by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] The current US and Israeli aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) is the culmination of the US-Iran conflict, which, oddly enough, began even before the Islamic Revolution and is associated with the growth of regional influence of Iran, which is independent in its foreign policy.
Contradictions accumulated despite periods of thaw and even, it would seem, “following progress” and common interests in certain periods.
But in any case, the war was bound to happen while Iran was pursuing the policy it is pursuing, if not strengthening, then defending its position in the region and rejecting American dictates and pressure.
THE PAHLAVI ERA AND THE BEGINNING OF RIVALRY
Contrary to popular belief, the proclamation of the Islamic Republic in Iran in 1979, led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, was not a challenge or a surprise to Washington.
Moreover, the United States itself, in a sense, even contributed to the removal of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi from power instead of trying to support the Shah’s regime, which is listed as one of its strategic allies.
Around the mid-1970s, the Shah of Iran ceased to be a satisfactory ally for the United States due to his excessive ambitions and claims to regional leadership. It's unclear how events would have unfolded had the revolution not occurred, but in one possible future, the Shah's Iran would also have become a dangerous competitor and rival for the United States in the region.
Pahlavi sought to replace the United States and Britain as the security guarantor for the Gulf states and the Arab world, leading Tehran to make efforts to strengthen its position.
For example, in 1972, Iranian troops were sent to Oman, where they played a key role in suppressing a communist rebellion in Dhofar. In many other areas, the Shah also continued to enjoy increasing autonomy and independence from the United States.
In particular, it was during his time that the Iranian nuclear program was launched (and its military component, according to some sources, in conjunction with South Africa), which continued in the IRI when the Islamic Republic acquired the necessary resources for this.
The Shah did this without Washington's knowledge and went even further, declaring his readiness to "stand united against the American conspiracy" aimed at disrupting the unity of OPEC and its "blood ties with the Third World countries."
American media immediately accused Pahlavi of "premeditated and hasty" actions. Several high-ranking US administration officials openly expressed their dissatisfaction with him. A powerful anti-Shah campaign began, involving the intelligence services of several Arab and European countries, as well as Israel.
During the revolution, Jimmy Carter's administration attempted to work with both sides—Pahlavi and his opponents—in an effort to maintain its influence in the country regardless of who won. But some steps by the American authorities could be interpreted as outright sabotage.
In particular, in early January 1979, on Carter's orders, American General Robert Huyser arrived in Iran without the Shah's consent . He was to hold talks with the hawkish Iranian generals who intended to suppress the anti-monarchist protests and dissuade them from this plan through "persuasion and threats."
The general successfully completed his task, and the introduction of armed forces into Iranian cities to suppress unrest was stopped.
The Americans also directly intervened to prevent the generals from attempting to establish military rule in the country after the Shah left the country for Egypt.
Ultimately, the White House's hopes for establishing a weak government of "any color" in Iran were not realized, and the Islamic regime that came to power in Iran began to pursue a much more anti-American policy than Washington had expected.
But this does not change the fact that the US and the Islamic Republic had many common interests that compelled both sides to prevent excessive escalation until a certain point.
Of course, the seizure of American hostages in Tehran was a "cold shower" for the Americans, and their unsuccessful release was not only a stain of shame, but also a triumph for the new Iranian authorities, who demonstrated to the entire world their banner of struggle against American imperialism, under which numerous supporters throughout the Islamic world began to rise.
In turn, attacks by Shiite groups created by the Islamic Republic in Lebanon on American Marines, with numerous casualties, further strengthened Iran's position as the leader of the anti-American and anti-Zionist resistance.
At the same time, these actions not only did not lead to the start of an American-Iranian war, but did not even interrupt limited cooperation where the interests of Tehran and Washington converged.
FROM CONFRONTATION TO MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING
The Iran-Iraq War, which began in 1980, also benefited the United States. On the one hand, it weakened Iraq, which became bogged down in a protracted and futile war. During this period, Baghdad's military might began to pose a threat not only to Israel but also to the Gulf monarchies, but was now being ground down in battles with Iran.
On the other hand, the restoration of Iran's regional position after the revolution and the Iranian leadership's announced plans for its "export" also did not fit into the framework of American expectations regarding the course of the "ayatollah regime," as the Iranian government was called in the West.
Therefore, as the famous American journalist Bob Woodward wrote in his book “The CIA’s Secret Wars, 1981–1987,” the United States provided aid and information to both sides of the conflict, hoping to lead them into a dead end.
