by Andrey Bulkin
[REGNUM] Today, the world has entered a new era in nuclear security, as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), the final agreement between Russia and the United States that limited their nuclear arsenals, expired on February 5.
To understand why this document has attracted so much attention, it's important to understand why it was needed, how it worked, and what will change if it is finally abandoned.
WHAT WAS THE POINT OF THE NEW START TREATY?
New START is not a disarmament treaty, but a deterrence treaty. Its main idea was to prevent the world's largest nuclear powers—Russia and the United States—from uncontrolled strategic force buildup and to ensure they understood the capabilities of the other side.
The document established strict quantitative restrictions on deployed nuclear warheads, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers.
Simply put, the treaty prevented an indefinite increase in the number of nuclear warheads and their carriers, and also created a mechanism for mutual verification.
This reduced the risk of mistrust, errors in threat assessment, and ultimately, accidental conflict.
POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES: RUSSIA, USA, CHINA
Moscow and Washington's approaches to the future of the New START Treaty differ significantly.
The Russian leadership has stated its readiness to continue to comply with the key quantitative restrictions of the treaty for a limited time.
Back in September of last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated : “Russia is ready to continue to adhere to the central quantitative restrictions under the START Treaty for one year after February 5, 2026. ”
However, it was emphasized that such a step would only be possible if the United States followed suit. There has been virtually no official response to Russia's initiatives to maintain the framework of strategic stability. Meanwhile, Moscow maintains that it remains open to dialogue—if genuine political will is demonstrated on the other side.
It's important to note that the New START's termination does not mean Russia will be left in a more vulnerable position. Moscow's initial position boils down to a simple principle: if the treaty is no longer needed by one party, the other is not obligated to maintain its restrictions unilaterally.
Russia has all the necessary capabilities to ensure its own security and strategic deterrence even without the New START.
Moreover, in recent years, the development of Russian strategic weapons has focused on the qualitative modernization of delivery systems and increasing their resilience to any countermeasures. This ensures the maintenance of a balance of power even in the absence of a formal treaty framework.
The Russian Foreign Ministry stated this today : "Under the current circumstances, we proceed from the assumption that the parties to the New START Treaty are no longer bound by any obligations or symmetrical declarations in the context of the treaty, including its central provisions, and are fundamentally free to choose their next steps. At the same time, the Russian Federation intends to act responsibly and prudently, formulating its policy on strategic offensive arms based on a thorough analysis of US military policy and the overall strategic situation."
The American position on the New START Treaty, in turn, appears more assertive. US President Donald Trump previously admitted that the treaty's expiration would not be a disaster, expressing confidence that another agreement could be concluded in its place.
"If it expires, it expires," Trump philosophically remarked to The New York Times in January 2026. "We'll get a better deal," he added, insisting that China, which currently has the world's fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, should also be included in the new treaty.
The United States has previously stated that future agreements should include not only Russia but also other nuclear powers, primarily China. In Western rhetoric, this argument is increasingly used to explain why extending the New START Treaty in its current form has supposedly lost its purpose.
However, this approach appears questionable. China has never been a party to the treaty, and its nuclear potential, despite its rapid growth, remains incomparable in scale and structure to the arsenals of Russia and the United States: while China's nuclear warheads number in the hundreds, those of Russia and the United States are in the thousands.
Moreover, Moscow and Beijing are not bound by a military alliance and do not coordinate their nuclear forces. Meanwhile, discussions about the need to include China in the treaty often leave out the United Kingdom and France—nuclear powers that are US NATO allies and are effectively integrated into the West's unified military-political planning system.
In this context, appealing exclusively to China appears to be nothing more than a disingenuous act designed to cover up the unwillingness to extend the treaty.
Beijing, for its part, views US initiatives to involve China in Russian-American nuclear arms reduction talks as unfounded and unfair. The Chinese Embassy in Washington explained to TASS that, at the current stage, the demand for China to join such talks is unreasonable precisely because the scale of China's nuclear arsenal is incomparable to that of the US or Russia.
"China maintains its nuclear forces at the minimum level necessary for national security and does not intend to enter into an arms race with any country," said Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lin Jian, commenting on the expiration of the New START.
Recent high-level Russian-Chinese contacts provided additional context for assessing the parties' positions. The day before, Vladimir Putin held talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping, during which they emphasized that, amid growing global instability, cooperation between Moscow and Beijing plays a role in fostering global stability.
The Russian side declared its readiness for further close coordination with China on key international and regional issues, both bilaterally and at multilateral forums, including the UN, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
At the same time, the emphasis was placed on political and diplomatic coordination, which fits in with the previously stated position: Russia and China do not form a military or nuclear alliance, but they do jointly advocate for a more predictable and stable system of international security, including against the backdrop of the crisis in treaty mechanisms in the sphere of strategic weapons.
POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONSEQUENCES
Of course, New START never covered all nuclear weapons in the world. It was a bilateral treaty. Nevertheless, it served as the foundation of the entire architecture of strategic stability, setting the upper limit for acceptable nuclear confrontation.
From an international perspective, the end of the New START Treaty means the disappearance of the last mechanism of control over the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States.
With the number of states seeking nuclear weapons growing, the demise of such a treaty sends a particularly dangerous signal. If the major nuclear powers demonstrate a rejection of restrictions, it undermines the very idea of strategic arms control as an instrument of international security.
For countries that are already on the threshold of joining the nuclear club or are considering such a possibility, this could become an additional argument in favor of their own nuclear choice.
Today, there are already regions of chronic instability in the world where nuclear weapons play a role as a source of constant risk: the confrontation between nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, tensions surrounding the Iranian nuclear program, and the uncertain nuclear status of Israel.
Against this backdrop, the disappearance of New START looks like a dangerous precedent that weakens international norms and makes the global security system more fragile.
Moreover, from a military perspective, the absence of New START opens the way to a new round of the strategic arms race. This doesn't necessarily mean the immediate construction of thousands of new missiles, but it does create the conditions and opportunities for increasing the number of nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles, as well as for the development of new strategic weapons and their delivery systems.
Clearly, contract termination also increases the burden on early warning systems and increases the risk of erroneous decisions in a crisis. The fewer restrictions and rules, the greater the likelihood that a technical failure or misinterpretation of the other party's actions will lead to catastrophic consequences.
Therefore, although New START didn't solve all the problems, it served an important function: it kept nuclear rivalry within certain limits. Its possible termination makes the world less stable in terms of nuclear security.
At a time when trust between major powers is low, the disappearance of such safety nets is alarming.
The future of strategic stability now depends largely on whether new forms of dialogue can be found—or whether the world will return to the logic of unlimited nuclear rivalry, and the era of nuclear arsenal limitations that lasted more than half a century will finally become a thing of the past.
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