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Caucasus/Russia/Central Asia

The Specter of a 'Green' Revolt: What the Killing of Gaddafi's Son Means for Russia

2026-02-06

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited

Responding to this story from two days ago.

by Kirill Semenov

[REGNUM] The assassination of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi in Zintan on the evening of February 3, 2026, closes more than a decade of unresolved chapters in Libya's transition period related to the Gaddafi leader.

The attack on him was not carefully planned: a group of armed men burst into his home while he was observing a voluntary Islamic fast and talking on the phone with members of his political team. Saif al-Islam managed to warn them of the intruders' presence and even returned fire with a pistol, but was shot dead before completing the conversation.

This attack, which appears poorly organized and left a chance for survival, stands in stark contrast to previous unsuccessful, albeit well-planned, assassination attempts. It occurred amid a series of alarming signs: increased political maneuvering in Libya, harsher rhetoric from local militias, incidents in the south, and renewed intense diplomatic activity around the country.

All of this raises many questions. Significant is the muted, almost silent, initial reaction of Libya's main political factions, which is rare in local culture.

A PARADOXICAL LEGACY
The death of Saif al-Islam reveals the fundamental paradox of his figure and the true nature of his support.

The so-called "Green" bloc he led, aligned with supporters of the former regime of his father, Muammar Gaddafi, remained one of the most difficult political forces to analyze in Libya. Its uniqueness was multifaceted and stemmed from the biography of the younger Gaddafi himself.

With a brilliant Western education,

…where brilliant apparently means purchased…

Saif al-Islam tried in the 2000s to present himself as the architect of Libyan reforms and a bridge between his father's regime and the outside world.

An important, but often overlooked, part of this strategy was his efforts to reconcile the state with Islamist circles. He established contacts and negotiated with figures such as the influential Islamist ideologist Ali al-Sallabi

…who led an adventurous life in the various centers of radical Islam from the 1990s until Moammar Khadaffy was overthrown in the 2011 Libyan Civil War, when he was commissioned to bring $2 billion in aid for the rebels from Qatar…

and the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood*, seeking to integrate moderate Islamists into the legal political arena and win them over to his father's side.

After 2011, these old connections transformed into channels for dialogue, forming part of the complex network capital that allowed Saif al-Islam to remain alive and influential. This was especially important given the lack of any widespread nostalgia for the Muammar Gaddafi era in Libya—the "green" movement is marginal and fragmented.

But thanks to his long-standing connections, including with the current head of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, and his ability to build alliances, Saif al-Islam was able to become more than just a leader of marginal Gaddafi supporters, although his claims to supreme power were always considered illusory.

As Grigory Lukyanov, Deputy Dean of the Faculty of Oriental Studies at the State University of Humanities and Social Sciences, told Regnum news agency, the assumption that he could realistically run for president in the elections is “somewhat far-fetched and overestimates his potential.”

"More likely, he could have acted as a 'spoiler candidate.'" He could have been voted for by irreconcilable opponents of the entire current political class—opponents of [Abdel Hamid] Dbeibah, [Khalifa] Haftar, [Aguila] Salah Isa, and other key figures who are currently using their administrative influence in the struggle for power. And as a candidate with no initial chance of winning, but capable of taking away some votes, no one needed him. All the main candidates intend to use administrative resources and understand how fragile the balance of power is, so every group of votes has a price," the orientalist noted.

Thus, Saif al-Islam became a figure for whom not so much convinced Gaddafi supporters, but a wide variety of “dissenters” were ready to vote.

His appeal was never solely based on nostalgia for his father. Increasingly, it reflected protest and rejection in both the east and west of the country against the ruling class, which ordinary Libyans perceive as disunited, ineffective, and pursuing its own clannish interests.

On the contrary, Saif al-Islam represented the possibility of a referendum of no confidence in the entire Libyan government.

Support for him was perceived not as an endorsement of the past, but as a gesture of despair about the present, which made him dangerous for any established influence group.

And herein lies the paradox: unable to claim power, Gaddafi Jr. could have turned out to be a "black swan," posing a threat to all genuine contenders. After all, he promised to take their votes and make any election outcome unpredictable. This prevented any behind-the-scenes electoral "deals." And now, after his death, the chances of holding elections in the country are increasing.

