by Alexander Melnik
[REGNUM] A year after Donald Trump's return to the White House, the US foreign policy machine has begun to clearly outline a new African strategy. While under Joe Biden, Washington attempted to embrace the continent with rhetoric about a "partnership of equals" and "defending democratic values," today, idealism has been replaced by a cold, almost corporate calculation.
State Department leaks and recent policy statements by administration officials, particularly Nick Checker, head of the Bureau of African Affairs, paint a picture of a radical shift: Africa has been officially relegated to the category of "peripheral theaters," where US interests will be defended selectively, harshly, and exclusively in the context of global competition for resources.
BIDEN'S LEGACY: THE TWILIGHT OF AMERICAN INFLUENCE
By early 2025, the US position in Africa was in deep crisis. The Biden era, which began with ambitious promises to "include Africa in global governance" and launch multi-billion dollar investment projects, has in reality resulted in a series of diplomatic and strategic defeats.
The main reason was the fatal gap between Washington's high-flown rhetoric and the real needs of African elites for security and economic development.
The most important indicator of decline was the "domino effect" in the Sahel. The Biden administration's attempts to condition military aid on compliance with so-called democratic standards led to the Americans being sidelined after a series of coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The new leaders of West African countries preferred real assistance from the Russian Federation to stabilize the security situation.
Ultimately, at the request of the new Niger authorities, the Pentagon was forced to ignominiously abandon Air Base 201 in Agadez – a key intelligence hub in the Sahara, in which hundreds of millions of dollars had been invested.
While the US was losing military bases, China was using economic instruments to increase its influence and dominance in Africa. By early 2026, Beijing had firmly established itself as the undisputed trading partner for most countries on the continent. By 2024, trade between China and Africa had nearly reached $300 billion, while the US presence continued to stagnate.
China's "infrastructure for resources" model has proven far more understandable and attractive to African leaders than complex, bureaucratic American aid programs burdened with climate and gender agendas.
Moreover, Washington's "soft power" has faltered. The Biden administration's attempt to draw African countries into an anti-Russian coalition after 2022 has failed: most African states opted for neutrality, viewing US pressure as a manifestation of neocolonialist dictate.
By the time Trump was re-elected, Africa had become a space where the US position had weakened on all fronts, giving way to the growing influence of BRICS+, the strengthening of the Russian power bloc, and China's all-out economic expansion.
"PERIPHERAL THEATER": THE TRUMP MODEL
The new Trump administration has abandoned attempts to “save all of Africa” and moved toward a strategy of selective intervention.
According to materials published by Semafor, the State Department's new course is based on the recognition that Africa is not a "vital" interest for the United States, but rather a space for second-order competition.
This admission by Checker shocked many experts, but it reflects the essence of “realism 2.0”: Washington will no longer spend resources on the general development of the continent unless it brings immediate benefits to the American economy or security.
The main distinguishing feature of the new strategy is the shift to "commercial diplomacy." US embassies are now reoriented to serve as outposts for American business. The primary focus is on critical minerals (lithium, cobalt, copper), essential for modern electronics and the defense industry.
Trump isn't trying to outmaneuver China in building bridges and railways across the continent. His goal is to "strategically displace" Beijing from key links in supply chains. The US is willing to invest billions, but only in specific projects, such as the Lobito Corridor, which connects mines in the DRC and Zambia with Atlantic ports to guarantee exclusive access to raw materials for American companies.
Washington's behavior has become emphatically transactional. This manifests itself in three key aspects.
First, the rejection of "democracy at any cost." The Trump administration has effectively curtailed programs to "promote democracy" in countries willing to cooperate on economic or military issues. Washington has begun cautiously exploring ways to restore relations with the military regimes in the Sahel, making it clear: "We don't care who's in power, as long as you limit Russia's presence and provide access to resources."
Secondly, a revision of humanitarian aid: even the PEPFAR program, sacred to American diplomacy in Africa, has been reconsidered. The White House has begun redirecting resources from Africa to the Western Hemisphere (Latin America), considering it a higher priority for US security interests. Aid is now viewed not as charity, but as a tool of influence to be used where it yields the greatest political impact.
Third, innovative aid: instead of direct grants to governments, the US is shifting to private sector support and loan guarantees. The "self-sufficiency" model promoted by Checker implies that African countries should create their own conditions for investment, rather than waiting for handouts from the US budget.
Trump's model of behavior in Africa is an attempt to maintain the minimum necessary influence at a minimum cost.
Washington no longer claims the role of a "benign hegemon." It presents itself as a hard-line investor and power broker, intervening in the continent's affairs only when it becomes concerned about Chinese control of cobalt deposits or Russian military bases. This is a strategy of maintaining a foothold in a world where Africa has ceased to be an "object of trusteeship" and has become an arena for a violent clash of interests among major players.
Ultimately, the shift in US strategy under Trump is an acknowledgement of the end of the era of global dominance. Washington intends to consolidate its position on coastlines and in mines, transforming African policy from an ideological mission into a pragmatic struggle for survival in the face of resource scarcity.
Whether Africa will accept such a cynical approach remains an open question, but the rules of the game have already changed irrevocably.