, reconnaissance, refueling, logistics) and help with replenishing the most scarce types of missiles and aerial bombs.
EASTERN BASES AND THE "30 MISSILES A DAY" TACTIC
If in the first week of the war analysts predicted the rapid depletion of Iran's missile potential, now the picture has become more complex.
Yes, the intensity of the strikes did decrease—from 350 missiles on the first day to approximately 30 launches per day by the middle of the first week of the conflict. However, this decline was not a collapse, but rather a plateau, which Iran continues to maintain, rationing its missile consumption to approximately 30 launches per day.
Moreover, on March 13, Iran launched its most powerful attack in recent days, using the same 30 missiles, but a super-heavy version with a warhead weighing over one ton. IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Majid Mousavi stated that this operation "disrupted and destroyed important Israeli air surveillance systems," and now another swath of the sky is under Tehran's control.
We are talking about the latest solid-fuel Heybarshakan missiles, which Iran, apparently, was saving for decisive strikes.
The key factor allowing Iran to play the long game is maintaining its military capabilities at its eastern bases, far from the main coalition strikes. Experts note that Tehran has adopted a strategy of "asymmetric endurance," relying on dispersed underground missile bases and inexpensive drone swarms capable of wearing down allied air defense systems for months.
We're talking about so-called "missile cities"—massive networks of tunnels 30 to 80 meters underground, stretching for tens of kilometers, where ballistic missiles are stored and prepared for launch. According to authorities, such bases exist in all 31 provinces of the country.
Iran has changed its tactics: instead of massive salvos, it now launches smaller numbers of missiles with greater destructive power. The goal is to exhaust the enemy's air defenses.
| Is it working? Because what I’m seeing is Israelis having parties and worship services and weddings in the bomb shelters, while overhead the defenses are defending. |
Given the US's manufacturing capabilities, the Americans would run out of missiles and interceptors sooner than Iran would run out of hypersonic ballistic missiles. This would give Tehran the potential to inflict significant damage in the final stages of a military conflict.
Meanwhile, US Central Command has already requested additional intelligence officers from the Pentagon to support operations against Iran for at least 100 days—possibly even until September. This rush underscores that Trump's team failed to foresee the war's far-reaching consequences.
After two weeks of operations, the US and Israel still maintain military superiority, but logistical and economic constraints are becoming increasingly apparent. If Iran manages to endure the coming weeks without exhausting its missile potential and maintaining control, the initiative could begin to shift.
THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY SLAMMED SHUT
Amid mounting logistical challenges, the diplomatic dimension of the conflict is becoming increasingly apparent. In recent days, Donald Trump has been actively seeking an exit from the protracted war.
However, if Trump had hoped to find a path to negotiations, those hopes were met with harsh reality. Iran, having weathered the shock of the first few days and consolidated around its new leadership, has radically changed the tone of its rhetoric.
On March 10, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, in an interview with PBS, effectively closed the door to any diplomatic contact with Washington.
"I don't think the issue of further contacts or negotiations with the Americans will be under consideration, because we have had a very bitter experience communicating with the Americans," the head of the Iranian Foreign Ministry stated, making it clear that the previous format of interaction has been exhausted once and for all.
Moreover, according to diplomatic sources, Iran is not only refusing to negotiate, but is also putting forward preconditions that are clearly unacceptable to Washington.
We are talking about the demands voiced by Abbas Araghchi: the withdrawal of all American military bases from Iraq and the Persian Gulf region, as well as compensation for damage to Iranian infrastructure as a result of the bombings.
| An amusing thought altogether… |
| A hudna. Of course. Iran has been waging the war for 47 years, after all. |
| That’s certainly one calculation. |
| That’s ok. We are not suckers like President Barack Obama's team |
In these circumstances, the position of the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf, which find themselves at the epicenter of the storm, plays a special role.
Since the first days of the war, Iran has been striking civilian targets and infrastructure in all Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait. However, the Gulf monarchies, which possess powerful militaries and modern air defense systems, have focused on defense and damage control rather than retaliation.