At the same time, the Supreme National Electoral Commission's technical statements about its readiness to begin preparations for elections as early as April 2026 sound more like a formality. Fundamental obstacles—the lack of a constitutional basis, consensus on rules, and deep mistrust between Tripoli and Benghazi—have not disappeared.

In a system where maintaining the country's division is safer than attempting to reconcile the parties and resolve conflicts, the very idea of elections that could lead to the emergence of a strong national mandate frightens the ruling groups.

Eliminating a potential "black swan" event reduces the immediate risks for them, but does not change the nature of the game. At the same time, other players are becoming more active, seeking to reformat alliances to fit the new reality, where one unpredictable variable, Saif al-Islam, has disappeared, but the fragility of the system has only increased.

THE STRENGTH AND WEAKNESS OF THE GREEN GRID
The political future of the "green" movement has become even more uncertain.

As Anton Mardasov, an expert on the Middle East and North Africa, explained to Regnum News Agency, finding a replacement for the Gaddafiites is extremely difficult due to the lack of other influential family members in the country: they live abroad, and it is unlikely that any of them will decide to return to Libya.

On the other hand, today the Greens represent not a formal political movement, but a disparate network integrated into Libya's security structures and tribal communities, present to varying degrees in all three regions of the country. It is internally contradictory, yet highly flexible and capable of adapting to regional conditions.

Much of it – especially in the east and south – was co-opted by Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA), who offered them security and status in exchange for loyalty.

At the same time, other fragments of the movement supported the GNA in Tripoli. A prominent example of this pro-Gaddafi group is Tuareg General Ali Qann, a former high-ranking military officer under Muammar Gaddafi who later headed the Southern Regions Military Council, loyal to Tripoli, and opposed Haftar.

It was this deep and multi-directional rootedness in Libyan society, rather than overt political activism, that constituted the real strength and complexity of Saif al-Islam's entourage.

BETWEEN THE HAFTARS AND DBEIBAH
The removal of Saif al-Islam directly affects the core of the Libyan political system, which is often characterized as a “system built on fragility,” where equilibrium is maintained not so much by consensus as by mutual vulnerability.

For the Haftar family – and particularly for Field Marshal Saddam's son, who was in charge of security and tribal relations – Saif al-Islam was perhaps the greatest uncontrollable threat to their long-term project.

Despite the successful integration of many Gaddafi supporters into the LNA structures, it was Seif al-Islam who remained the only figure whose symbolic capital and origins allowed him to lure away the allegiance of key tribal and regional networks at any time, especially in the south, where Benghazi's influence remained incomplete.

“For a long time, the claim was maintained in Libya that Saif was hiding in the south of Libya—in Haftar’s zone, but populated by tribes that, although they cooperate with the LNA, maintain a distinct opinion about Libya’s future,” Mardasov believes.

"I think this information was spread intentionally—both to disinform and to demonstrate that during the transition of power in the east, the tribes' support for Saif al-Islam could play a role, and how this factor could influence the possibility of holding elections," the expert believes.

In the younger Gaddafi, the Haftars saw a direct competitor who, if allowed to participate in the elections, could deprive them of their monopoly on the votes of the conservative and disillusioned electorate, which would threaten both the LNA project itself and the plans for a transition of power within the family.

At the same time, Lukyanov proposed “considering the situation with Abdel Hamid Dbeibah on an equal basis.”

"Although he and Saif al-Islam were once friends and collaborated at the Investment Agency, and although Dbeibah did much to allow Gaddafi Jr. to participate in the political process after coming to power, their paths ultimately diverged," the orientalist explained. According to him, Dbeibah's pragmatic interests ultimately prevailed, and given his precarious position, Saif al-Islam, as a "spoiler," could have been as dangerous for him as for Haftar.

Therefore, the elimination of a candidate capable of consolidating the protest electorate is beneficial to key players in both the east and west of the country, Anton Mardasov emphasized.

