by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The year 2025 has been a challenging one for Iran. The country faces pressure on all fronts, from military to diplomatic. Domestic and foreign policy challenges, as well as social and environmental issues, have all overlapped.
And although Tehran has successfully navigated most of its difficult situations, it's too early to talk about the country's darkest hour. Not least because the country is currently gripped by protests by merchants, sparked by the depreciation of the Iranian rial.
DIPLOMATIC DIFFICULTIES
Contrary to expectations, Iran failed to achieve major diplomatic victories in 2025. Negotiations on the nuclear deal, on which Tehran had placed great stakes, reached a deadlock by the summer.
It became clear that the parties (primarily the US) were unwilling to make even minimal compromises and wanted to "sell" Iran even more restrictions under the guise of a deal. After a series of high-level meetings, the discussions were frozen.
Tehran also failed to reach an agreement with Europe and thereby create a counterweight to the United States: the "European troika" (France, Great Britain, Germany) took a "hawkish" position and at some point even surpassed the United States in the toughness of its demands in negotiations.
As a result, the situation for Iranian diplomacy has become a stalemate.
Of course, the miscalculations in the Western direction were stabilized by expanding contacts with Russia and China, but Tehran was unable to fully utilize the “friends from the East” factor in negotiations, including on Syria.
A certain desynchronization is also evident in the dialogue with movements and parties that make up the pro-Iranian "Axis of Resistance" in the Middle East. Tehran, apparently, has not yet fully determined the limits of its support for the forces fighting in Gaza. Moreover, it was caught off guard by Donald Trump's "peace plan" for Gaza and therefore de facto withdrew after the ceasefire was declared.
Forces loyal to Iran have also had to change their strategy on their own – which is especially noticeable in the example of the Yemeni Houthis and Lebanese Hezbollah, who stopped their operations literally “on the fly.”
ELITE SPLIT
The most acute internal challenge for Tehran has long been the rivalry between the "hawks" (conservative politicians, clergy and military) and the more flexible reformists.
The polarization of Iranian elites that arose after the death of Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi in a plane crash in late 2024 has only intensified over time.
The "hawks," aligned with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and key figures in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), advocated a tougher stance toward the West, a "tightening of the screws" within the country, and a gradual transition to a "besieged fortress" regime.
Reformists led by President Masoud Pezeshkian, on the contrary, tried to initiate a "thaw" in the country by repealing some controversial laws and regulations of the "hawks", and also to reach a diplomatic deal with the West.
The forces and influence of the disputing parties were roughly comparable, forcing them to seek balance in the new system of relations. And by the end of the year, such a balance had indeed been achieved.
After the 12-day war with Israel in June 2025, when the West de facto supported Israeli strikes, the hawks received a universal argument in the dispute with those who saw peace as an opportunity to escape the sanctions trap.
Hardliners were able to maintain the national nuclear program's vector and achieve the consolidation of Iranian society in the face of a common enemy.
The reformists also reaped benefits: for example, they completed the liberalization of rules related to wearing the hijab, strengthened technological sovereignty, and carried out reforms in education.
It's hard to say that either camp is happy with the current status quo, but given the ongoing conflict with Israel, neither wants to be seen as a "fifth column." Therefore, internal squabbles have been put on hold until better times.
DROUGHT AND SPY MANIA
But despite the relative stabilization of Iran's elites, numerous challenges remain within the domestic political landscape, undermining the country's stability. The most obvious is the water crisis.
In 2025, Iran faced a record-breaking drought, the likes of which local residents had not seen for at least half a century. Water shortages in major cities reached catastrophic levels; several cities, including the capital, have already begun evacuation plans.
Although precipitation gradually returned to normal by December, the acute phase of the crisis remains unresolved. The republic is virtually defenseless against a recurrence.
The Western-imposed economic blockade remains a major problem. Due to disagreements over Iran's nuclear program, the US and EU countries have dramatically increased sanctions pressure on Tehran, which has hit the well-being of ordinary Iranians.
Despite the fact that the country has long since established alternative financing mechanisms, and trade chains have been restructured to non-Western markets since the 2010s, it has not been possible to completely eliminate the problem.
The growing burden on the financial sector also hits the image of the government, which promised to reboot the economy and return the country to the global market.
Finally, residual reactions to official Tehran's confusion in the first hours of the June war, further exacerbated by spy mania, persist in society. Mutual suspicion has a significant impact on social cohesion and complicates its preparation for new challenges.
PREPARING FOR THE SIEGE
Tehran has little doubt that Iran will once again face Israel on the battlefield in 2026. Therefore, it is rapidly expanding its national defense capabilities to repel a hypothetical attack.
In the six months since the ceasefire, the Iranians have almost completely reformatted their air defense system, strengthening their defenses even in areas previously considered safe.
Furthermore, a rotation of personnel took place within the senior command staff, resulting in a nearly 80% renewal of the General Staff. Apparently, this was done to reshuffle the command and complicate any potential leaks from the highest offices.
On the other hand, the Iranians remain convinced that Israel will strike the same targets as last time – airfields, nuclear facilities and key military bases.
The Iranian leadership considers the likelihood that Tel Aviv will go beyond these limits to be minimal, and therefore, in a sense, they are preparing for “yesterday’s war.”