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Arabia

'Collection of Downed Pilots': The UAE Saved the Houthi Enemy from Yemeni Revenge

2026-01-17

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] The former leader of Yemen's now de facto defunct Southern Transitional Council (STC), Major General Aidarus al-Zubaidi, whose high-handedness has caused a falling out between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, continues to stir up trouble in and around Yemen.

After disappearing from the airwaves for almost a week, the southerner suddenly reappeared, calling on his supporters to "fight for the freedom of the South to the end." This not only further soured relations between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi but also drew new countries into the squabble, which had previously only nominally followed events in Yemen.

DANGEROUS DELUSIONS
It is believed that al-Zubaidi was at the origins of the “counter-terrorism operation,” under the guise of which the southerners attempted to seize the disputed provinces of Yemen.

And it was he who convinced the UAE that the Saudi-backed northerners had lost their fighting ability, were only nominally in control of critical provinces, and that the local population was only waiting for the arrival of Emirati proxies.

Moreover, al-Zubaidi has consistently reported a critical decline in Saudi involvement in Yemeni affairs, citing, among other things, closed discussions that took place in the presidential council (which is composed predominantly of northerners).

Lacking alternative sources of information due to the fact that all southerners on the Council were represented exclusively by al-Zubaidi's minions, Abu Dhabi ultimately believed it had a unique opportunity to subjugate pro-Saudi tribes and undermine Riyadh's position in Yemen. And so it agreed to the southerners' blitzkrieg.

In the end, the exact opposite happened: Saudi Arabia intervened in the conflict very quickly. And, what's more, directly, striking the rebels from the sea, air, and land.

A few days later, tribal militias that had supported the southerners defected to the Saudis and helped clamp down on their former overlords. The southern project was on the brink of collapse.

ESCAPE IN MAKEUP
The critical discrepancy between al-Zubaidi's reports and the realities on the ground cost him dearly: the Emirates decided to shut down the "State of South Arabia" project, which had been in the works for almost ten years, and stopped supplying the southerners.

The Emirati advisers present in the country were quickly recalled home. As a result, the STC was left alone against the growing pro-Saudi coalition.

However, at the last minute, the Emirates decided to take al-Zubaidi with them. Apparently, they believed that the northerners, with Riyadh's tacit approval, would turn the arrest of the former southern leader into a political show and further tarnish the Emirates' reputation.

Interestingly, al-Zubaidi had to flee to Abu Dhabi quickly, leaving most of his property and savings in Yemen.

Moreover, the former head of the SPS was allegedly forced to disguise himself as a private militiaman to avoid being lynched by his own subordinates. This latter claim, however, is unsupported by anything other than anonymous statements from former southern commanders.

Interestingly, the former head of the SPS still denies fleeing. Moreover, he's been strenuously trying to convince his supporters that he's been plotting a counterattack all along, calling on them to protest "in the name of the South." However, the new campaign is proceeding extremely sluggishly, and his calls remain largely unheeded.

A LONG VOYAGE
Al-Zubaidi didn't reach the UAE immediately. For a time, he found refuge in the autonomous Puntland region of Somalia, where the UAE controlled several military facilities.

Somali authorities reacted painfully to rumors about the disgraced STC leader's resettlement, fearing the spread of the "Yemeni vendetta" to their country, which has more than enough problems of its own.

In retaliation for this arbitrary action, Mogadishu terminated all existing security and defense agreements with the UAE. This decision was motivated, among other things, by the fact that Abu Dhabi was supplying separatists in Sudan through Somali hubs, thereby undermining stability in Africa.

Although al-Zubaidi's name didn't appear in any of the statements, his presence clearly became the cause of the dispute, as the "Sudanese flights" from UAE bases in Somalia were known to Mogadishu almost from the very first day.

Saudi Arabia contributed to the critical campaign, seizing the opportunity to further taunt its opponents. Riyadh supported Mogadishu's decision and promised to "help uphold justice" if necessary.