In particular, in 1981, the United States resumed limited arms supplies to Iran, and in 1985 launched the Iran-Contra program, under which Tehran received TOW anti-tank missile systems, spare parts for the missiles and the Hawk anti-aircraft missiles themselves, as well as other weapons and equipment.
Moreover, during the Soviet military campaign in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the United States and Iran found themselves on the same side, supporting Afghan rebels.
Thus, while the US supplied weapons to the Sunni "Peshawar Seven" through Pakistan, Iran provided military assistance not only to the so-called "Shiite Eight," but also to the Sunni field commander Ismail Khan , the "Lion of Herat," commander of the "Western United Group" of Afghan mujahideen.
Against this backdrop, Tehran's position during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 is particularly revealing. When the American coalition began expelling Iraqi forces from Kuwait, Iran, contrary to the expectations of many, maintained neutrality, which was de facto favorable to Washington.
Despite all the rhetoric of hatred towards the "great Satan," Tehran not only failed to take any action in support of its recent enemy Saddam Hussein , but also used the situation to strengthen its own position.
The decline of Baghdad's influence opened a window of opportunity for Iran: in the following years, the country was able to significantly increase its arms purchases from Russia, North Korea, and even Poland (300 T-72s).
These deliveries occurred, if not with the tacit consent of the United States, then at least in the absence of any strong opposition. Washington, preoccupied with consolidating its presence in the region, chose to ignore Iran's rise, believing that a weakened Iraq no longer posed a threat and that a new regional balance could be adjusted later.
Iraq also became the culmination of situational and pragmatic cooperation between Iran and the United States.
After the overthrow of the Baathist regime in 2003, Washington, unable to cope with the Sunni guerrillas, placed its bets on the Shiite majority, allowing Nouri al-Maliki , a politician who returned from Iran and the leader of the Islamist Shiite Dawa Party, deeply integrated into pro-Iranian networks, to power.
Meanwhile, numerous pro-Iranian groups previously waged war against the American occupation forces. And many of them—Kataib Hezbollah, Hezbollah al-Nujaba, the Badr Organization, and others—have ended up on the American terrorist list.
American strategists believed they could control al-Maliki, who, in turn, controlled Iraqi Shiite forces, which would be used against Sunni insurgents. The American plan succeeded, but Tehran was also able to significantly strengthen its position in Iraq.
Under the cover of official Baghdad and without any US opposition, Iran was able to support numerous Shiite militias on Iraqi soil, which were formally subordinate to the government, but in fact to officers of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
However, the real paradox emerged in 2014, when ISIS (an organization designated as a terrorist organization in Russia) captured a third of Iraqi territory. American air power and Iranian proxy forces found themselves on the same side of the front line.
The situation looked like this: for example, the pro-Iranian Iraqi group Kataib Hezbollah, led by colonels and officers of the Iranian IRGC, which the State Department has listed as a terrorist organization, was receiving American Abrams tanks and M113 armored personnel carriers from the Iraqi army.
Under the cover of US Air Force A-10 attack aircraft, these Shiite militias, led by Iranian instructors, advanced on Mosul, driving out the "caliphate" militants. Washington and Tehran were de facto allies at the time, although each pursued its own goals: the US wanted to preserve its remaining influence in Iraq, while Iran wanted to turn the country into a permanent stronghold.
STRATEGIC CONTEXT OF THE CONFRONTATION
The common ground they found, despite their pragmatic nature, failed to reverse the underlying trend: strategically, the United States and Iran remained implacable enemies. And the main issue was not oil trade or other market interests, but their attitude toward the existence of the State of Israel.
For Iran, the destruction of Israel was never just a rhetorical slogan. It was also part of the religion, since, according to Shiite theology, the hidden Imam Mahdi will return to the world only after the Muslims' victory over the Yahuds (Jews).
Therefore, the fight against Israel remains a clearly stated goal of the Islamic Republic, the instrument for achieving which has become proxy forces along the entire perimeter of the Jewish state.
Back in the early 1980s, IRGC officers created Hezbollah in Lebanon—not just a party or a subversive cell, but a fully-fledged army, integrated into Lebanese society. It was Hezbollah that dealt the first crushing blow to the American presence in the region: the 1983 bombings of the US embassy in Beirut and the Marine barracks, which claimed the lives of hundreds of Americans, were the work of Iran's partners.
Washington then chose to retreat, but learned its lesson: behind every attack against American interests in the Middle East there is an Iranian trace.
The evolution of Hamas is no less revealing. Having emerged as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (an organization designated as terrorist in Russia), it long engaged in preaching and charity work, while its military wing was armed with little more than stones and slingshots.