At the same time, as Lukyanov noted, Seif al-Islam “could really be of no use to anyone and at the same time completely unprotected from attempts at liquidation.”

According to the analyst, the direct benefit of his assassination is not that great. For Libyan politicians within the country—whether Haftar in the east or Dbeibah in the west—it merely removes one, far from the most pressing, issue from their agenda.

"It's entirely possible that the game wasn't worth the candle: the political assassination of such a figure would generate more gossip than it would bring real dividends in the form of additional support or resources," the orientalist emphasized.

IMPORTANT CIRCUMSTANCES
What deserves special attention, according to Lukyanov, is the possible “French connection.”

While Saif al-Islam was no longer able to make any significant changes within Libya, in the past, as one of the managers of his father's investment funds, he knew a lot about connections with European politicians and companies, primarily French ones.

Given the high-profile case of Libyan financing of the election campaign of former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, "the version of the involvement of French interests deserves consideration. "

However, the death of Saif al-Islam creates new geopolitical realities for Russia as well. His death represents a strategic loss and a narrowing of its room for maneuver.

Moscow has long viewed him as a potential alternative or backup asset, one that would allow it to avoid being tied solely to Haftar. Saif al-Islam, with his unique image and networks, could theoretically become the basis for a more independent political project, friendly to Moscow but not entirely dependent on Benghazi.

Now that option has disappeared, which, according to Mardasov, “increases Moscow’s dependence on Haftar,” depriving the Kremlin of an important lever for diversifying its influence and conducting negotiations.

This makes Russia's position in Libya more vulnerable and less flexible.

"RESURRECTION OF THE GHOST"
According to Mardasov, the role of Seif al-Islam and the threat of a "green" rebellion were often exaggerated, as many former supporters of the regime had already integrated into new structures.

His death, on the one hand, could accelerate this process of disintegration and co-optation, but on the other, it risks transforming his image into a powerful symbol of martyrdom, capable of consolidating a new generation of dissatisfied people based on shared resentment rather than nostalgia.

Thus, if those behind the assassination expected that the physical elimination of Saif al-Islam would finally neutralize the threat he posed and consolidate control over his legacy, they likely made a strategic mistake in underestimating the depth of the rift among his potential supporters.

As Grigory Lukyanov explained, "he had neither a cohort of authoritative politicians behind him willing to use their influence for his projects, nor strong social or political institutions. He also lacked sufficient experience in public administration."

According to the orientalist, this led to him performing poorly during the 2011 crisis. This ultimately led to his capture, and then to the status of exile and hostage in his own country, a situation he remained in for almost the rest of his life. "This, perhaps, is his greatest tragedy," Lukyanov concluded.

Thus, Saif al-Islam became a political ghost even during his lifetime, feared not so much for his actual capabilities as for what his survival symbolized.

His absence from formal politics for many years effectively preserved and strengthened Saif al-Islam's mythical status, shielding him from the inevitable compromises and disappointments that accompany real power. And his death could elevate this image to absolute status, transforming him from a ghost of the past into a banner for those who see no future in the current order.

This legacy will be contested, and it is already fraught with division.

On one side are those Gaddafi supporters who have integrated into Haftar's project and find stability and a strong government a guarantee of their position. For them, Saif al-Islam was more of a hindrance.

On the other hand, figures like General Ali Kanna, as well as other local leaders and tribal groups in the west and south who maintained independence or oriented themselves toward Tripoli, could see the image of the slain Saif become a powerful unifying symbol of resistance to both Haftar and the government's weakness.

But there's also a new generation of commanders or public figures who have no connection whatsoever to the "green" movement. And they may rally around not a single individual, but rather the idea of martyrdom and a new collective grievance. This creates the risk of more sporadic, localized, and therefore less predictable destabilization, especially in the south and central regions of the country.

In a system in fragile equilibrium, the removal of one, even seemingly peripheral, support can lead to an unexpected rebalancing of the entire structure.

So, while Libya may see a deceptive calm in the coming months and the appearance of one political obstacle being lifted, the long-term consequences of Saif al-Islam's assassination are likely to manifest themselves in new forms of social and political division, making genuine national reconciliation an even less achievable goal.

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