by Kirill Semenov
[REGNUM] 2025 has become a year of bitter paradoxes and agonizing impasse for the Gaza Strip and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, the shaky de-escalation, unfairly called a "truce" or "ceasefire," leaves some hope for a fragile calm that could last for several more months.
The word "peace" in this case would sound too pompous and unrealistic. And trying to peer beyond the horizons of the first month of spring 2026 would be like reading tea leaves.
In 2025, Hamas once again stood firm, and Israel once again failed to achieve its goals. However, this resilience of the Palestinian resistance came at the cost of nearly 30,000 lives lost in Gaza by the Israeli army in 2025, as well as hunger, disease, and other suffering among the enclave's residents, which devalues Hamas's achievements.
TRUCE PAST AND PRESENT
The outgoing year was marked by two truces.
Clearly, without the January ceasefire, the October one would not have happened. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu needed further confirmation of the futility of attempts to end the Gaza war with a "resounding victory."
However, the failure to resolve the tasks set by Israel threatens to result in a new military campaign, despite its obvious senselessness and the fact that it is incomprehensible to most Israelis after the liberation of the last remaining captive citizens.
However, for now, Netanyahu is leaving the possibility of a military scenario open: the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is establishing staging areas along the Yellow Line for a future offensive. An open zone hundreds of meters wide is being formed in the adjacent outer territory, where all buildings are being systematically destroyed, which also constitutes a violation of the ceasefire agreement.
This zone could allow the IDF to make a first deep push while avoiding losses if a decision is made to resume the war.
With diplomatic breakthroughs failing to materialise due to incessant bombing, political squabbles and winter storms, the prospect of renewed fighting seems very real.
Thus, the confrontation that began in 2023 had not been resolved by the end of 2025, entering a phase of unstable, bloody, and “frozen” pause, teetering on the brink of a full-scale resumption of war.
The formal ceasefire, which took effect on October 11, 2025, is violated daily: the IDF carries out almost daily bombing and artillery strikes, attempting to hunt Hamas commanders. Nearly 900 ceasefire violations have been recorded, resulting in the deaths of over 400 Palestinians, including 157 children, and the wounding of over 1,075.
This growing trend is confirmed by recent reports: on December 23, Israeli aircraft carried out strikes on the eastern Gaza Strip, Deir el-Balah, and Khan Yunis. On December 24–25, additional civilian casualties were recorded as a result of Israeli attacks, and apartment buildings were bombed in Rafah, among other places.
Israel also tried to alternate tactics of limited military pressure with provoking divisions within the Palestinian ranks, but apparently was ultimately forced to abandon its support for Palestinian groups operating against Hamas in Gaza.
Each of these groups saw a growing number of supporters of unification with Hamas, which eroded these factions from within. Some militants even helped Hamas organize the assassination of their leaders.
In particular, Yasser Abu Shabab, the leader of the largest pro-Israeli group, the Popular Forces, was killed in a Hamas ambush in this way, and the faction itself disintegrated.
At the same time, the humanitarian consequences of the war reached monstrous proportions by the end of the year.
Since October 2023, more than 70,000 Palestinians have been killed, not counting the bodies still recovered from the rubble and debris, and the number of injured has exceeded 171,000.
Despite the ceasefire, humanitarian aid continues to arrive intermittently. Israel is deliberately restricting its flow. To avoid criticism, the Israelis have slightly increased the number of cargoes allowed through, but it turns out that up to 60% of the trucks allowed through are carrying commercial goods, not life-saving aid.
The targeted blockade continues: at least 475 people have died of starvation, 165 of whom are children.
Meanwhile, Gaza remains in a state of medical collapse and the risk of epidemics: all hospitals have been destroyed. The shortage of medical supplies has reached 71%.
Winter storms and floods are exacerbating the situation. Floods have damaged hundreds of tents in overcrowded camps, and deaths from hypothermia have been recorded, including infants. Fifteen people died in the last days of December alone from the collapse of damaged buildings due to severe weather.
POLITICAL IMPASSE: THE ARCHITECTURE OF TRUMP'S PLAN AND THE STUMBLING BLOCKS
The year's political results also offer little cause for optimism. Trump's plan, despite its ambitions, found itself in a deep implementation crisis by the end of December 2025 and was effectively frozen before the start of the second phase.
The key provisions of this stage of the agreement—the disarmament of Hamas and the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops—remain unfulfilled and are the subject of fierce debate. The same applies to the third provision, the creation of the International Stabilization Force (ISF).
No one wants to participate in this project with an unclear mandate, much less disarm Hamas.
On the other hand, discussions about the participation of Indonesia, Turkey, and Egypt in the ISF are blocked by questions of command, rules of engagement, and Israel's position.
The UN Security Council, while adopting the relevant resolution, which calls for the formation of an ISF and an interim international administration, criticised it for its “vagueness” and the lack of a path to a two-state solution, which appears “further away than ever”.
In particular, Russian representatives stated that they did not vote against, but abstained only because they could not be more Arab than the Arabs themselves, who for some reason supported it.
