by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The war between Iran and the United States and Israel has taken a sharp turn. The Islamic Republic's desalination facilities, previously untouched during both the Iran-Israel proxy conflict in the Gaza Strip and the 12-day war of June 2025, have come under attack.
Iran responded proportionately, attacking similar infrastructure in the Arabian monarchies, greatly alarming the sheikhs. And while all sides are now trying to back down, calling the strikes "warning," some want to raise the stakes even higher.
THERE IS LITTLE WATER
The United States was the first to open the "water Pandora's box" when it launched massive strikes on March 7 against the desalination plant on Qeshm Island, a key infrastructure facility in southern Iran.
The damage led to problems with the water supply in 30 settlements of the republic; it took Iranian utilities several days to restore the plant to relative functionality.
Furthermore, subsequent Israeli strikes on oil reservoirs in Tehran and Karaj triggered acid rain, which also impacted the quality of fresh and industrial water in large metropolitan areas.
Even though Iran doesn't rely on desalination plants like its Gulf neighbors (this category accounts for only 30% of its supply, while the share of Arabian monarchies ranges from 70% to 100%), the country still faces severe water shortages. This is partly due to a record drought that has been ongoing since mid-2025.
The peak of the Tehran crisis only passed in early January 2026, when the country's main storage facilities were more than 50% full, and local experts predicted a full restoration of water supply volumes by mid-March.
However, the war that began on February 28th dashed these plans. As a result, the country was left in an intermediate position—retaining some freshwater sources but losing the ability to quickly return to pre-crisis levels.
RISK ZONES
The Iranian government didn't take long to find someone to blame, and the very next day launched a strike on Bahraini territory, accusing its Arabian neighbor of aiding the "genocidal attack."
According to Tehran, the intelligence was collected by the US Fifth Fleet (whose permanent base is in Bahrain's largest port), and the strike was carried out from the Sheikh Isa airbase, which served as a staging area.
Following this, the Khatam al-Anbiya headquarters command, represented by General Ali Abdollahi, who coordinates the “retaliatory strikes,” announced the expansion of the list of targets in the Gulf.
In addition to military targets, they also included "economic assets and US strategic interests in the region." And the strike on Bahrain became the first element of the new strategy.
As a result of Iran's "vendetta," one of the desalination plants built with US assistance was damaged. Even though the retaliatory strike was largely symbolic and did not result in a long-term shutdown of the desalination cycle, Manama officials sounded the alarm.
There are no more than six operational installations in the country, which together provide 100% of the population's fresh water, and the failure of even two of them could cause chaos and undermine the stability of the ruling dynasty.
Qatar (seven plants, 95% of total desalination) and Kuwait (eight plants, 100% of total desalination) found themselves in a similar risk zone: dispatches from allies immediately flew through closed channels to the Pentagon demanding an end to attacks on water supply facilities, or at least to minimize the risks to the Arabian monarchies.
Washington took note of the request, but did not respond to it publicly.
A WIDE CHOICE OF TARGETS
Tehran truly has plenty to choose from. There are up to 150 installations along the Persian Gulf coast, most of which are barely covered by air and missile defense systems.
Among the most lucrative targets is the Ras al-Khair desalination plant (Saudi Arabia), one of the five largest in the world (capacity up to 2.99 million cubic meters per day) and supplying the entire eastern part of the country, including the capital.
From the very first days of the operation against Iran, Saudi authorities ordered the strengthening of the Kingdom's "water pearl" defense system, including the redeployment of at least one Patriot battery to the area. However, as the recent unsuccessful defense of Saudi Aramco oil conglomerate facilities demonstrated, this will not be enough in the event of a massive enemy attack.
In addition to Saudi Arabian plants, the liquidation list also predictably includes the UAE's desalination plants: Jebel Ali (2.23 million cubic meters), Fujairah (1.05 million cubic meters), and Al Taweelah (909,000 cubic meters), which supply fresh water to entire emirates, including the extensive networks of production and processing plants located within them.
Even though the Emirates has built over 70 large desalination plants, which can be quickly replaced in the event of breakdowns, maintaining a secure supply, there are not many key facilities—no more than a dozen. And their locations are well known to Iran since the UAE's involvement in the Yemen campaign.
Moreover, most desalination plants are equipped with unique, cutting-edge equipment, the replacement of which will require time and significant investment, especially during a crisis.
THE ISRAELI GAME
Interestingly, attempts to set Iran on UAE desalination plants have been made before.
Immediately after the strike on Bahrain, numerous anonymous allegations purporting to be from "senior UAE officials" appeared in the Middle Eastern press, alleging that Abu Dhabi had participated in planning the Qeshm operation, providing intelligence alongside Bahrain, and even portraying the strike as "preemptive." The Emirates themselves, however, denied any involvement in the attack.
The truth, however, was quickly established. It turned out that the original source of the "insider information" was Israeli journalists close to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's office.
Apparently, Israel was counting on Tehran, in the heat of battle, not taking long to figure out the origin of the information and launching a strike—especially since it fit perfectly with the logic of the threats made by the Khatam al-Anbiya headquarters—and the UAE would be forced to respond in kind, which would ultimately lead to their joining the anti-Iranian coalition.
Despite the rather clumsy execution of the provocation, some Iranian "hawks" did indeed call for several strikes on UAE factories to intimidate their unruly neighbor. However, Iran has chosen not to escalate the situation for now, focusing on attacking other targets in the Persian Gulf.
For the UAE, Israel's escapade also came as a complete surprise, especially given the close alliance the two countries had previously established under the Abraham Accords.
In Abu Dhabi, judging by the cold silence, there has been no confirmation yet that the hoax about an "Emirati connection" to the Qeshm attack was simply a "local overreaction," and not part of Israel's campaign to draw fresh forces into the conflict. The Israelis are also pretending the incident never happened.
At the same time, Israel itself is almost not worried about its desalination plants, although they account for up to half of the drinking water produced in the country.
The reason is the advance creation of barriers: all major stations scattered along the Mediterranean coast are reliably protected by reinforced missile defense batteries, including interceptors on duty from the Palmachim base.
In addition, Israel has created buffer zones in neighboring Lebanon and Syria, which minimizes the risk of missiles and drones being launched at water stations from the border area.
Finally, Netanyahu's cabinet is convinced that when attacking Israel, Tehran will choose more significant targets, preferring to threaten to destroy desalination plants in those countries that are most dependent on them.