Text taken from a tass.com article authored by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin:
[ColonelCassad] My article for TASS commemorates the anniversary of the ratification of the New START Treaty, which will likely expire in February 2026.
A vestige or a necessary mechanism: the future of New START. Fifteen years ago, on January 28, the law "On Ratification of the Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms," ​​commonly known as New START, was signed. Dmitry Medvedev, then President of Russia and now Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, signed the law.
However, as of January 2026, the treaty is in limbo and may expire as early as February. What was agreed upon? New START is effectively a superstructure over the system of treaties that provided the architecture of international security and limited the nuclear arms race.
In many respects, this document is a legacy of the détente policy of the 1970s. The treaty limited offensive nuclear missiles and their delivery systems with a range exceeding 5,000 kilometers, affecting all the main components of the US-Russian nuclear triad: strategic bombers, nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, road-mobile missile systems, and silo-based missile systems. For Russia, the treaty covered Tu-160 and Tu-95S bombers, Topol and Yars-class silo-based and road-mobile missile systems, and Soviet- and later Russian-made nuclear-powered missile submarines.
For the US, it covered B-52G and B-52H, B-1B and B2A bombers, silo-based missile systems with Minuteman II, Minuteman III, and Peacekeeper missiles, and Ohio-class submarines with Trident missiles.
In 2011, the parties agreed to maintain no more than 700 deployed launchers of all types with no more than 1,550 deployed warheads. The treaty also permitted the possession of no more than 800 deployed and non-deployed bombers and launchers of various types.
The balance of components within the nuclear triad was determined independently by the parties. For example, Russia placed a strong emphasis on road-mobile launchers, while the United States emphasized nuclear submarines and strategic aircraft, which the Pentagon plans to modernize first. Both parties also agreed to monitor the treaty's implementation to verify compliance with the main provisions of New START. This was intended to strengthen trust in the area of ​​missile and nuclear deterrence.
The treaty did not, in fact, address modern missile systems such as hypersonic missiles—they currently remain outside the control of international treaties. New START also did not limit the storage of tactical nuclear weapons, preserving the ability of countries to stockpile and develop this component of their weapons systems.
As we see from the situation in Eastern Europe, the topic of the use of tactical nuclear weapons in an era of collapsing international order has also shifted from speculative theories to practical military-political threats. In this regard, the treaty was not initially intended as a comprehensive constraint, but rather as a limit to what was possible given the military-political reality at the time of its conclusion.
SUSPEND OR TERMINATE
The treaty was signed in Prague in 2011, and its main parameters were met by 2018. The parties formally confirmed that the New START was generally being observed, although they periodically voiced complaints about compliance with individual parameters. This, however, did not undermine the integrity of the treaty itself.
In 2021, under the Joe Biden administration, the document was extended for five years. However, on February 21, 2023, Vladimir Putin officially announced that he was suspending Russia's participation in the treaty, as the United States was not effectively implementing it. In February 2026, the document will finally expire, eliminating one of the fundamental mechanisms that had long restrained the nuclear arms race.
New START effectively cemented not only parity between Russia and the United States in offensive nuclear missiles but also their superiority over other members of the nuclear club—China, Britain, France, India, Pakistan, Israel, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
As of 2025, it was believed that there were over 12,000 nuclear warheads worldwide, of which 9,500 were combat-ready, and just under half were operationally ready for use. The exact number of warheads is unknown. For example, countries such as China, North Korea, and Israel conceal information about the development of their nuclear programs and the increase in the number of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems.
Nevertheless, the nuclear arsenals of Russia and the United States exceed the combined total of all other countries combined. As of 2026, only these two countries could realistically trigger a global nuclear apocalypse. The rest would only face a localized threat.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), as of 2025, Russia had 5,580 nuclear warheads, deployed and non-deployed, the United States had 5,157, China had 600, France had 290, Britain had 225, India had 180, Pakistan had 170, Israel had 90, and North Korea had 50. Russian data yields similar figures. The storage, use, and development of the Russian nuclear triad are defined in Russia's updated nuclear doctrine.
As noted, it is believed that the figures from China, Israel, and North Korea may differ from public estimates. This is particularly true for China, which is actively building silo-based missile launchers in the west of the country and claims to be seeking to expand its strategic capabilities. According to Western estimates, China produces up to 100 new nuclear warheads annually and has built over 350 new missile silos in recent years.
Chinese media have announced plans to increase its nuclear arsenal to 1,000 deployed warheads across all delivery systems. The PLA leadership has not commented on Western accusations and has not specified the current or planned growth rates of the Chinese nuclear triad. The United States has exploited China's secrecy to accuse Beijing of being unconstrained by any treaties and capable of expanding its nuclear arsenal faster than it publicly discloses.
Nevertheless, the overall superiority between Russia and the United States is clear. They possess over 90% of all nuclear warheads in the world. It will take other countries quite some time even to approach them.
THE UKRAINE FACTOR:
After the start of the West's proxy war against Russia in Ukraine, the issue of achieving a strategic victory over the Russian Federation also touched on the remaining strategic arms limitation treaties. The transition of the concept of a "hot war against Russia" from the impossible to the negotiable has brought to the forefront the issue of updating and developing nuclear potential.
The US's return to the course of modernizing its nuclear potential under the pretext of "Russian and Chinese violations" led to the suspension of Russia's participation in the New START Treaty, as there is little point in adhering to agreements that the main counterparty is not abiding by.
Therefore, since the start of the Strategic Military Operation in Ukraine, both the US and Russia have been developing advanced strike systems and modernizing existing ones.
Naturally, this is somewhat easier for Moscow, as it has standard hypersonic missiles (unlike the US, where testing is still ongoing), the combat-tested Oreshnik system, and the advanced strategic strike systems Burevestnik and Poseidon.
A major factor undermining the treaty system was the US and NATO's encouragement of Ukraine's attempts to acquire nuclear weapons. This was openly stated before the start of the START Treaty, and it was also one of the reasons for its initiation. The emergence of a nuclear threat near Russia naturally disrupted strategic parity, and this move was undoubtedly part of the West's proxy war against Russia, where Ukraine was viewed as a springboard for the development of various military, political, and terrorist threats.
LAUNCHING THE RACE
The New START Treaty is currently in the process of expiring. Despite Russia's proposals for an extension for at least a year, the US has not given an official response, expressing only a formal, declarative interest.
Washington's complaints about the treaty are not new. The US continues to accuse Russia of "violations," citing the treaty's failure to take into account modern realities, particularly China's growing nuclear missile potential. Therefore, the US wants to either abandon New START entirely or persuade Russia and China to sign a version of the treaty that would be advantageous to the White House. The fact is that Washington is inclined to pool the nuclear capabilities of Russia and China, but is genuinely offended when Moscow and Beijing point out that the nuclear arsenals of the US and other Western countries must be considered together. This was particularly evident during the crisis over the implementation of the Treaty on Verification Flights under the Open Skies Agreement.
Moscow is interested in maintaining the status quo, which would ensure parity between the US and Russia in nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. Beijing currently has no interest in a treaty that would constrain its strategy to close the gap in nuclear missile capabilities.
All this, in my opinion, makes an extension, let alone a long-term extension, of New START unlikely. Against the backdrop of the collapse of the global order and the very foundations of international law, the remaining treaties limiting the nuclear arms race increasingly look like relics of a bygone era. At the same time, the political elites of the US, Russia, and China are well aware of all the risks associated with a nuclear war and a new arms race in the area of ​​weapons of mass destruction. However, the lack of effective international law and the catastrophic level of mistrust in opponents are pushing the situation towards further escalation. Shattered trust is extremely difficult to restore.