The official position, recorded at an emergency meeting of the GCC Council of Ministers on March 1, condemns the Iranian attacks and reaffirms the right to self-defense, but leaves this right hypothetical.
Moreover, in a joint communiqué with the European Union, the Gulf countries explicitly stated that they would not allow their territory to be used for attacks on Iran, while the Omani representative directly accused the US and Israel of thwarting successful diplomatic efforts and of "immoral" actions to start a war.
The GCC countries want a swift end to the war with minimal destruction and a return to the status quo. Israel, on the other hand, is interested in a protracted conflict, chaos, and the fundamental weakening of Iran, even at the cost of destabilizing the region.
For the Gulf monarchies, a "simmering conflict" is catastrophic: their diversified economies, oriented toward tourism and investment, will collapse. For Israel, which shares no border with Iran, this scenario is optimal and strategic, allowing it to regularly "mow the grass" deep within its adversary's territory.
The irony is that in 2003, the Gulf states opposed the invasion of Iraq, fearing that Iran would exploit the chaos. Now they fear that Israel will exploit the chaos in Iran.
The main paradox for Gulf elites is that the overthrow of the Islamic Republic will not bring peace. It will remove the last major constraint on Israel's own revisionist policies. As a result, the Arab monarchies will find themselves squeezed between three unstable states (Yemen, Iraq, and a shattered Iran) and a strengthened Israel striving for regional hegemony.
That's why their strategy is to wait and defend, rather than attack. The example of Oman is particularly illustrative in this context. The Sultanate, which has no permanent foreign military bases on its territory, demonstrates a different security model.
Oman has traditionally remained outside the military confrontation with Iran, maintaining strong diplomatic and economic ties and successfully playing the role of a regional mediator.
Remarkably, even three drone attacks on its territory (their origin remains unconfirmed) were described as "accidental" and did not lead to escalation or the country's involvement in the conflict. This incident confirms that the absence of foreign bases reduces the risk of being drawn into foreign wars, while their presence, on the contrary, creates risks.
And this approach is now being openly discussed in the region. For example, Qatari intellectual Abdullah Alamadi directly points out that the current circumstances provide the Council with a unique opportunity to reconsider its military presence with Western powers.
Particular attention should be paid to the fact that the current domestic political situation in the United States demonstrates a steady trend toward a policy of self-isolation and curtailment of its global presence.
This tectonic shift should prompt Gulf states to invest in working with influential groups within the United States that advocate for the withdrawal of American troops from abroad. A logical outcome of such efforts should be the inclusion of the Gulf region among the territories these forces are demanding be freed from foreign military presence.
The current situation could present a unique, unrepeatable opportunity for the Cooperation Council countries. This is an opportunity not only to shed the burden of foreign bases but also to begin fully developing their own independent regional military system, capable of adequately responding to real challenges and threats.
Oman's experience over the past decades shows that abandoning the deployment of permanent foreign contingents is not only possible, but also allows for a more flexible and secure foreign policy.
"We are being deliberately pushed into an absurd and bloody war with Iran," Alamadi concludes, expressing the sentiments of a significant portion of the intellectual elite. "Most thinkers and intellectuals in the region agree that today our common task—both governments and peoples—is to leave the Americans and Israelis no room to maneuver."
We must avoid being drawn into this conflict at all costs. By entering into a senseless war with Iran, we would essentially be throwing Trump a lifeline. He is currently caught in a complex political trap, driven into it by Benjamin Netanyahu. Once we find ourselves in the epicenter of hostilities, both Trump and Netanyahu will have the opportunity to escape unscathed, citing our involvement as a cover."
At the same time, Iran also has a significant trump card, which helps prevent Saudi Arabia and the UAE from becoming involved in the conflict and deters them from taking rash steps. If Riyadh or the UAE directly joins military attacks on Iran, this will automatically activate the Yemeni front.
The Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement, which has demonstrated its ability to inflict painful blows deep into Saudi territory over the years of conflict, would in this case immediately enter the war on Iran's side.
