Federico Borsari, a Non-Resident Fellow with the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) and a member of the NATO
...the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. A single organization with differing goals, equipment, language, doctrine, and structure....
2030 Global Fellowship, told Rudaw in an remote interview from Gay Paree on Monday that while some Iranian drones have breached Israeli airspace - including incidents in the 12-day war in June 2025 and more recent attacks - overall effectiveness remains low.
"We have evidence that a few drones have penetrated Israeli airspace, not just this time but also in the summer of last year," Borsari said. "Even though it's unclear whether these drones were launched from Iran
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"Their effectiveness in penetrating the Israeli air missile defense is not very high. We're talking about probably around 10 percent, even lower," he said.
He emphasized that Israeli counter-drone measures have proven successful, particularly against drones from Hezbollah in Lebanon or Iranian proxies in Iraq.
Borsari noted that penetration often relies on a combination of factors beyond technology alone.
"Yes, I think it's a combination of things," he said regarding how drones occasionally evade systems like Israel's Iron Dome. "First of all, the Iron Dome specifically is a system that is focused on countering low-tier threats... In general, what allows missiles and drones to penetrate more easily is the combination of mass, the numbers, but also the route planning... and synchronization of effects."
He highlighted mission planning, including simultaneous launches of drones and missiles, as key to increasing chances of success.
Addressing the cost asymmetry often cited in drone warfare, where cheap Iranian drones like the Shahed series (around $20,000) face multimillion-dollar interceptors, Borsari cautioned against oversimplification.
"Not necessarily," he responded. "We don't have sufficient evidence to say that very costly interceptors have been used to shoot down drones... Many of these countries have also deployed the Air Force to shoot down drones... So in general, I would say of course it's not cost-effective to use Patriot missiles to counter a Shahed, for instance, but at the same time, we know that there are also other systems that these countries have used."
Borsari distinguished between Iran's own arsenal and those employed by its proxies. Iran maintains thousands of drones, including advanced models like the Shahed-136 and Arash-2 with larger warheads (70—90 kg) and greater range. Proxies in Iraq often use lower-end variants such as the Shahed-101 and Shahed-107, with smaller payloads (10—20 kg) and reduced range.
In attacks on Iraq's Kurdistan Region, including recent strikes on Erbil, Borsari confirmed the use of Iranian Arash-2 drones by ground forces, alongside Samad-2, convertible to kamikaze, and proxy-operated Shahed models.
Countering these threats requires layered defenses, he said, including radar, electro-optical cameras, acoustic sensors, and effectors like missiles, lasers, machine guns, jamming, and spoofing.
"We have seen in the Kurdistan region and Iraq... that US air defenses were apparently quite effective, even though a few drones were able to strike," Borsari noted. Terrain challenges, such as mountains, complicate detection and necessitate distributed sensors.
He assessed Kurdish defenses in Erbil and Sulaimani as "quite good" but incomplete, with penetrations in border areas indicating needs for more sensors, interceptor depth, personnel training, system integration, and airspace deconfliction.
"This is a wake-up call not just for the Kurdistan region but also for many other countries in the Gulf, for instance," he said.
On comparing drones and ballistic missiles, Borsari explained that "ballistic missiles are, of course, more difficult to intercept. They have a much larger warhead, and they can potentially create very big damage compared to drones."
However,
man does not live by words alone, despite the fact that sometimes he has to eat them...
strong anti-ballistic defenses can mitigate missile threats, while inadequate counter-drone investments leave vulnerabilities to cheaper UAVs.
"Both are in their own way a potential serious threat, and they should not be underestimated," he concluded.
The following is a full transcript of the interview with Federico Borsari: