by Azat Rakhmanov
[REGNUM] The high-profile reshuffles in China's security apparatus and the arrests of senior military officials, which have made international headlines, are more than just the arrests of individual bribe-takers. For over twelve years, China has been undergoing a complete overhaul of its entire state and military apparatus, a true tectonic shift.
To a Russian observer, recent events may seem like a series of isolated scandals or yet another media campaign. However, this is misleading; this is not a one-time event.
The anti-corruption campaign in China under the leadership of Xi Jinping, which began immediately after the landmark 18th CPC Congress in 2012, has long since evolved from a surgical operation to eliminate competitors into a permanent mode of operation for the system.
The first devastating blows to those who enjoyed immunity under Jiang Zemin in the 1990s and Hu Jintao in the 2000s occurred in the mid-2010s, when former vice chairmen of the Central Military Commission Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong came under investigation. These men had controlled the military's career ladder for decades, and their fall signaled that there were no longer positions in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) that guaranteed immunity.
Why does the military always remain the number one priority in this process? The answer lies in the very nature of modern Chinese government.
The PLA is not simply a state armed force in the traditional Russian or European sense. The PLA's key principle was formulated by Mao Zedong himself during the revolutionary years : "Power comes from the rifle." This means that the army is led by the Party.
Formally, the highest military body is the Central Military Commission, but in reality, it is a direct extension of the party structure. Therefore, for Beijing, any pocket of corruption in the military is not an economic crime, but a factor that erodes political loyalty. If a general takes bribes, his loyalty to the center can be called into question, which is absolutely unacceptable in the context of the global confrontation with the West.
The latest round of this endless struggle was revealed by a publication in the PLA's official newspaper, Jiefangjunbao, which came out in early February. It went almost unnoticed in the international press, which was preoccupied with other headlines, but for those who follow the Chinese political system, this is anything but a routine signal.
Jiefangjunbao is not a forum for debate or a space for journalistic interpretation. It is an institutional channel through which the leadership's will is conveyed to the army corps and the entire system.
When a programmatic text about “political hardening” appears in such a body, it means that a decision at the very top has not only been made – it has been put into action.
PERSONAL CONNECTIONS WON'T SAVE YOU
The formula voiced in the newspaper's text is extremely strict: there can be no safe havens for corrupt officials in the army. But the subsequent caveat is far more important: the "corruption residue" has not been completely eliminated. This is an official admission that, despite a decade of purges, corrupt mechanisms still persist.
The names behind this "remnant" are impressive - we are talking about people at the level of the high military command, such as Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli.
The first figure is particularly noteworthy. Few people know that Zhang Youxia and Xi Jinping had long-standing, almost familial ties. Their fathers were party comrades, true comrades in arms. It was precisely because of this that Zhang, although implicated in some matters, like many of the PLA generals of the 1990s and 2000s, enjoyed long-standing special favor with Chairman Xi and successfully survived the early stages of the purges.
In 2023, when Defense Minister Li Shangfu resigned amid scandal, Zhang retained his post. It appears that Xi chose to ignore certain corruption cases involving Zhang, effectively giving him a huge vote of confidence.
However, in China, the credit of trust is not an infinite thing.
| Nor anywhere, really. Which is as it should be. |
But the reality, as is often the case, is more prosaic. Many established Chinese political scientists, in "private WeChat conversations," are leaning toward the theory that Li's blunder was due to carelessness. His son, who has business interests in the United States, was under CIA surveillance, and important information could have leaked through ordinary conversations in places where the Americans had installed wiretaps.
Zhang Yuxia's situation is different. This veteran military man had no contacts with the West. He was caught in corruption schemes. Perhaps national character also played a role: anyone caught for financial dishonesty at least once must pay the price, even if initially forgiven. In China, punishment for a breach of trust is inevitable, even if it is postponed for a while.
There are also rumors of a coup attempt by Zhang, but they are unsubstantiated. One thing is clear: he has been arrested, and any attempts at destabilization have been thwarted by officers from the Central Security Bureau of the CPC Central Committee—the "personal guard" of the top leadership.
REFLASHING THE SYSTEM
Why did Beijing decide to talk about the “corruption residue” now?
There are no casual words in Chinese political rhetoric. This term acknowledges that the problem lies not in isolated "bad apples," but in the accumulated layers of informal connections that have been built over decades.
But even more significant is the term "political reorganization." To the uninitiated, it may sound like a bureaucratic procedure, but in reality, it represents a complete overhaul of the system.
It implies, firstly, the priority of loyalty over professionalism. In Xi Jinping's eyes, even the most talented general, well-versed in hypersonic technology, is useless and dangerous if he is politically unreliable. PLA modernization is considered secondary to ideological discipline.
Secondly, a purge of the environment itself. Reorganization means rethinking the personnel ladder. While previously personal loyalty to a superior was sufficient for promotion (which gave rise to corrupt clans), now end-to-end control mechanisms are being introduced.
And thirdly, the elimination of "gray zones." Military governance is being reformatted toward a more rigid, centralized, and ideologically aligned model. The system projects confidence. The increasing number of cases is presented not as a sign of weakness, but as proof that control is penetrating ever deeper.
Chinese political practice rarely addresses a problem publicly without the intention of bringing the process to a conclusion. In this context, new investigations appear less sensational than a logical continuation of the current course. The CPC leadership, led by Xi Jinping, is building an army that must be ready for a new "Long March," and in such battles, the home front must be crystal clear.
THE OUTER CIRCUIT AND RUSSIA
It's important to emphasize that the anti-corruption campaign in the PLA is becoming a long-term policy, integrated into the strategy of building a "strong army." In China's political system, short-term media coverage is not as important as the gradual reduction of gray areas and strengthening of disciplinary control.
The PLA is today a key instrument of Beijing's foreign policy amid growing tensions around Taiwan and in the South China Sea. China's political leadership has a vested interest in ensuring that this instrument is fully manageable, monolithic, and free of internal fissures through which external forces could exert influence.
The fight against the "remnant" is preparation for the great challenges of the future, where any unauthorized activity within the command could be fatal.
For us, there's one fundamentally important point in this whole story of purges and arrests of China's top generals. The Chinese leadership, led by Xi Jinping, no matter what transformations it may undergo, remains firmly committed to strategic cooperation and building constructive relations with Russia.
For Beijing, the stability of its northern neighbor is as much a guarantee of security as the integrity of its own army ranks.
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