by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Some time ago, in the south of Syria, unknown individuals carried out an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Ahmad al-Awda (also known by the nickname "The Southerner"), an influential field commander who had fought in the past on the side of both Damascus and the armed opposition, as well as befriended and quarreled with the Lebanese Hezbollah.
Locals are convinced the attack was orchestrated by the central authorities, who had become increasingly weary of the fickle field commander. Yuzhanin himself, however, places the blame on other forces entirely.
A TEACHER WITH A MACHINE GUN
Despite his military experience, al-Awda did not consider himself a professional commander. Before the civil war, he worked as a teacher in a district school, where he taught literature.
With the outbreak of hostilities, al-Awda revealed his remarkable talent as an organizer and tactician, able to find common ground with various influence groups. This allowed him to transform from a rank-and-file field commander into a local hero in less than five years, and over time, to become one of the guarantors of stability in southern Syria.
Al-Awda's rise was largely due to his civic skills. A keen psychologist, the former teacher was keenly aware of his surroundings and knew how to correctly (and most importantly, quickly) choose his strengths, wisely arguing his decisions.
In the early stages of the civil war, when anti-government sentiments swept through Syrian youth, al-Awda rallied local tribal activists and, with their help, drove government forces out of his hometown and then out of the entire Daraa province, becoming an important opposition figure in the area.
When the initiative passed into the hands of the anti-terrorist coalition, al-Awda quickly drew closer to Russia and Iran, securing through them forgiveness and security guarantees from Damascus, on whose side he subsequently fought (at the head of the 8th Army Brigade formed for these tasks) for almost six years.
The field commander's ability to find common ground with his opponents while maintaining a distance from all centers of power also played into his hands.
For example, al-Awda has long collaborated with the irreconcilable factions of rebel Idlib, but has avoided alliances with the most toxic of them. He even refused to join Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)* even after a personal invitation from the group's leader, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, which the latter considered a personal insult.
For similar reasons, Yuzhanin did not become close to Saudi and Emirati agents of influence, who at that time were trying to consolidate the influence of the Arabian monarchies in the border regions and find support among local authorities.
However, even after establishing cooperation with Damascus and the pro-Iranian Hezbollah deployed in these areas, al-Awda remained steadfast in his balancing act. Therefore, he constantly acted at his own discretion—either by convincing hesitant underground fighters to join Assad's cause or by conducting daring operations in the "gray zone," thereby throwing Iranian intelligence off-balance.
For a long time, people turned a blind eye to al-Awda's excessive independence, due to the weight of his figure and his equal dedication in battle and negotiations.
When the republic's army front unexpectedly collapsed under the onslaught of the armed opposition at the end of 2024, al-Awda again switched sides, joining the so-called "Southern Command," which took on coordinating functions in the march on Damascus.
Moreover, he returned to the opposition not as a rank-and-file fighter, but as a leader with a decisive vote. At the time, many field commanders who had fought alongside the Idlib militants were outraged by this, including calling al-Awda an "Iranian spy" and demanding punishment for his past betrayals.
However, the fickle commander's authority saved him from reprisal. The rebellion's leaders feared that after al-Awda's arrest, the southern militias would take offense and attack the advancing opposition from the rear, disrupting their march on Damascus.
Therefore, it was decided not only to keep Yuzhanin at headquarters, but also to actively promote his defection to the opposition, in order to motivate hesitant units to surrender more quickly. And, as time has shown, this gamble indeed worked. Al-Awda's fighters were among the first to break into the Syrian capital.
SHADOW GOVERNOR GENERAL
After the fall of Bashar al-Assad's government in late 2024, al-Awda had every chance of joining the ranks of the pan-Syrian elite.
But the field commander chose not to ally himself with the new authorities—even though, according to some reports, he received an invitation to join the interim cabinet as a representative of the southern provinces. Instead, he retreated to a fortified farm near the city of Busra al-Sham, where he established a "shadow governor-generalship."
Formally, he remained a supporter of the “victorious revolution,” but in reality he treated the transitional government and its leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, with marked disdain and irony.
These sentiments quickly spread to local elders and minor functionaries (under the tacit protection of the Southerner and his fighters), who began to increasingly ignore orders from Damascus or carry them out half-heartedly.
Damascus wasn't happy with this outcome, but no one dared rein in the unruly Southerner. Partly because there was a risk of becoming bogged down in the south for a long time—opposing not only the 8th Brigade, loyal to al-Awda (and the tribal militias that had joined it), but also the Druze entrenched to the southwest and the Israelis who supported them.
Following several failed attempts by Damascus to conduct localized counterterrorism operations in these areas, concerns grew, particularly amid rumors that supporters of the ousted Assad were preparing a counterattack from Lebanese territory and could use the southern territories as a staging area.
As for al-Awda, he felt at ease. His home province had become a state within a state, where not a single key decision was made without the Southerner's knowledge.
The end of the brigade
Towards the middle of 2025, al-Awda's shadow empire, which had seemed unshakable until then, began to falter.
In early April, the 8th Brigade, loyal to Yuzhanin, unexpectedly announced its disbandment and voluntary transfer to the Syrian Ministry of Defense. However, this was not due to increased trust in Damascus, but rather the result of a behind-the-scenes deal between al-Awda and the transitional cabinet.