Thus, the second phase of the plan (troop withdrawal, deployment of the ISF, creation of a temporary "Peace Council") has fallen into a logistical and political trap. The US role as mediator appears ambiguous: the Trump administration, having achieved a temporary lull, is demonstrating "flexibility" that prioritizes the deal, but is unable to move the process of resolving fundamental contradictions forward.
Israel and Hamas, for their part, approach 2026 with different sets of cards and are not ready to part with their trump cards.
HAMAS'S STRATEGIC RESILIENCE
By the end of 2025, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) demonstrates impressive strategic resilience and adaptability, turning challenges into opportunities to strengthen its position.
Its resilience is the result of a well-thought-out model of “hard pragmatism,” which combines unconditional loyalty to ideological principles with flexible tactics, deep social roots, and the ability to undergo military-political regeneration.
Hamas has proven capable of skillfully combining tactical adaptability with intransigence on key principles such as the right to resistance and the pursuit of Palestinian unity.
This allows the movement to engage in negotiations, reaching temporary agreements (such as a ceasefire and prisoner exchange) without giving up its long-term goals, such as the liberation of Palestine from occupation.
Hamas consistently demonstrates this line, issuing policy documents that emphasize the national liberation struggle. However, they also express a willingness to embrace transitional political solutions, including the transfer of administrative control over Gaza to an independent Palestinian Authority unaffiliated with the Palestinian Authority, but in which Hamas will not participate.
Hamas is also prepared to make other concessions, but these should not lead to the dissolution of the organization that acts as the vanguard of the Palestinian resistance movement. For example, as a compromise, Hamas is prepared to transfer its heavy weapons to Egypt, so that this move could be presented as disarmament, in accordance with Trump's plan.
But these measures will not affect small arms, which will allow Hamas to remain a military organization.
Thus, the movement links the issue of disarmament to the achievement of a broad Palestinian consensus and the end of the occupation, demonstrating a willingness to discuss the status of heavy weapons while maintaining self-defense means to ensure internal stability.
Such Hamas initiatives are welcomed in Washington, but they put Tel Aviv in an awkward position, for which the only acceptable option is complete disarmament and the dissolution of the movement. However, Israel's refusal to accept compromise solutions is increasingly irritating Washington.
TIME TO RESTORE POTENTIAL
Moreover, Hamas effectively uses periods of reduced conflict intensity to restructure and build up its forces.
Israeli sources record that even in areas that the army considered "cleared," the movement successfully rebuilt its forces.
Experts estimate that it continued to swell its ranks even during the war. Hamas's numbers not only haven't declined, but have actually increased compared to October 7, 2023. According to movement representatives, Hamas could have up to 40,000 fighters by the end of 2025, up from 25,000 two years ago.
Since the ceasefire was launched in October 2025, the movement has been regrouping its disparate units and groups, merging them and reorganizing them into regular battalions and brigades.
The restoration and development of underground infrastructure is underway, including the continued construction of tunnels.
Should a multinational force be deployed and Israeli troops withdraw from Gaza, Hamas will be prepared to destroy these facilities. But as long as the risk of renewed IDF operations remains high, the Palestinian resistance will prepare to repel further attacks.
This also concerns replenishing arsenals, including establishing our own production of ammunition.
Hamas is turning time into a strategic asset for the movement, which is causing serious concern among its opponents.
As senior Republican Senator Lindsey Graham stated after meeting with Netanyahu in Jerusalem: “I got the impression that Hamas is not disarming, but rearming… ”
POLITICAL RECOGNITION
Hamas's political viability is ensured by its ability to conduct complex negotiations while maintaining key positions.
Regional partners Qatar, Türkiye and Egypt play a key role in facilitating dialogue.
Here, the unconditional success of the movement, whose roots go back to the Muslim Brotherhood*, was the transformation of Egypt from an ally of Israel in the fight against Hamas into, in fact, the new patron of the movement, despite the historical enmity between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and the Muslim Brotherhood*.
And now the Egyptian side declares that it “considers demands for the disarmament of Hamas premature,” etc.
This is due to Hamas demonstrating a responsible approach, heeding constructive pressure from Cairo itself. This speaks to the organization's maturation and its ability to adapt to changing conditions, using them to its advantage.
Moreover, Hamas has de facto become a direct participant in the dialogue with the United States. The Trump administration personally brokered the peace plan, coordinating it equally with both sides—Israel and Hamas—and managed to persuade them to sign on to its first phase.
The discussion of Gaza's post-war structure, now involving Washington, by default makes Hamas a key player that cannot be ignored. This creates a strategic reality for the movement, where time is on its side, allowing it to maneuver and strengthen its position.
ISRAEL'S STRATEGIC FAILURE
By 2026, the results of the Gaza war for Israel had become a mosaic of massive strategic failure.
The promises of "total victory" made by Benjamin Netanyahu's government were not only not fulfilled, but also led to profound negative transformations that affected all areas: from the country's moral authority on the world stage to internal instability.
Despite the unprecedented use of force, the war's key stated objectives have not been achieved. Two years after its beginning, Hamas has not been destroyed, but has transformed into a successful, decentralized guerrilla movement with which negotiations are underway.
