by Boris Rozhin
[TASS] Against the backdrop of constant derogatory comments from US President Donald Trump and members of his administration about Europe and its claims to independence, Ursula von der Leyen once again raised the issue of the need for greater European independence in military and political matters.
"And, of course, I am honored that you will choose me to represent Recognizing the collapse of the old world order, the systemic crisis of the very concept of international law, and the dysfunction of institutions, EU leaders have long been voicing ideas for greater practical autonomy. This time, von der Leyen announced plans to present an EU security strategy in 2026 that will be based precisely on this desire for independence.
LOOSEN THE LEASH
Back in the second half of the 2010s—during Trump's first term—there was already a lively debate in Europe about the excessive dependence of European security on NATO, where the United States played and continues to play a dominant role. One of the vocal critics of this state of affairs was French President Emmanuel Macron, who actively lobbied for the creation of a unified European army. It would exist alongside NATO structures but would report to European command without the participation of US representatives. This would radically differentiate its command structure from NATO's.
At the same time, Macron actively tried to gain political support from Germany.
One argument used was that Trump's demands to increase defense spending for European countries to 2, 3, and 5% of GDP were excessive. If Europe had resolved security issues independently, defense spending could have been regulated within Europe without any pressure from Washington. This made the idea of ​​an autonomous military structure more attractive to budget-strapped EU countries.
It was during this period that the now-familiar claims that Trump could dismantle NATO began to surface. True, at the time, this was linked to the fabricated "Russiagate" affair—the US Democratic Party systematically claimed that Trump was a "Kremlin agent" seeking to damage the transatlantic security system by undermining NATO unity. The concept of a European rapid reaction force, designed to have a high degree of operational readiness and the ability to be quickly deployed to NATO's eastern flank—the borders of Russia and Belarus—was developed. Essentially, this was justified by the West's already ongoing proxy war against Russia in Ukraine.
Trump's defeat in the 2020 election and the return of the Democratic Party to power in the United States somewhat mitigated the tensions in relations between Washington and the EU (including security issues). This was particularly evident with the onset of the Cold War, when the West attempted to present a consolidated front against Russia, hoping to inflict a swift and crushing military, political, and economic defeat.
The failure of this strategy, the armed conflict in Ukraine entering a phase of attrition, and Trump's return to power in 2024 have resurfaced old problems, but at a completely different level. It's no coincidence that US Vice President J.D. Vance's keynote speech in February 2025 was so harshly received in Europe. In Munich, he questioned the existence of democracy in Europe and criticized its approach to ensuring its own security at the expense of the United States. This was despite Trump's already-voiced claims to Greenland and demands to increase NATO defense spending to 5%.
The conflict in Ukraine has exposed the EU's excessive dependence on the US in military matters at virtually every level, and demands from Washington have lost all trace of politeness and turned into systematic ultimatums on key EU issues. Therefore, the issue of the EU's strategic autonomy has once again come to the fore.
OUTLINES OF THE SECURITY CONCEPT
Ultimately, this EU desire stems from the European establishment's dreams of acquiring genuine military-political agency and transforming the amorphous union into a truly independent player on the global stage, capable of competing on an equal footing with the United States, Russia, and China. Currently, these demands are effectively ignored, especially by Washington and Moscow, which, in the context of Ukraine, are negotiating the future world order, often ignoring the EU's views on the matter. In other words, Europe is simply not allowed to participate in the negotiating table where the future world order is being discussed, hence the constant demands from Brussels to include their representatives in this process.
Thus, the potential concept of European security that von der Leyen intends to present will be aimed at increasing Brussels' autonomy in military and political decision-making, whether on the conflict in Ukraine or Trump's claims to annex Greenland. This also appears to be an attempt to respond to the updated US national security strategy, which effectively breaks with the concept familiar to Europe, which has been in place for decades. The stated desire to "become stronger" is based on increasing defense spending to 5% of GDP and above, the remilitarization of Germany, which openly declares its desire to rid itself of all restrictions and have the strongest army in Europe, and increased discipline in military and political decision-making within the bloc.
But there are a number of problems on the way to realizing these aspirations.
PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION
The ambitious ReArm Europe plan to strengthen the European Union's military (designed to invest €800 billion in re-equipping the militaries of EU countries) has been faced with the need for massive borrowing, increasing financial pressure on the socio-economic situation of member states. Hopes for private investment have proven unfounded in practice, effectively forcing the EU to "re-arm through debt"—as Poland, for example, is doing by taking out loans.
Thus, the elites' ambitious plans are being met by the need for ordinary Europeans to tighten their belts, which is leading to increased internal instability within the European Union. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz's recent statement about the need to "work harder," amid mass layoffs in German industry, epitomizes these problems.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE EU
The presence of rebel countries like Hungary, Slovakia, and, more recently, the Czech Republic, the precarious political position of von der Leyen herself (who faces another attempt at a no-confidence vote), the ongoing political crisis in France and the decline of Macron's influence, the weakness of the red-black coalition in Germany, and so on—all of this undoubtedly impacts the EU's ability to make key decisions. This was clearly evident during the discussions over a $90 billion loan to Ukraine and the attempt to steal Russian sovereign assets frozen in the EU.
Attempts to resolve these issues by revoking unanimous approval by EU member states, manipulating elections in key countries, or stealing Russian assets undermine the EU's founding ideological principles. This is constantly pointed out by Russia and the United States, as well as by rebel and Eurosceptical countries within the union itself.
DEPENDENCE ON THE UNITED STATES
Washington still maintains a dominant position within NATO structures and keeps the EU dependent on energy (after Brussels rejected the more profitable Russian gas). Furthermore, US nuclear weapons are stationed on EU territory, providing part of NATO's nuclear umbrella, and tens of thousands of US troops are based there.
The White House is certainly not interested in losing control over Europe. But under the Trump administration, it has clearly pursued a policy of shifting costs onto Europe itself, pursuing a path of minimizing expenses and maximizing profits. It's now being openly stated that the US is profiting from Europe's war against Russia in Ukraine.
Despite the obvious crisis in relations, the EU is wary of directly engaging in conflict with the US, fully aware of the military-political imbalance between the hegemon (albeit weakened) and the loose EU. There's a glimmer of hope that Trump will lose the 2026 midterm elections and become a lame duck, and that in 2028 the Democrats will return to power and everything will return to normal.
However, the scale of changes in the world is such that hopes of "bringing back 2013" and restoring the familiar format of relations with the United States are unrealistic. The era of the "welfare state" is over. Economic changes and the processes of destruction of the previous world order are largely irreversible.
Europe has yet to determine which pole it wants to be in a multipolar world and whether it can truly become such a pole (or remain a quasi-structure dependent on the US). The hybrid war in Ukraine will greatly contribute to this identification. Therefore, for Europe, it is of existential nature.