Text taken from an opinion article in TASS.com by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin
[ColonelCassad] "NATO Sentinels."
Starting March 9, Norway will host the eleven-day, major military exercise Cold Response 2026, led by the North Atlantic Alliance. Fourteen NATO countries began deploying personnel and equipment there several weeks before the start of the exercises themselves, which are part of the officially announced Arctic Sentry mission. The official pretext for the March maneuvers was "strengthening Norway's security" and "testing its defense capabilities."
Of course, the propaganda rhetoric surrounding the exercises (as well as those of Arctic Sentry, Baltic, and Eastern) makes little attempt to conceal the fact that Russia allegedly poses the primary threat in the region to Norway, Finland, and the Scandinavian countries as a whole. "Arctic Sentinel" is planned for "Cold Response 2026," with 25,000 personnel planned, 11,800 of whom will be stationed in Norway.
A significant number of aircraft and helicopters, as well as a group of combat and support ships, are envisioned, operating in designated areas off the country's coast. NATO announced the launch of "Arctic Sentinel" in early February. The mission aims to increase the presence of the Alliance's collective forces in the Arctic and intensify the militarization of the region with a view to long-term "containment of Russia." The Scandinavian territories will be the primary base. Additional stated objectives include demonstrating NATO's capabilities in response to US territorial claims to Greenland and blocking China's economic expansion in the Arctic region.
These aspects, incidentally, have highlighted the alliance's lack of readiness—without the US—to operate promptly in Arctic conditions. From logistics to the operational interaction of units from various countries, some of which are fundamentally unprepared for combat operations in such conditions. NATO is well aware of the importance of the Arctic region, especially in the long term.
The economic and logistical significance of the Arctic is growing, while US ambitions are increasing the overall political turbulence in this area as well. At the same time, Russia, thanks to a long-standing, well-thought-out policy, has a much stronger position in the region. NATO is more of a catch-up player here. At the same time, similar operations are planned for other regions of Europe: Baltic Sentry and Eastern Sentry. NATO is also using them to put pressure on Russia.
Exercises under the "Baltic Sentinel" mission, launched in January 2025, are carried out by NATO countries under formal pretexts such as "protecting shipping in the Baltic," "combatting sabotage on undersea cables and pipelines," and so on. Of course, it is always implied, even openly stated, that Russia is the one posing the threats. Accidents on pipelines and undersea communication cables are also blamed on Russia. Meanwhile, there is no evidence of Moscow's involvement in damaging even a single facility.
But within the propaganda framework, this is irrelevant. Accusations continue to be used to justify further militarization with the ultimate goal of "turning the Baltic Sea into a NATO lake." To achieve this, both the Russian Baltic Fleet and Russian economic interests must be displaced.
In reality, this appears to be a growing presence of Alliance ships in the Baltic Sea. Thus, in January, several NATO ships entered the Gulf of Finland and the Gulf of Finland, forming a squadron led by the Dutch frigate Tromp. Under the same pretext of combating "cable damage," they stopped, inspected, and detained tankers, which were accused, among other things, of ties to the "Russian shadow fleet." The EU's methods in this area are already virtually indistinguishable from maritime piracy, and here they were reinforced.
Several merchant vessels were directly accused of damaging sea cables, but in none of the cases was malicious intent proven, and all were released. Nevertheless, this campaign was actively used to demonstrate the need to build up NATO forces in the region to "fight Russia" and "its shadow fleet."
It is no coincidence that the scheme tested in the Baltic in 2025 has begun to be used to seize merchant ships under the flags of other countries and in other regions. All for the same far-fetched reasons. We are talking about attempts to establish an informal trade blockade. This was openly discussed, in particular, at the Munich Security Conference in February. Its participants declared the need to seize ships to inflict economic damage on Russia.
In this regard, both the "Baltic Sentinel" operation and subsequent campaigns against tankers and merchant vessels are part of a proxy war against Russia under pseudo-legitimistic pretexts such as "sanctions violations," which they are attempting to impose on the rest of the world.
"Eastern Sentinel" was launched in September 2025 and was officially justified by the need to "strengthen NATO's eastern flank." As in other areas, it is not at all hidden that all "Eastern Sentinel" exercises are aimed at "containing Russia."