For Riyadh, which has been unsuccessfully trying to emerge from Yemen's protracted conflict, the prospect of its resumption with renewed vigor is one of the most frightening scenarios.
STRAIT OF HORMUZ: FROM BLOCKADE TO BATTLE FOR THE ISLANDS?
The main question facing military experts today is what reaction to expect from Donald Trump going forward. Failure to reach a face-saving peace agreement with Iran could prompt the White House to reconsider the campaign format, including launching a ground operation.
The trigger for its implementation could be the need for Washington to “respond” to the actual closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
The strait's blockade has become the main paradox of this conflict. The more active measures are taken to neutralize the blockade's consequences, the more the operation transforms from a limited military strike into a large-scale, long-term campaign.
Against this backdrop, Trump's rhetoric appears contradictory. On the one hand, he claims complete military victory over Iran. On the other, on March 14, he wrote on the social media platform TruthSocial that it was up to other countries that receive oil through this route to unblock the Strait of Hormuz, and that the US would merely coordinate these efforts.
This framing of the issue—"let others unblock"—seems like an attempt to distance oneself from the escalation, but it contradicts the logic of the Pentagon's already begun redeployment of forces, and is more likely aimed at trying to draw at least the UAE into this war.
Data from the field and the nature of the American force deployment strongly suggest a scenario for a large-scale amphibious operation. The Pentagon has already decided to deploy up to 5,000 soldiers and marines from the 31st Expeditionary Force from Japan to the shores of Iran. This is an amphibious assault force designed for large-scale landings.
The journey to the Middle East takes up to two weeks, and this timeframe brings us to the end of March – a possible window for decisive action, after a reboot of the military campaign will be required if it cannot be stopped after the exhaustion of the resources concentrated in the Middle East.
The keys to the Strait of Hormuz are the islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, which Iran has held since 1971, and their legal status has always been a subject of dispute with the UAE.
Today, these islands have become "unsinkable aircraft carriers": Abu Musa houses missile batteries, drone runways, and bases for high-speed mine-laying boats, which block the strait. It is from these islands that the IRGC controls the narrow shipping lanes, squeezing them like pincers.
If the US, with the support of the UAE, decides to establish control over these islands, the strategic goal of the operation will be revealed in a completely different way: it will no longer be “punishing Iran for its nuclear program,” but an attempt to permanently wrest from Tehran the instrument of pressure on world prices.
But these three islands are not enough to completely control the strait. The Iranian islands are located in the immediate vicinity, allowing for complete closure of all shipping lanes and raids on the Iranian coast.
First and foremost, there's the large island of Qeshm, which is the key to the strait; there's Larak Island, which could be turned into a veritable fortress with electronic countermeasure systems and anti-ship missile launchers; there's Hormuz Island, which provides control over the strait's narrowest point; and there's Hengam Island, located south of Qeshm—all of these form Iran's unified defensive line.
Qeshm, the largest island in the strait, deserves special attention. The US strike on a desalination plant there on March 8, which left 30 villages without water, appears to be a deliberate, rather than a coincidence.
Qeshm isn't just a territory; it's a beachhead. If American forces can establish a foothold there, they'll be able to control not only shipping but also overlook the entire Iranian coastline.
The scenario could unfold as follows. The first stage is the capture of the islands of Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. This would allow for control of the northern channel and the deprivation of Iran of its forward bases.
The second stage is a landing on Larak Island to destroy missile systems and electronic warfare systems threatening the ships.
The third stage is the capture of Qeshm Island and the creation of a full-fledged military base on it.
And the fourth, most risky stage is an attempt to land from the islands on the Iranian coast, creating bridgeheads to consolidate complete control over the strait.
By capturing the islands and securing control of the strait, the United States will be able to guarantee the passage of all ships, turning Hormuz into an area of exclusive US responsibility. Essentially, this amounts to creating an American equivalent of Britain's Gibraltar—the rock that has controlled the entrance to the Mediterranean for three centuries.
US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has already outlined a condition for the commencement of ship escorts: complete control of the skies. But control of the skies is impossible without control of the land from which missile threats originate. Therefore, the logic of the US military machine will push the command to expand the operation.
