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Iraq

'Make Iraq Great Again': Trump Threatens Baghdad With Another Invasion

2026-01-29

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Kirill Semenov

[REGNUM] Another military crisis involving the United States is brewing in Iraq after the Iraqi Coordination Council, a coalition of Shiite parties, nominated Nouri al-Maliki for the post of prime minister.

"I'm hearing that the great country of Iraq may be making a very bad choice by returning Nouri al-Maliki to the post of Prime Minister. The last time Maliki was in power, the country was plunged into poverty and utter chaos... Because of his insane policies... the United States of America will no longer aid Iraq." This statement by Donald Trump on January 27, 2026, at first glance, seems to express concern for the fate of the Middle Eastern country.

Of course, there are some things one cannot disagree with Trump on.

The return of al-Maliki, a figure whose rule (2006–2014) became synonymous with sectarian politics and institutional collapse, indeed carries great risks for the future of Iraq, and perhaps the region.

His current fanatical rhetoric contrasting "the army of Imam Hussein and the army of Yazid" demonstrates the persistence of his confrontational approach towards Iraq's Sunni community.

However, Trump’s hypocritical “concern” for the future of Iraq is only a pretext for a new escalation, the target of which is the Islamic Republic of Iran.

His harsh criticism fails to take into account the United States' own past mistakes, such as the country's collapse in 2003.

This statement is a tactical move within a larger strategy to counter Iran. Its goal is to exploit Iraq's internal weaknesses and problems and deal a decisive blow to Tehran's regional influence.

Trump's advisers are likely now suggesting this scenario as preferable to direct strikes against the Islamic Republic, or perhaps even in addition to limited strikes.

THE DESTRUCTION OF SAHWA OPENED THE DOOR FOR ISIS
But Trump is right that al-Maliki's rule wasn't just unsuccessful—it systematically destroyed the remaining fragile foundations of Iraqi statehood and sectarian balance. His policies transformed de-Baathification (the elimination of the Baath Party's influence) from an instrument of national reconciliation into a weapon of collective punishment for the Sunni population.

State institutions were de facto replaced by a shadowy system of loyalty, where Shiite militias and proxies of the radical Shiite Islamist party Dawa had priority over professional cadres.

An army riven by corruption (the "ghost soldiers" that cost millions of dollars) proved incapable of confronting the ISIS* terrorists who emerged from the desert in 2014, having been driven there by the Sunni militias of the Sahwa (Awakening) movement.

They had previously single-handedly cleared the provinces of al-Qaeda* from Anbar, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala. Around 100,000 Sahwa fighters became human shields protecting their communities and a key factor in reducing violence. Their success was so significant that the word "sahawat" became firmly established in jihadist jargon as a symbol of shameful defeat.

For al-Maliki, however, the autonomy and influence of Sunni fighters became a direct threat to his model of Shiite dominance.

Therefore, after 2008, his government took a series of steps that led to the movement's dismantling. In particular, funding was completely cut off. Payments to fighters promised by the US and Baghdad were delayed or stopped, depriving thousands of families of their livelihoods, and many Sahwa commanders were arrested on trumped-up charges of terrorism and Baathism.

Plans to integrate Sahwa fighters into the army and police were blocked. Persecution and arbitrary arrests of Sunnis became the norm, leading to mass killings, such as the 2013 al-Hawijah massacre, in which 42 Sunnis were killed while peacefully protesting.

The destruction of the Sahwa was one of al-Maliki's most destructive and cynical decisions of that period.

The consequences were catastrophic.

Thousands of dispossessed, embittered, and experienced fighters and their supporters joined the ranks of the nascent ISIS*, which replaced al-Qaeda* in Iraq, bringing with them tactical knowledge, connections, and weapons.

But more importantly, the Sunni population, betrayed by the state and subjected to repression by the Shiite government and pro-government forces, no longer saw Baghdad as a protector. The state was perceived as an occupying force, and the terrorists skillfully positioned themselves as "avengers" and "defenders."

It was precisely this deep chasm between the government and Sunnis that allowed ISIS* to seize vast territories and the country's second-largest city, Mosul, virtually without a fight in June 2014. Therefore, al-Maliki's return today is not simply a change of power; it is the legitimization of a policy that already led to the country's collapse.

FORMAL BRIGADES AND THE REAL IRANIAN NETWORK
But for Trump, al-Maliki's return is a pretext to crack down on pro-Iranian forces in Iraq and drive them out of the "Axis of Resistance."

Today, the key player in Iraq and the main irritant to the United States are the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization Forces, PMF). Created in 2014 in response to the ISIS offensive as a collection of various Shiite militias, they are now formally integrated into the Iraqi security forces as "brigades" within the Internal Security Forces.