Despite the fact that Somali authorities have only limited control over the autonomous regions and would not have been able to expel the Emirati military by force, the UAE took the hint the first time and did not escalate the situation.

There was an attempt to evacuate the former leader of the southerners to Somaliland, a quasi-state whose territories were once part of Somalia. Apparently, the plan was to temporarily hand over the decommissioned leader to the Israelis, Abu Dhabi's allies under the Abraham Accords. Shortly before, Tel Aviv officially recognized Somaliland's statehood and had already set up forward pickets there.

True, the Israelis weren't exactly thrilled to welcome their distinguished guest either. Especially since, as head of the STC, al-Zubaidi had tried to inflate his own image and sabotaged Israeli intelligence operations in every way possible, preventing the latter from establishing a stronghold against the Houthis in Yemen.

Moreover, Israel proved uninterested in getting involved in the squabble between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, preferring to remain neutral for now. As a result, the Emirates had no choice but to evacuate al-Zubaidi, who had already moved to three countries in less than a week.

GHOSTLY CHANCES
Despite his bellicose statements, al-Zubaidi is in no hurry to return to Yemen. And it's unlikely he'll be able to return there in the foreseeable future: his former allies in the anti-Houthi coalition consider him a traitor. Both northerners and some southerners, who paid for the former STC leader's escapades with their careers, do so.

Yemen's leadership aims to turn the "al-Zubaidi case" into a show trial, discredit his ideas and thereby destroy the very foundation of the southern independence movement.

Work in this direction has already begun. Yemen's Attorney General, Qaher Mustafa, recently ordered an investigation into al-Zubaidi and his inner circle.

The package of charges is more than serious and includes such serious articles as undermining the military, political and economic stability of Yemen, using the “southern issue” for selfish purposes and disrupting the inter-Yemeni settlement.

Under all the articles, al-Zubaidi faces at least life imprisonment in his home country.

There's little chance of putting the matter on hold. Especially since Fawzi Ali Saif Said, a heavyweight northern politician and longtime adversary of al-Zubaidi, has been appointed to lead the investigation.

Said has broad powers to summon and arrest suspects regardless of rank or name, and he has the backing of not only the President of Yemen but also the House of Saud. This makes his reach virtually limitless.

At the same time, the northerners dealt a blow to al-Zubaidi's last lever of influence: Faraj Salmin al-Bahsani, the former vice-president of the STC and governor of the oil-rich province of Hadramaut, was removed from the Presidential Council.

However, the decision was largely bureaucratic. Al-Bahsani himself, like his former boss, is currently undergoing treatment in the Emirates and apparently has no plans to return home.

COLD WORLD
As tensions mount between the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the pro-Iranian Houthis watch the conflict from the sidelines and prefer not to interfere.

Neither local politicians nor opinion leaders loyal to the movement have ever commented on the clashes between northerners and southerners, nor have they supported the claims of either side.

There's a simple explanation for this: after such a dramatic shift in the balance of power in Yemen, only two de facto permanent centers of power remain. These are the Iranian-backed Houthis and the Saudi-supplied northerners, who have absorbed some of the southern forces and resources. And both are roughly equal. At least for now.

For this reason, Sana'a prefers not to escalate the conflict with Riyadh—or with the local legitimate government that returned to Aden after the failure of the southern coup.

And although the temptation to launch preemptive strikes against the northerners is too great, there are no willing to repeat al-Zubaidi's mistakes. So, thanks to the southerners' gamble, a "cold peace" has once again been established in Yemen.

As for the former leader of the STC, his career is clearly over: the UAE has become disillusioned with the "State of South Arabia" project and is unlikely to try to revive it.

Although the fugitive may retain indirect participation in the political affairs of the Middle East: the UAE has a tendency to gather “downed pilots” near the throne.

It is possible that al-Zubaidi is destined for the same political retirement as the disgraced Palestinian security official Mohammed Dahlan, who serves as an adviser at the court and consults with the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi.

Posted by:badanov

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