| Precisely as the Syrian branch of Al Qaeda intended — the hard jihad of the sword finished quickly. The easier, but slower, soft jihad of the law is taking place in front of our eyes. |
Context: The SDF’s area of control consolidated on the eastern bank of the Euphrates after Turkish-backed Syrian factions seized Manbij and Tel Rifaat following the Assad regime’s collapse in December 2024. The SDF now controls most of Hasakah and Raqqa provinces and roughly half of Deir Ezzor.
Analysis: Despite last-minute diplomatic efforts and US mediation to salvage the March agreement, there are growing signs that a breakthrough is unlikely by the intended year-end deadline. An extension remains possible, but likely only briefly – unlikely to run beyond March – and the odds of a real breakthrough are shrinking fast unless one side makes major, unexpected concessions. If that doesn’t happen, the prospect of escalation to subjugate the SDF by force increases.
Even setting aside the question of US political approval, the political geography itself gives each of the three actors a paradoxical advantage–disadvantage balance that complicates any move toward war.
1) The SDF: demographic weakness, geographic necessity
For the SDF, the core geographic problem is that large parts of what it controls sit well outside its comfort zone and popular base. That leaves a Kurdish-led project structurally fragile: despite years of governing Arab-majority areas in Deir Ezzor and Raqqa, and parts of Hasakah, the SDF has made limited inroads in winning hearts and minds there.
The rise of a Sunni-led order in Damascus further intensifies these demographic realities. Many Sunni Arabs are naturally drawn to an emerging authority that is also Sunni Arab. Two separate polls—The Economist in March and a newer survey by Arab Barometer—show support for Syria’s new leader Ahmad al-Sharaa at 81%. Notably, even after events between March and September–October (when the more recent poll was conducted), support for al-Sharaa remained at 81%. Both polls say they sampled across all provinces, including the SDF-run northeast and Sweida, though neither specifies what share of the sample came from those provinces. The overall direction is still clear: there is consolidated Sunni Arab support around al-Sharaa—and that matters directly for the SDF’s long-term prospects because a large portion of the population in its territory is Sunni Arab.
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