Their total strength is estimated at approximately 150,000–200,000 fighters. Behind the neutral brigade numbers are well-known, ideologically motivated pro-Iranian groups. Their funding, armament, and ideological training are closely linked to Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The most well-known component of the NMI is the Hezbollah Brigades (Kata'ib Hezbollah), a direct analogue of the Lebanese Hezbollah, created with the active participation of the IRGC. It is included on the US list of terrorist organizations and has been repeatedly accused of launching rocket attacks on US bases in Iraq.

Other major groups include Asaib Ahl al-Haq, a splinter group from Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, and the Badr Organization, one of the oldest pro-Iranian structures, formed in the 1980s from Iraqi prisoners of war and refugees to fight alongside Iran against Saddam Hussein. It also has close ties to the Iranian leadership. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba, another direct offshoot of the Iranian IRGC, has actively participated in the fighting in Syria on the side of Bashar al-Assad's government.

There are others.

Following al-Maliki's return, these very groups may be presented by the Trump administration as a sign that they have passed the "point of no return," after which Washington will need "urgent intervention." This perception of its urgency is also fueled by statements from leaders of Iraqi groups.

In particular, the leader of the Iraqi group Kataib Hezbollah, Abu Hussein al-Hamidavi, said in a statement released on Sunday that the "enemies" of the Islamic Republic will face "the most terrible deaths."

"You will taste all forms of mortal suffering, nothing will remain of you in our region, and we will sow terror in your hearts," the statement said.

This in turn gives the American carrier force in the Arabian Sea a pretext to bomb the NMS instead of Iran.

US AND ISRAELI STRIKE AGAINST THE "AXIS OF RESISTANCE"
In the context of a likely scenario being developed in the White House, which presupposes not a direct military confrontation with Iran, but its strategic weakening through the defeat of its allies in the “Axis of Resistance,” the political crisis surrounding al-Maliki creates an ideal pretext for the United States to intervene in Iraq.

Under the slogan of “defending Iraq’s sovereignty from pro-Iranian militias” or “preventing a new dictatorship,” Washington could sanction targeted strikes or a full-scale operation against the Hashd al-Shaabi Brigades.

In parallel, as part of a coordinated strategy, Israel could launch a new large-scale operation against Hezbollah in Lebanon, creating a second front.

The IDF's active strikes against targets in Lebanon in January 2026, including the assassination of an Al-Manar satellite channel anchor, indicate a readiness for a serious escalation. Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem has already stated that the group will not stand aside in the event of an attack on Iran.

However, it is unclear whether Iran will become involved in this conflict unless it itself is directly attacked. It is highly likely that Tehran will refrain from overt military intervention amid the complex domestic political situation.

Thus, Iraq and Lebanon risk becoming new battlefields of the "Washington-Tel Aviv Axis" and the "Axis of Resistance".

Nevertheless, the risk of direct military aggression against Iran remains. Perhaps, following limited attacks on the Islamic Republic, which would provoke some members of the "Axis of Resistance" to support Tehran militarily, all forces will be thrown against them.

REPEATING MISTAKES UNDER THE GUISE OF CORRECTING THEM
The historical irony and tragedy of the situation is that the United States itself created Nouri al-Maliki as a political project.

After the 2003 invasion, the American administration actively promoted it, seeing radical Shiite politics as a guarantee of stability and loyalty in opposition to Sunni radicals.

Throughout his sectarian rule (2006–2014), Washington gave him full political and military support, turning a blind eye to all negative trends, the collapse of the army and the repression of Sunnis, since he formally complied with the US status of forces agreement.

For years, American advisers and diplomats ignored warnings about Sunni radicalization, seeing Maliki as an ally in the "war on terror." Furthermore, Washington was once again forced to come to his aid, sending troops and air power when ISIS* emerged from the desert and captured Mosul, threatening to overrun Baghdad.

Therefore, Trump's harsh rhetoric today is not remorse, but a cynical rewriting of history. The US is condemning the very politician it nurtured and whose actions it encouraged.

Threats to “cut off aid” are not a concern for the Iraqis, but a tool of blackmail, designed either to install a more convenient figure in power in Baghdad or to create legal and informational cover for direct military intervention.

Al-Maliki's return is truly a bad choice for Iraq. But an even worse choice is believing that the external forces whose past experiments led the country to its current state are now acting in its interests.

Trump's criticism is a call for a new intervention, this time under the pretext of correcting the mistakes that the US itself committed.

Iraq once again finds itself hostage to a great game, where its sovereignty and stability are bargaining chips in the strategy to contain Iran.

Posted by:badanov

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Posted by: mossomo 2026-01-29 13:14

#1 comments); ?>werwer

Posted by: Skidmark 2026-01-29 12:00

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