This scenario explains why the US continues to expand its presence despite the obvious economic losses from the blockade. The White House is willing to pay a high price now to gain a strategic foothold for decades to come.
Iran understands this perfectly well. Therefore, Tehran's rhetoric that any attack on the islands will result in the deaths of American soldiers is not a threat, but a statement of inevitability. The battle for the islands will become a battle for the survival of the current regime in Iran, if, of course, Washington agrees to such a risky step.
REGIONAL RIFT: HEZBOLLAH AND KURDISH HESITATION
While the main events unfold around Iran, equally important trends are taking shape on the periphery of the conflict. Israel's northern front, which officials claimed should have been cleared of the Hezbollah threat months ago, continues to rage, and Lebanese missile launches into Israel are complementing Iranian ones.
It turns out that Hezbollah not only survived last year's attacks (including the death of its leadership and the episode with exploding pagers), but also retained its full capabilities.
Contrary to Israeli claims, the elite Radwan unit suffered no significant losses—the last time, the fighters merely carried out a tactical retreat. They are currently operating in small groups, striking Israeli units and northern settlements with anti-tank missiles, rocket systems, and mortars.
Their level of training is estimated to have improved even further. These groups conserve ammunition and fire accurately, taking advantage of Israel's lack of an effective tactical response to low-flying, high-speed anti-tank missiles with a range of eight kilometers. In just one day, Radwan units carried out 29 coordinated attacks—more than ever before.
Hezbollah currently maintains approximately 20,000 missiles and shells in its arsenal, as well as approximately 2,000 drones, the losses of which have been partially replenished with the help of Iran.
Command centers in the Dahieh area remain operational, and key leadership and operational structures remain functional. To evade Israeli signals intelligence, fighters abandoned digital communications, switching to a liaison system and analog methods, dramatically reducing their electronic footprint.
Moreover, Hezbollah is now synchronizing its rocket attacks with Iran's strikes, with the level of coordination between them higher than ever before.
On March 13, the movement's leader, Naim Qassem, officially declared his readiness for a "protracted confrontation." In a sense, the organization has become even stronger: it has adapted to the new Israeli military doctrine, and its defeat would require a large-scale and protracted ground operation. Throughout this time, northern Israel will remain under attack.
It's unlikely that Israeli intelligence was truly unaware of the true state of affairs. The world was confronted with the work of Netanyahu's disinformation networks, which vigorously promoted the narrative of Hezbollah's "victory" and "degradation," and the media eagerly embraced it.
In fact, the "decapitation" and "weakening" of the organization did not represent a strategic defeat for it - its network remained virtually intact, and its elite tactical units remained almost unharmed.
On the other side of the struggle—the Kurds—the situation was different. The US attempted to create a "second front" by exploiting Iran's Kurdish minority. In telephone conversations, Donald Trump offered Kurdish leaders "extensive air cover" and support in their quest to seize western Iran, urging them to decide on a side in the conflict. However, according to recent reports, Iraqi Kurdish parties have refused to send their forces to Iran.
Several journalists went to the border areas to document the moment of their transition to Iranian Kurdistan, but have already left the areas and returned home.
They had previously been told that the parties were preparing and were on high alert for an invasion "in a matter of days," but now the groups have retreated and decided not to deploy their fighters.
The political alliance of Kurdish parties, consisting of six groups (including the PJAK/PKK), was unable to reach a consensus on this issue. As a result, it did not approve the deployment of fighters to Iranian Kurdistan, and some film crews left the border area.
The alliance's decision to refrain from invading is driven by a combination of factors: Iran's continued military strength, its distrust of the United States and its willingness to see this war through to the end, its own relative weakness, and the fact that the Iranian army and IRGC maintain their positions in these areas despite the massive air campaign that has been deliberately waged against them over the past week.
This was made possible because the IRGC and the army abandoned their fixed locations and appear to be adapting to the new conditions by settling into new field positions.
The failure of the Kurdish scenario is further evidence that the bet on Iran's internal division has not paid off.