Israel, however, had the chance to reach a deal without resorting to a "confession parade." To do so, Netanyahu simply needed to show restraint during the first ceasefire in early 2025. At that time, he could have returned more Israeli prisoners alive.
However, the Israeli prime minister could not come to terms with the way Hamas celebrated its victory in Gaza with colorful military parades and presented the return of every prisoner as a propaganda show.
Netanyahu's nerves then gave out, and he was forced to return to a useless and bloody military campaign that was destroying the remnants of Israel's international authority.
The release of hostages by the end of 2025 is largely complete, but the fact that most of those released were the result of exchanges rather than military operations also works against Israel.
Hamas has also managed to return hundreds of its prisoners, including those serving life sentences, and can also report success.
A BLOW TO INTERNATIONAL REPUTATION AND LEGITIMACY
The war in Gaza has led to unprecedented moral and diplomatic isolation for Israel. The narrative of a victim state, protected by the memory of the Holocaust, has been shattered. Instead, it has been firmly entrenched in the global media as an "executioner": international courts are considering charges of genocide, and images of destruction and murdered children in Gaza have irreparably damaged the country's reputation.
Israel is increasingly seen as a pariah state, with even traditional allies distancing themselves from it.
A striking manifestation of this isolation was the “parade of recognitions” of the State of Palestine in September 2025.
Under pressure from public opinion and in opposition to Israeli policies, a number of key Western countries, including France, Belgium, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom, have officially recognized Palestinian statehood.
This move, which brought the number of countries recognizing Palestine to 157 out of 193 UN members, was a clear diplomatic defeat for Tel Aviv and a signal of the collapse of its traditional foreign policy.
Meanwhile, American support, long unconditional, began to wane: the bipartisan consensus on Israel in the US disintegrated, and the AIPAC lobby group lost its former influence.
In fact, Washington was forced to put forward terms for a ceasefire acceptable to Hamas in order to stop geopolitical losses and prevent a complete break with its allies in the Persian Gulf after the incident with the Israeli bombing of Qatar.
It is now also clear that without American protection, Israel is incapable of independently determining the course of the campaign.
DEEPENING INTERNAL CRISIS AND SOCIAL DIVISION
On the other hand, for the Israeli prime minister, agreeing to Trump's plan, which he publicly presented as a forced concession to an ally, was a political salvation.
This allowed him to shift responsibility for military failures and the inability to defeat Hamas to external forces, under whose pressure he supposedly agreed to the peace plan. In this way, he avoided facing direct responsibility before his electorate for the failure of his "total victory" slogan.
Paradoxically, Netanyahu's coalition was threatened precisely by agreeing to this ceasefire, which far-right ministers viewed as capitulation. Thus, the Israeli prime minister's greatest achievement was not military success, but the temporary preservation of his power.
The war did not bring the promised unity to the country, but instead deepened existing divisions. Public opinion is polarized between demands to continue fighting "until the bitter end" and growing protests calling for an end to the bloodshed now that all hostages have been returned.
Netanyahu, seeking to retain power and avoid responsibility for the intelligence failures of October 7, 2023, shifted the blame to the military, leading to a conflict between the political and military leadership and paralysis in decision-making.
Despite the prime minister's surge in popularity on the back of his militaristic rhetoric, Israel's long-term political stability remains in question.
Even the military achievements of 2025, such as the weakening of Hezbollah and the strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities, are tactical and temporary. Moreover, in the end, neither Iran nor Hezbollah has been defeated, but has rebuilt its strength and is ready to continue the war.
These actions do not compensate for Israel's strategic failure: Hamas has not been eliminated, the Palestinian issue has returned to the center of the international agenda, and border security has not been ensured. The country finds itself in a situation of permanent low-intensity confrontation with no clear prospects for a political settlement.
The year ended with a "Pyrrhic victory" for Israel,
| …that’s certainly one perspective. Not Israel’s, whose alternative to this victory is defeat followed by rivers of blood flowing from all the inhabitants of the land, not just the Jews, from the Mediterranean to the Jordan as a first step… |
| For Gaza and the rest of the Iran axis, yes, which lost entire levels of personnel and even more equipment, including serious damage to Iran’s nuclear bomb program. Not for Israel, which faces significantly weakened enemies while having stronger weapons and better unity on key issues than before 10/7. |
| Idiots believe the propaganda. Non-idiots noticed that it failed both logically and factually. And the cowardly who went along to get along with the Jew-haters have been shocked that President Trump is imposing a high price, both domestically and abroad, for what used to be a rewarded position. |
The main outcome of 2025 for the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a whole was the transition from a phase of high-intensity war to a phase of limited conflict, not yet fully “frozen,” which continues to claim lives daily, deepen the humanitarian catastrophe, and postpone any hopes for sustainable peace.
| As long as Hamas exists in the Palestinian Territories there is no hope for even a temporary peace, let alone a sustainable one, because they remain determined to erase the Jewish state. After 10/7 even the Israelis on the left have come to understand this. |
| The exhausted population of Gaza could have peace and freedom immediately, just by laying down their arms, turning over that last hostage corpse, and turning in the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad leadership or escorting them to the Rafah border crossing. But they refuse to do any of that, and so by their choice the war continues. |