by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The rapid fighting of recent days has turned the situation in northeastern Syria upside down.
After abandoning their positions in Aleppo, supporters of the predominantly Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) attempted to retreat to regroup, but were caught up by government forces.
Through cunning and deception, Damascus managed to force the Kurds into an agreement on a ceasefire and their integration into the country's armed forces.
However, beyond the scope of the brief negotiations, many pressing issues remained that could potentially roil Syria again.
CONTROLLED ESCAPE
After abandoning the Kurdish neighborhoods of Aleppo, they retreated to the southwestern part of Raqqa province. The new "border" between the SDF and government forces stabilized by January 17 and, according to the agreement, was to remain so until the conclusion of negotiations.
However, the very next day, Damascus made a surprise move, taking control of nearly 40 settlements east of the Euphrates River, cutting off part of Deir ez-Zor province.
The SDF's southwestern flank came under attack from several sides at once, and the Kurds were forced to hastily abandon their positions and cross to the other side of the Euphrates.
It is worth noting that former supporters of the "Deir ez-Zor Military Council" (consisting mainly of nomadic Arabs) made an invaluable contribution to the collapse of the Kurdish front.
Previously, this structure was an ally of the SDS, but after the failed coup of 2023, it was destroyed, and its leaders were arrested or exiled to neighboring countries.
Now, sensing the approach of government forces, the Military Council took up arms again and helped Damascus seize four of Syria's largest oil and gas fields: Conoco, Kafra, Al-Omar, and Tanim.
A day later, on January 18, government forces captured the Tishreen Dam and took the city of Al-Hasakah (the de facto capital of the SDF) in a pincer movement, thereby putting the Syrian Kurds, who during the civil war had achieved not only de facto autonomy but also, with the help of the Americans and Arab tribal militias, controlled significant oil and agricultural resources in Syria, on the brink of final defeat.
At the crucial moment, even the United States turned its back on the Kurds. Although Washington condemned Damascus's penchant for using force to resolve issues, it did nothing to stem the mounting offensive. The future of the "Kurdish project" in Syria depended solely on the Kurds themselves.
Against this backdrop, SDF Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi hastily traveled to Damascus to persuade interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa to stop the operation.
And he succeeded: albeit at the cost of an agreement signed that same day on the final integration of the SDF into the ranks of the Syrian Armed Forces.
UNSTEADY VICTORIES
During the brief negotiations, Damascus took almost complete control, as evidenced by the overall tone of the new version of the agreement between the SDF and the Syrian authorities. Some of the "red lines" that SDF leaders had been defending for the past year were erased.
Among other things, the Kurds' demand to retain at least three fully-equipped brigades (with their own commanders) within the new armed forces was not heeded; instead, SDF soldiers and officers will be separately integrated into the Syrian Ministry of Defense, and Kurdish units will be significantly diluted with representatives from other factions.
In addition, as a counter-condition, Damascus established a procedure for checking the biographies of the commanders of the formed brigades - and the dismissal from the armed forces of those officers who maintained close contact with the Kurdistan Workers' Party, Lebanese Hezbollah and other "unacceptable" groups and movements.
This seriously reduces the "personnel reserve" of the Kurdish forces and forces a significant portion of the SDF's high-ranking commanders into political retirement.
The balance of power on the ground has evolved similarly: Kurdish-populated areas have received de facto autonomy from Damascus, albeit significantly curtailed. The governor of Al-Hasakah will be appointed by Damascus, and all SDF-nominated candidates for government positions will need to be approved by the central government.
At the same time, the Asayish police units that worked as part of the SDF also found themselves out of work – supervision of prisons and refugee camps, as well as the overall coordination of law enforcement activities, is being taken over by the Syrian Ministry of Interior.
The SDF leaders cannot yet count on forming their own “pocket army” similar to the Iraqi Peshmerga.
Of course, Damascus, following Washington's insistent recommendation, didn't forget to sweeten the pill a bit and grant the Kurds a number of symbolic victories. For example, the Presidential Office issued orders permitting the teaching of the Kurdish language in schools—for the first time in over 60 years.
Furthermore, it was announced that all Kurds would be granted Syrian citizenship without any additional vetting procedures. This latter move is particularly important given that at least 300,000 people lacked any documents, and that numerous people from other countries where Kurds constitute a minority have migrated to SDF-controlled areas of Syria over the past decade.
Finally, Navruz (a March New Year's holiday with Zoroastrian roots. - Ed.) has received the status of a national holiday.
NEW RISKS
Although the Kurds, at first glance, appeared to have traded territorial control quite favorably and gained more freedoms and opportunities than they had during Rojava's peak period of power, a clear ideological rift emerged in the confederation against the backdrop of the curtailment of its autonomy.
Some leaders did not understand or accept such a clear surrender of positions and promised to continue the struggle in a personal capacity.
The weakening of the enemy was not lost on supporters of a harsh suppression of the “spread of Syria,” of whom there are still many in the government.
Immediately after the agreement between Damascus and the SDF leadership was announced, the Syrian Ministry of Defense announced a ceasefire. However, despite this, fighting continued in the former Kurdish territories.
Having stopped at the captured lines, Damascus threw forward irregular forces, including the so-called “Arab Tribal Army” (ATA), consisting of Bedouin militias and having personal scores to settle with the Kurds.
This predictably provoked additional tensions on the ground.
For example, an attempt by APA fighters to attack an SDF convoy in the city of Al-Hasakah and set fire to Kurdish vehicles resulted in the start of a large-scale “counter-terrorism operation” in the local district and surrounding villages.
According to Syrian media reports, the death toll has exceeded 120 people, some of whom are not members of the APA.
Given that the Bedouins have already promised blood feuds to their offenders, there is a high risk of a repeat of mass ethnic cleansing—similar to what occurred with the participation of Bedouins in the Druze-populated As-Suwayda in 2025—but this time against the Kurds.
Moreover, the question remains open as to how Damascus will thank the Deir ez-Zor Military Council, which so timely raised an uprising in the Kurdish rear and ensured the return of key resource bases to government control.
The Bedouin's list of demands is extensive—from the extradition of those responsible for the massacre of the Council's leadership in 2023 to the unilateral resettlement of Kurds from Arab-majority areas and the transfer of a portion of oil and gas revenues to nomadic leaders. Although Damascus has not yet decided to what extent it will grant the request, it has no reason to quarrel with the new loyalists.
The current state of affairs greatly increases the risk of new pockets of resistance emerging in post-war Syria.
The weakened, but not completely disunited, Kurds, if pressure from new loyalists increases, may well resume resistance; especially since many authoritative commanders remain outside the framework of the "Abdi-al-Sharaa pact."
Israel may well act as the “shadow sponsor” of the remnants of the Kurdish resistance.
Tel Aviv is interested in maintaining “points of tension” within Syria, which would allow it to justify the strengthening of the IDF presence in the Golan Heights and in the Druze Mountains region, and therefore is unlikely to miss such a tempting opportunity.
Moreover, military ideologists close to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have repeatedly suggested that he pay attention to the potential of Kurdish commanders and “use it in a timely manner” to strengthen Israel’s position in the region.