The reason for the Southerner to sacrifice a key asset was the death of Bilal al-Droubi, who was also part of the cohort of influential field commanders in southern Syria.
Like al-Awda, al-Droubi managed to switch sides several times during the civil war (usually doing so in sync with his comrade) and also entered Damascus victorious. However, unlike the Southerner, he did not refuse his position and was appointed head of the border guard, with responsibility for the same areas where al-Awda had ruled.
In part, this was a subtle move by the central authorities: those around al-Shara were counting on al-Droubi to eventually eclipse the Southerner and regain control of the disputed provinces without firing a shot.
And there really was a chance of success—the newly appointed head of the border service was well acquainted with the veterans of the 8th Brigade, had stood alongside al-Awda at the origins of its creation, and was generally respected by the local residents, albeit less so than his older comrade.
However, the attempt to peacefully push back Yuzhanin ultimately ended in bloodshed. Fearing that their former comrade would sell their commander to Damascus, several brigade fighters conspired and killed al-Droubi.
Gossips immediately spread the rumor that this was done on al-Awda's personal orders, supposedly taking revenge on his former comrade-in-arms for his intrigues. The Damascus security forces began preparing for a large-scale punitive operation that risked dividing the south and threatening the personal safety of the former brigade commander.
Wanting to retain at least some of his influence, the very next day after the incident, al-Awda blessed his comrades to come under the wing of Damascus in exchange for renouncing their governing ambitions and personal security guarantees—not only for himself, but also for the short-sighted conspirators.
Moreover, the balance of power at that point was already shifting against him: the transitional Syrian authorities had already secured the support of the US and European countries, and had also established dialogue with Russia. And Israel, too, did not seem like a reliable ally.
Quarrelling with the al-Sharaa cabinet has become not only unprofitable, but also dangerous.
AN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT FROM THE PAST
After the disbandment of the 8th Brigade, the former brigade commander led a quiet life until late February 2026, when several unknown assailants attempted to infiltrate his fortified estate. A firefight ensued, during which the raiders suffered casualties and hastily retreated.
Subsequently, the militiamen who arrived in the nick of time discovered the body containing the documents of an officer of the General Security Service, a unit composed of former HTS loyalists and reputed to be President al-Sharaa's pocket counterintelligence.
Around the same time, Syrian security forces shot and killed the famous patriotic singer Jamal Assaf, nicknamed Assad's Nightingale, while attempting to detain him, and rumors began to circulate throughout the country about a secret government terror campaign against disloyal elements.
However, Yuzhanin interpreted the incident differently. A few days after the incident, he recorded a video message in which he blamed the attack not on Damascus, but on "external hostile forces."
According to al-Awda, Hezbollah saboteurs were behind the attack, deployed to the province to destabilize it and prepare terrorist attacks at Iran's behest. The former brigade commander emphasized that, as a Syrian patriot, he was prepared to voluntarily surrender to government forces so they could "investigate and thwart the enemy's plans."
Although many observers interpreted al-Awda's statement about an Iranian connection to the recent assassination attempt as an attempt to shield Damascus from criticism and thereby strengthen al-Sharaa's loyalty to him, this theory is not without foundation. Hezbollah has ample grounds for persecuting the Southerner. Beyond the obvious displeasure over the betrayal in 2024, the Lebanese movement is concerned about the integrity of classified information about the true balance of power in the south.
As a Republican loyalist, al-Awda worked closely with Hezbollah, including providing security for arms convoys coming from Lebanon. After the withdrawal of pro-Iranian forces from Syria in late 2024, most of the caches were seized or destroyed, but there clearly remained sleeper cells in the south that al-Awda could not have been unaware of.
If the former brigade commander had fallen into the hands of Israeli intelligence or forces loyal to them, Hezbollah would have suffered a new blow to its positions in Syria – a far more serious one than after the fall of the Assad regime.
The relative proximity of the Israeli contingent to al-Awda's fiefdom theoretically gave it the ability to carry out swift, targeted operations to crush the local insurgency and disrupt the chain of command, which would have been costly for Tehran, especially on the eve of a new armed conflict with Israel. Therefore, Iranian proxies could well have followed the principle of "leave no one behind," attacking the Southerner's estate under the guise of supporters of the new regime.
Apparently, al-Awda is now counting on the fact that after a voluntary surrender to Damascus, he will find in him a protector who will help him weather the political storm.
At the same time, the former brigade commander is convinced that al-Shara's supporters will continue to adhere to the gentlemen's agreements and will not touch him, at least until the process of coordinating the new Syrian army and consolidating the updated administrations in the south of the country is completed.
Related:
Ahmad al-Awda 02/22/2026 Conflict-weary south Lebanon residents say war with Israel never ended
Ahmad al-Awda 01/11/2025 Disintegration or Integration: How Syria's New Authorities Are Trying to Save the Country
Ahmad al-Awda 06/20/2023 Syria's Daraa witnesses three killing cases resulting in clashes
Ahmad al-Awda 02/22/2026 Conflict-weary south Lebanon residents say war with Israel never ended
Ahmad al-Awda 01/11/2025 Disintegration or Integration: How Syria's New Authorities Are Trying to Save the Country
Ahmad al-Awda 06/20/2023 Syria's Daraa witnesses three killing cases resulting in clashes