The situation changed radically when Iran took over. Tehran didn't just provide funding; it transformed the previously disparate Hamas factions into a 25,000-strong army with its own missile arsenal, engineering units, and combat tactics copied from Hezbollah.
Iranian instructors trained Palestinians to build tunnels, manufacture missiles, and operate drones. It was this work that transformed the Gaza Strip into an impenetrable fortress and Hamas into a force capable of challenging the Israel Defense Forces.
OCTOBER 7 FACTOR
October 7, 2023, marked the point of no return. Israeli leaders realized not only their country's vulnerability but also that time was working against them. If today Iran was capable of arming Hamas to the point of breaching Israel's "iron wall," then tomorrow Tehran would strike a blow from which Israel would be unable to recover. The question of survival outweighed any considerations of tactical expediency.
But even earlier, Israel began to realize its vulnerability when it became surrounded by networks of Iranian proxies, while Tehran's ballistic missiles were aimed at Tel Aviv.
Donald Trump's first tenure in the White House allowed Israel to begin acting in concert with the United States.
For Trump himself, this duality—situational cooperation in Iraq and irreconcilable hostility over Israel—predetermined the climax of the escalation he then embarked on. And precisely in Iraq.
The assassination of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Quds Force, in January 2020 was not just another act of retaliation for undermining American interests, but a logical consequence of the very "Israeli factor," which by that point had already outweighed any talk of pragmatism.
By then, the Middle East Strategic Alliance—the US-Israeli coordination effort to contain Iran—had concluded that targeted strikes on Iraqi bases entrenched by pro-Iranian militias were no longer working.
By 2020, Soleimani had transformed himself from a commander instrumental in the fight against ISIS into a symbol and chief architect of the “Arab arc of resistance” that was supposed to close around Israel.
It was he who built the corridor from Tehran through Baghdad and Damascus to Beirut and the Gaza Strip. It was his logistics that allowed Hezbollah to accumulate a missile arsenal capable of overloading Israel's air defenses and opening the skies to Iranian ballistic missiles.
Trump, despite his professed anti-war stance and desire to withdraw troops from "endless Middle East adventures," found himself hostage to this logic. The Israeli lobby and the neoconservative wing of his own administration (like Mike Pompeo and John Bolton ) convinced the president that Soleimani was preparing an "imminent attack" on American targets, but more importantly, he was coordinating a massive strike against Israel through his Shiite proxies.
For Trump, who built his policy on rejecting Barack Obama's legacy and taking a hard line on Tehran (withdrawing from the JCPOA), this marked the point where the transactional approach gave way to a forceful gesture.
The assassination was intended not only to decapitate the IRGC, but also to demonstrate to Tehran that no amount of counterterrorism assistance or ad hoc alliances would protect Iran's commanders if they continued to build siege lines around Israel.
However, the paradox of Trump's strike was that, having cut one knot, he tightened another. Iran, having swallowed its grievance and limited itself to a symbolic response to the Ain al-Asad air base, drew its own conclusions: there were no longer any illusions about the possibility of reaching an agreement with Washington as long as Israel dictated the American agenda.
Soleimani became a martyr, and his cause—the accelerated development of deterrent weapons, including nuclear capability—was given carte blanche by the Iranian establishment. Trump, who sought peace through force, in fact hastened the very explosion he was trying to prevent.
Under different circumstances, the differences between the US and Iran could certainly have been resolved. The Trump administration, despite all the rhetoric, was rather anti-war in line with the MAGA (Make America Great Again) concept and was seeking the deal that Oman had so diligently pursued in the indirect talks in Geneva.
The economic benefits of stabilizing the Iranian market and returning to the nuclear deal were obvious. However, Israel, recognizing the existential threat, managed to reverse this trend during Trump's second term, capitalizing on the events of October 7 and the war in Gaza.
The current war the US is waging in the region is a war waged in Israel's interests. The blow to China's interests will be only a secondary, albeit welcome, benefit for some in Washington.
After all, Iran isn't just another player in the Middle East. It's a key supplier of cheap oil to China and a critical link in the grand Belt and Road infrastructure strategy.
A weakened Tehran will inevitably complicate Beijing's access to energy resources and call into question the security of land routes through Central Asia that bypass US-controlled sea lanes.
Thus, by fanning the flames around Iran, America is solving two problems: ensuring the security of its main ally, Israel, and harming its main geopolitical competitor, China.
But the geoeconomic context, significant as it may be, remains secondary. The primary motive is the blood and iron on the streets of Israeli cities on October 7.