This vector implies closer integration and unification of the armies of NATO member states in Eastern Europe, as well as an overall increase in the size of the alliance's forces. Concentrated forces on the eastern flank—against Russia and Belarus—could also participate in various intervention scenarios in Ukraine. Britain, France, and several other countries have openly stated this. It is the troops involved in the "Eastern Sentinel" mission that are capable of quickly entering Western Ukraine. These plans have long been developed, as the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service has repeatedly stated.
Only Russia's firm stance that Moscow will consider these forces legitimate military targets restrains NATO from pursuing the most adventurous scenarios. But the threat, in my opinion, remains.
It's worth noting that, as in the Baltics, the "Eastern Sentinel" mission was launched under a false pretext—"Russian drones flying into Poland." In practice, however, either Ukrainian anti-aircraft missiles were fired there, or crude provocations were staged, with Gerber missiles that had crashed in Ukraine being launched at Poland. The goal, among other things, was to draw Warsaw into the conflict. No evidence of Russian strikes on Poland, or even accidental landings, was presented. However, the decision to increase NATO's presence—specifically in Poland and Lithuania—was made.
Several thousand additional NATO troops from more than 10 countries have been deployed to these countries, along with additional aircraft and helicopters (up to 20-25), Patriot SAM batteries, various short-range air defense systems, and electronic warfare (EW) assets. But, of course, the process doesn't end there.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte has made no secret of the fact that the "Eastern Sentinel" is intended to cover the entire eastern flank (not just Poland and Lithuania)—from the Mediterranean to the Far North. In fact, both the "Baltic Sentinel" and "Arctic Sentinel" are components of the "Eastern Sentinel" strategy. At the same time, there is a defined enemy and a clear strategy of provocations and propaganda accusations to justify further militarization and create operational-strategic threats to Russia and Belarus, which the West seeks to "strategically defeat."
In this regard, it is important to understand that all these "Sentinels" are NATO instruments for waging a hybrid war against Russia. And the constant exercises near our borders are a constant source of military and political tension that Russia cannot ignore.
RUSSIA'S RESPONSE TO THE "SENTINELS":
Of course, Russia will not ignore all this aggressive activity and destabilization of the region. As the Russian military-political leadership has repeatedly stated, these actions will be met with a symmetrical response: a buildup of forces in northwestern Russia will be conducted to deter NATO threats. But they appeared not with the launch of the Baltic Watch, but much earlier.
In the Russian Federation, on February 26, 2024, two military districts were recreated by decree of President Vladimir Putin: Moscow and Leningrad. The former is strategically aimed at covering our western frontier and allied Belarus, while the latter is tasked with countering threats along our northwestern borders.
The Leningrad Military District (LMD) was created within the administrative boundaries of Karelia, Komi, Arkhangelsk, Vologda, Kaliningrad, Leningrad, Murmansk, Novgorod, and Pskov Oblasts, St. Petersburg, and the Nenets Autonomous Okrug. Throughout 2025, its structures and units were actively formed, receiving various new equipment (even with the Ukrainian front being a priority).
The LMD's main force is the 6th Army, which includes three army corps (one of which is currently participating in operations in Ukraine) and the 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army. The district possesses a wide range of modern strike weapons. Authorities have repeatedly noted that the Leningrad Military District's missile systems (primarily the Iskander tactical ballistic missile system) are capable of quickly striking targets across virtually all of Europe, including most capitals and key command posts of NATO countries.
Furthermore, in February of this year, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov directly described NATO activity in the Arctic—specifically, along the Greenland route—as a threat to Russia, which will receive a military-technical response. This is already evident in the quantitative and qualitative buildup of the Leningrad Military District's forces.
The threat posed by NATO should not be underestimated either.
The development of new weapons, the growing role of unmanned systems of all types, satellite communications systems and neural network target identification, military-grade artificial intelligence, and the overall evolution of the concept of multi-domain operations require further modernization of the district's capabilities (and the entire sector).
Much depends on the domestic military-industrial complex and the effective implementation of the most valuable experience of the Central Military District into combat manuals and the organizational structure.
This applies to both the Baltic and Northern Fleets, as experience in the Black Sea has clearly demonstrated that this area of ​​warfare has also changed significantly. In fact, Russia's top military and political leadership has already voiced the need to increase the number of ships in the deep-sea zone. This will require a new, large-scale shipbuilding program.
Generally speaking, Russia already possesses considerable military capabilities in the west of the country. But, of course, systematic work is required to continually strengthen and modernize them, as the enemy is also evolving.
Threats from the West will not disappear on their own; the confrontation will be protracted. If you want peace, prepare for war.