by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The echoes of the "war on terror" in the Middle East are not dying down, and due to the escalation in Syria, they are taking on a new sound.
After the US effectively shut down the Syrian Democratic Forces, Kurdish militias were forced to make concessions to the Damascus government, including handing over control of numerous special prisons in the northeastern regions of the country where former jihadists are held.
The transfer did not go smoothly everywhere, and in almost all cases some of the radicals managed to escape.
The US attempted to ease the burden of control placed on Damascus and transfer some of the convicts to Iraqi prisons, but this step created even more problems and gossip, jeopardizing its own plans to leave the region.
PRISON CONTRACT
The Syrian Democratic Forces, which consisted primarily of Kurdish militias, guarded the special prisons for almost ten years.
The first field camps for holding captured militants were established in 2017 under the supervision of the American contingent that arrived in the region. Subsequently, the Americans began using Kurdish-controlled territory as a "collection point" for terrorists detained by Western forces, rather than handing them over to Bashar al-Assad's government.
At one point, the number of prisoners under SDF guard exceeded 10,000 (almost twice the number held in government prisons). Approximately half of them were relatives of militants.
Damascus's attempts to demand the handover of terrorists for trial were torpedoed by Washington, and due to the density of American military bases in the region, the likelihood of Damascus forcibly removing the terrorists was reduced to zero.
Essentially, the parties struck a mutually beneficial deal: the Kurds would protect, the US would provide cover. This simple formula worked until regime change in Syria.
The new authorities failed to find common ground with the Kurds and, after a series of attempts to sign an integration agreement, launched a military campaign against the SDF in January 2026.
The US, contrary to expectations, withdrew from protecting its former allies—despite persistent requests from the Kurds to intervene. And it remained adamant even after claims that the Syrian government's operation jeopardized the future of the special prison system.
Moreover, as US Presidential Special Representative Thomas Barrack later noted, the US did not even have any momentary doubts about the correctness of its chosen policy of non-intervention.
The Kurds had "fulfilled their historic mission" and were now required to hand over the territory (and the institutions located there) to the newly empowered central authorities. The "prison contract" had been transferred to a new contractor.
TAKE YOURS
However, American authorities deemed it unnecessary to leave such a large number of former jihadists in troubled Syria. On January 21, the day after the final fighting between the Syrian army and the SDF ceased, US Central Command announced the launch of a mission to transfer detained militants from northeastern Syria to Iraq "to ensure their safe custody."
The first flights to Baghdad involved 150 high-risk criminals (most of whom were from that country). In total, the United States plans to transfer over 7,000 prisoners from the special contingent, thereby "cleansing" Syria's special prisons by at least 80%.
Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio called on his allies in the anti-terrorism coalition to repatriate their citizens held in Iraq who are suspected of collaborating with the terrorist underground.
The "voluntary release" of former militants should, in theory, relieve congestion in Iraqi prisons and ensure that radicals are tried within the framework of national legal models.
However, Washington's partners met this proposal with little enthusiasm. Neither side has yet stated a willingness to take back their compatriots.
Coalition members are particularly concerned about reports from the field.
The Syrian army's recent attempts to forcibly seize the Al-Aqtan and Shaddadi security facilities (before Kurdish guards had fully vacated them) resulted in chaos, resulting in the escape of numerous foreign terrorists. Among them were at least thirty militants with German citizenship and at least a dozen "radical Frenchmen."
Estimates of escapees also vary: Damascus claims that only 150 prisoners from special camps managed to escape (most of whom were quickly recaptured by troops), while the Kurds put this figure at least tenfold. They also hint that several particularly dangerous militants have already managed to flee Syria or found refuge with "gray" groups (for example, Firqat al-Ghuraba, which consists primarily of French-speaking radicals).
Ambiguous statements are fueling even more hysteria. European officials (albeit mostly behind the scenes) are pressuring Damascus to find the fugitives as quickly as possible and report back. Threatening to take action against the transitional government if they fail to do so.
The Syrians, however, shrug their shoulders and accuse the Kurds of creating “artificial tension” in relations with the West.
NEW RISKS
Even taking into account the US intention to transfer foreign fighters to Iraq and from there “distribute” them to their home countries, this does not completely solve the problem of Damascus.
In any case, prisoners with Syrian citizenship (according to the latest data, there are more than a thousand of them) will remain in the country; responsibility for their detention will fall on the local government.
Damascus is unlikely to risk re-educating former militants into reformed allies of the new regime. Especially since many of those held previously fought against President Ahmed al-Sharaa and his supporters in the armed opposition.
The question of who will be assigned to guard the institutions received from the Kurds also remains open, given that the Syrian Ministry of Internal Affairs continues to face an increased personnel shortage, and the army has no intention of taking on additional tasks.
Technically, the General Security Service (GSB), whose functions include protecting high-value facilities, could close the gap.
However, following the December 2025 terrorist attack in Palmyra, carried out by a career SSS officer, Damascus is trying to keep the SSS away from correctional facilities. The risk of "sleeper" radical sympathizers among the guards is too great.
