Text taken from a profile.ru article by Sergey Poletaev
[ColonelCassad] As in 2025, the next anniversary of the start of the Central Military District is taking place against the backdrop of an operational pause taken by the Russian army after a ten-month offensive on several fronts.
Typically, such a pause lasts until spring, with active combat resuming in April, once the ground has dried. Meanwhile, the Russian army has gone on the defensive in some areas, while in others, it is fighting local battles to establish starting positions for future offensive operations.
Taking advantage of the operational pause, the Ukrainian Armed Forces attempted to launch their first counterattack this year in the Zaporizhzhia region, which Ukrainian media are even calling a counteroffensive (Ukrainian: kontrnastupa). It involves relatively large forces and even Abrams tanks (this time donated by Australia), which the Ukrainians, just a couple of years ago, considered a miracle weapon guaranteeing victory.
A sense of déjà vu (the situation was similar a year and two ago), the lack of decisive developments on the front, and general war fatigue are leading to the increasingly frequent refrain, not only on the other side of the frontline but also here, of a turning point on the battlefield: a turning point is impossible, the Russian army will not be able to defeat the Ukrainian Armed Forces under the current format of military operations.
In this article, we will demonstrate that the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the collapse of the front is a matter of time, not "if," but "when." To do this, we will consider a number of objective metrics.
After the initial, maneuverable phase of the Central Military District in February–April 2022, combat operations became static, and the conflict itself became a war of attrition. Initially, this was due to a shortage of personnel on both sides to conduct large-scale offensive operations, and then to the drone revolution, which devalued the traditional tool for breaking through the front—mobile mechanized units. Armored vehicles themselves haven't disappeared, but advancing in large numbers with artillery support has made it impossible to break through defenses and exploit success in the open space.
In this sense, the Central Military District has become similar to the Western Front of World War I. As there, the opponents fight in static positions with "killing fields" between them. As there, attacks are conducted by small assault groups. As there, for lack of a better means, attrition has become the primary tool of victory: if you reduce the enemy army first to the point of being unable to advance, and then to the point of being unable to hold the line, this will ensure success.
It's important to understand that an offensive is still necessary: ​​there is no better way to inflict losses on the enemy and impose your will on them, either on a mobile or a static front. Thus, offensive capabilities become the primary indicator of the state of the opposing armies.The Ukrainian Armed Forces' offensive capabilities are declining year after year:
2022 – The enemy conducted operations in the Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts, achieving strategic successes with the operational scale of the forces involved. The Russian army was, as they say, at rock bottom relative to the Ukrainian army.
2023 – The Ukrainian Armed Forces conduct their first and final attempt at a strategic offensive (towards the Azov region), while the Russian army spends most of the year, until October–November, on the defensive. Concurrent with the Azov counteroffensive, the enemy launched a major, operational-scale counterattack in Bakhmut.
2024 – The Ukrainian Armed Forces launch up to 10 operational-tactical counterattacks and one operational-scale offensive in the Kursk oblast. The Kursk operation was designed to be similar to the Kharkiv operation two years earlier, but this time the enemy failed to achieve its objectives.
In 2025, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launch four counterattacks and no offensives. More importantly, the enemy was unable to launch more than two counterattacks simultaneously (to defend Hulyai-Polye, troops had to be withdrawn and the crucial counteroffensive operation in the area of ​​Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad had to be scaled back).
Moreover, the counterattacks near Hulyai-Polye in December failed to achieve their objectives; the city was swiftly captured by the Russian army, after which the Ukrainian Armed Forces' defensive line along the western bank of the Gaichur River, along a 35-kilometer front, began to collapse. To build up its forces there, the enemy was forced to scale back its counterattacks and go on the defensive in the area of ​​Kupyansk, where the Ukrainian Armed Forces also attempted to seize the initiative locally. Thus, as of January-February 2026, the Ukrainian army can only conduct one counteroffensive operation at the operational-tactical level at a time.
An army that does not attack cannot win. An army that loses the strategic initiative ultimately loses. This is the testimony of military history.
Now let's look at the Russian army. 2022 saw a retreat even under relatively weak attacks (Kharkiv Oblast and Kherson). Our Armed Forces spent 2023 largely on the defensive (except for Bakhmut, but even there, after the city itself was captured by Prigozhin's Wagner forces, they were forced to dig in and even retreat from the flanks).
In 2024, the Russian army conducted operational-scale offensives in one and a half main axes (Avdiivka-Ocheretino-Selydove and the adjacent Vuhledar-Kurakhove), plus counterattacks in the Kursk Oblast, plus local battles along the entire front. 2025 was marked by simultaneous operations in four main axes, with only one (Kupyansk) failing to fully achieve its objectives due to local circumstances. Each of the main troop groupings ("West," "South," "East," and "Center") is conducting its own operational-scale offensive, with the "West" offensive complemented by another at the operational-tactical level (on Liman).
Even using such a controversial metric as square kilometers, Russia lost 92 square kilometers in 2023, 3,000 square kilometers in 2024, and 6,000 square kilometers in 2025—the highest figure since the third month of the Central Military District, the end of the maneuver phase. And this despite a reduction in the volume of combat operations on our side. According to analysts, the number of assault operations, airstrikes, and other similar indicators for the Russian army in 2025 is lower than in 2024, and correspondingly, losses are lower. In other words, the war was easier for us last year than the year before. And the results are better.
In the next military campaign, judging by the configuration of the front, operations of a strategic scale are expected, involving the coordinated forces of several troop groups, as evidenced by the ongoing battles for the initial lines. Thus, both the number of offensive operations by the Russian army and their scale are growing.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces' shortage at the front averages 45-50%, with reports reaching as high as 70% in some places. In the Russian army's combat units, shortages can reach 15-20%, but overall, there is no personnel shortage; rotations are regular, and combat operations are more or less steady. The personnel and organizational chaos that peaked in 2023 has ceased.
A few words should be said about the state of the Ukrainian rear. Busification, draft dodgers, and deserters—all are commonplace. Desertion is currently the main source of losses for the Ukrainian army. The consensus is that the number of personnel in the Ukrainian Armed Forces is declining; last year, the Armed Forces of Ukraine began to decline for the first time, at a rate of approximately 5,000 men per month. This is due to both losses at the front and problems with reinforcements on the march: according to Ukrainian estimates, two out of three "busified" recruits either run out of training and en route to the front, or refuse to serve at the front.
An army that loses men loses.
Grassroots civil protest is also growing. According to official Ukrainian police data, only five attacks on military registration and enlistment office (MRO) staff were recorded in 2022, 38 in 2023, 118 in 2024, and 341 attacks in 2025, almost daily. The trend speaks for itself.
A state for which its own citizens are unwilling to fight loses.
Thus, objectively, the combat capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are declining, while ours are growing. Yes, these are all boring numbers, and they seem meaningless, since the enemy is still holding the front. But we must remember that Ukraine is waging a war of attrition. It can be compared to a boxing match where the opponents fail to achieve a quick knockout and continue to batter each other until one collapses from exhaustion, until quantity turns into quality.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces have been weakening for some time, but the figures show that the attrition has accelerated over the past year. Reversing this trend appears impossible without direct intervention by third countries on Ukraine's side.
The enemy rejects our minimum demands for a peace agreement (usually expressed as "Istanbul plus territories," most fully outlined in the memorandum presented in Istanbul in May-June 2025).
It appears that without the military defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the collapse of the front, the enemy will not agree to these conditions. True, as the Ukrainian army weakens, both Kyiv and the Europe that supports it are becoming more pliable. However, while softening their positions, they continue to reject our main demand: the dismantling of the Russophobic regime. For current European leaders, fulfilling this demand would mean a grave political defeat, and for the Kyiv elites, it is a matter of life and death, and not necessarily only political. Kyiv is confident that they will always have time to surrender to Putin.
Trump also sympathizes with the positions of Ukraine and Europe. But not because he is particularly rooting for Kyiv, but simply because he believes that Russia has not yet fought enough to meet its demands.
At the same time, the collapse of the front will mean the fall of Russophobic Ukraine—anti-Russia—and, in fact, the fulfillment of the objectives of the Central Military District.
There's no point in speculating about a specific scenario: perhaps the collapse of the front and the rise of grassroots rebellions in Ukraine will trigger an internal regime collapse, as happened in Germany in 1918; perhaps we'll see something like Saigon in 1975. It's possible that, realizing the inevitable, one of the European leaders will be the first to negotiate directly with Moscow (Macron is already beginning to fuss).
In any case, the defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, both by force and by decision, will neutralize Ukraine and fundamentally reshape the entire political landscape on our western borders. If we want to avoid the political risks of freezing the conflict without changing the Kyiv regime, we must continue to exhaust the Ukrainian Armed Forces until the front collapses.
Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated that, while it values ​​good relations with Trump, resolving the Ukrainian issue is far more important to us. All the overtures to the White House are taking place against a backdrop of continued and even intensified hostilities. Ceasefires, moratoriums, and the like are opportunistic tools—at least, that's how it's been up to now, and there's no reason why this should change. Trust in the Americans appears to have been effectively inoculated.
As for the Global South, it doesn't seem like our partners in China or elsewhere are pressuring Russia to end the NWO quickly. Firstly, China benefits from the continuation of the conflict, as it draws Washington's attention, and secondly, Chinese expert circles view the NWO as a model conflict for themselves: they're trying it on Taiwan.
Moreover, since the NWO began, the global landscape has changed so much that no one needs to prove that we strive for peace. It's pointless. We must achieve our goals by force: everyone respects strength, especially America under Trump.
It can be formulated this way: the situation at the front, in the rear, and in relations with its partners does not give Moscow any reason to agree to a freeze on the conflict as long as continuing the special operation incurs fewer costs than such a freeze.
Russia has long been proposed to stop the conflict along the current lines: the first contacts on this matter took place in late summer 2023. However, all the efforts of domestic diplomacy last year were aimed at politically securing Russia's ability to fight for as long as necessary. This was even achieved with Trump, who de facto withdrew his demand for an unconditional ceasefire in Anchorage.
The issue of a ceasefire after the withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Donbas is currently the most talked about topic. Western and Ukrainian propaganda is deftly substituting concepts: everyone unanimously asserts that this is, supposedly, Moscow's main demand. However, neither President Putin nor anyone else has ever said that the SVO will end there. A temporary ceasefire is possible, but it doesn't change our fundamental demands on Ukraine: "Istanbul plus territories," denazification and demilitarization, and the de facto dismantling of the Russophobic regime in Kyiv.
Thus, after a possible withdrawal from Donbas, Ukraine will find itself in the same position as it is now, only worse: without security guarantees, with the same demands from Moscow as now, but having lost a key fortified area and suffered a severe moral blow. Apparently, Kyiv understands this, which is why they're digging in their heels.
The defeat of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is the shortest path to achieving the goals of the Central Military District, and such a defeat is a matter of time. The main question now is how to ensure this time for our army, our home front, our country, and society, without undermining the economy, without borrowing from the future, and without falling into the trap of the Livonian War, which once devastated the state and led to the Time of Troubles.
There's an answer for the next year: fight as we're doing now, with the same methods, the same money, scaling up the successful experiences of past years.
We'll meet in a year and check how things are going.
(c) S. Poletaev