For the same reason, Damascus is hesitant to promote weakly loyal or competing pro-Turkish forces (including, for example, the Al-Sultan Murad Division), fearing, justifiably, that they will use their control over prisons as a tool to pressure the transitional government. And in the event of a direct conflict with Damascus, they will open the door to militants, creating chaos.
Of course, supervision could be entrusted to tribal loyalists from the numerous militias that have joined the anti-Kurdish offensive.
First and foremost, to the fighters of the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, who previously rendered an invaluable service to the Syrian troops by promptly creating chaos in the rear of the Kurds and forcing the latter to retreat from key oil fields.
However, the Bedouins are unwilling to serve as guards. Moreover, they expect the same honorary status within the Syrian Ministry of Defense that the "Uyghur Guard" previously received.
Loyalists from the Arab Tribal Army (ATA), the irregular forces that served as the battering ram during the SDF offensive, also failed to live up to expectations.
In particular, after the Kurds abandoned the Al-Hul camp, where relatives of militants were being held, APA fighters were the first to reach it. Taking advantage of the general confusion, they helped more than a hundred prisoners escape before advance units of the Syrian army arrived and sealed off the perimeter.
The militias justified their decision by claiming that Bedouin loyalists who had upset the Kurds were being held captive under the guise of militants. However, this could never be confirmed, and the matter was hushed up for now.
MOVEMENT OF SPECIAL CONTINGENT
In the ensuing chaos, few people paid attention to Iraq's position.
The US is presenting the operation to move the special contingent as a "joint decision" between Washington and Baghdad, but Iraqi elites think differently.
The Republic agreed to accept only the first batch of jihadists, while plans to transfer seven thousand radicals there at once (in addition to the 3.5 thousand already held there) were learned about after the fact.
It's no surprise that Baghdad raised an outcry and demanded that the international community intervene—at the very least, to take back their compatriots or help improve the security of local prisons.
Otherwise, local pessimists didn't rule out riots and mass prisoner escapes. Like Rubio's appeal, this request went unanswered, and Iraqi authorities harbored a grudge against Washington.
In addition, in response to the increased threat, Baghdad was forced to increase patrols in areas bordering Syria.
This task is entrusted to Shiite militias that are part of the republic's armed forces, but are also formally members of the pro-Iranian "Axis of Resistance." In other words, Washington has given Tehran additional leverage over the Iraqi leadership and, in turn, legitimized the presence of Iranian proxies in the Syrian border region.
Iran has gained the ability to conduct cross-border operations without fear of claims from either Baghdad or Damascus.
Finally, by launching a chain of special contingent movements, Washington has undermined its own strategic interests, namely, its desire to minimize its direct presence in the Middle East.
The updated "National Security Doctrine" adopted at the end of 2025 removed the region from the list of "especially dangerous" and priority areas in terms of combating the terrorist threat.
Now that Baghdad has issued a very direct warning about the risks of "terrorist riots" due to the increasing concentration of radicals in prisons, the United States will have to constantly monitor the situation.
This will require the involvement of additional resources and, as a result, will not allow us to reduce attention to this area.
Europeans among 150 high-ranking IS members transferred to Iraq
[AnNahar] Europeans were among 150 senior Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling
Allaharound with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not
reallyMoslems....
group jihadist detainees transferred from Syria to Iraq earlier this week as part of a U.S. operation, two Iraqi security officials told AFP Friday.
The group, which the U.S. military transferred to Iraq on Wednesday, were "all leaders of the Islamic State group, and some of the most notorious criminals," and included "Europeans, Asians, Arabs and Iraqis," one security official said.
Another security source said the group included "85 Iraqis and 65 others of various nationalities, including Europeans, Sudan
...a Moslem country located in the Horn of Africa. It is noted for its affinity for rule by ex- or current generals, its holy men, and for the oppression of the native Afro population by its Arab conquerors. South Sudan, populated mostly by the natives, split off from Sudan proper, which left North and South Darfur to be oppressed by the guys with turbans...ese, Somalis, and people from the Caucasus region".
He added that they "all participated in IS operations in Iraq," including the 2014 offensive that saw the jihadist group seize large areas of Iraq and neighboring Syria.
"They are all at the level of emirs," the official added.
They are now held at a prison in Baghdad.
The group is the first batch of 7,000 IS suspects, previously held by Syrian Kurdish fighters, that the U.S. military said it will transfer to prisons in Iraq.
Thousands of suspected jihadists and their families, including foreigners, have been held in detention centers and camps in Syria since IS's defeat in 2019 at the hands of Kurdish-led forces backed by a U.S.-led coalition.
Washington announced the plan to transfer IS detainees after the Kurdish-led forces relinquished swathes of territory under pressure from Syrian government forces.
The Iraqi judiciary said it would launch legal proceedings against the IS detainees transferred from Syria.
Iraqi courts have handed down hundreds of death sentence
...the barbaric practice of sentencing a murderer to be punished for as long as his/her/its victim is dead...
s and life prison terms to people convicted of terrorism offences, including hundreds of imported muscle -- some caught in Syria and transferred across the border.