by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] A little over a year has passed since the change of power in Syria. Since then, the country has seen a relative stabilization of its international relations, while domestic politics have continued to stagnate in the same place they were after the armed opposition's victory.
Damascus is aware of the problem, but is in no rush to take any serious steps to avoid further unbalancing the system.
INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION
Syria's position on the international stage has significantly strengthened over the past year. Following the formation of a transitional government led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, Damascus quickly emerged from the sanctions trap and achieved a formal reset in relations with the United States and the European Union.
Türkiye and the Arabian monarchies played a significant role in whitewashing the reputation of the new authorities, attempting, among other things, to elevate their own mediating role in the Middle East.
Relations with Russia have also seen a clear warming, although the opposition that initially came to power tried to raise the price, threatening to “completely reconsider” Moscow’s place in the Middle East.
Now, the transitional cabinet is taking every opportunity to emphasize that the “victorious revolution” has no grievances against Russia and that Damascus remains interested in deepening the Russian-Syrian partnership, including in the area of security.
Among other things, the Syrian authorities are hoping that Moscow could become one of the mediators and guarantors in the stalled "peace deal" with Israel—although this topic is being brought to the public very cautiously and with numerous reservations from al-Shara'a's cabinet.
In fact, by the end of 2025, Damascus had managed, for better or worse, to establish ties with almost all members of the “Security Five” – with the possible exception of China, with which dialogue remains markedly cold.
Despite the fact that Beijing has de facto recognized Syria's new political system and is willing to invest in local industry and the economy, it is demanding serious public concessions from Damascus, in particular the disarmament of the "Uyghur Guard," which is composed of former Asian radicals and is considered one of al-Sharaa's pillars of influence.
Unable to directly satisfy China's request, the Syrian leadership is trying to find a compromise or at least shift its focus to disarming other forces. This, too, is proving difficult.
NEW SYRIA
At home, the focus remains on finding a compromise with ethnoreligious minorities—primarily those capable of challenging Damascus's monopoly on power. This group includes the Kurds and the Druze.
Dialogue with the Kurds developed most intensively. At one point, the parties even managed to draw up a roadmap for integrating units into the national armed forces and preliminary agreed on constitutional amendments.
However, at the last minute, Damascus decided to pause reforms. The subsequent series of clashes between the Syrian army and the Kurds in November and December 2025 effectively set both sides back.
The situation with the Druze proved more complex: after Damascus's failed attempt to carry out ethnic cleansing in As-Suwayda under the guise of a counter-terrorism operation, the Druze Mountains region was lost to the central authorities. Local spiritual leaders are unwilling to negotiate with the transitional government until they are given ironclad security guarantees.
As for the remaining groups (Alawites, Shia Muslims from border areas, Armenians, and Assyrians), Damascus cannot fully ensure their security. Interaction with these communities, if it does occur, is sporadic.
Despite the al-Shara'a cabinet's attempts to attribute current problems to the "legacy of the old regime" and promise to quickly find innovative solutions, the number of sensitive issues on the agenda is not decreasing. In some cases, it's even increasing.
Minority issues remain a stumbling block. Damascus is not yet ready to make even symbolic concessions, such as granting full autonomy to the Kurds and Druze, for fear of the country's disintegration.
Moreover, in the case of the Druze, an additional deterrent for the central authorities was the rapprochement between local militias and the Israeli contingent, which arose, ironically, precisely because of Damascus's attempts to resolve everything quickly and by force.
Sporadic clashes with local militias continue today: Damascus lacks the resources to completely stop them.
This raises the problem of "local excesses." The revolution has brought to the fore a large number of different armed groups, some of which are only formally subordinate to Damascus and have their own views on what the "new Syria" should look like.
Finally, the problem of terrorism has not gone away. After the fall of Bashar al-Assad, the radical underground decided to take advantage of the confusion and intensified attacks against the new authorities and the civilian population.
Damascus's "new friends" were also challenged: one of the radicals' December attacks killed two American soldiers, sparking outrage in Washington and leading to an immediate, albeit short-lived, retaliatory operation.
The radicals are acting brazenly, including attacking buildings that are significant to Shiite Muslims (the latest such attack was the attack on a Shiite mosque in Homs on December 26), further fueling accusations of the al-Sharaa government's inability to protect its own population.
Neither Moscow, nor Washington, nor any other country is prepared to fight terrorists in Damascus' place—that's stated plainly. However, the new authorities, lacking a reliable rear and a well-led army, are hardly ready for a full-scale campaign.
As a result, operations against radicals are still targeted and aimed more at eliminating isolated cells in cities than at actually defeating terrorist units.
ADVANCE OF TRUST
The year 2026 will be a defining one in many ways for Syria.
The consolidating effect of the “victory of the revolution,” which was used by the transitional authorities to cement the various factions, is gradually ceasing to work.
Al-Shara's former allies are beginning to consider their own rise, peaceful and otherwise.
Moreover, Western partners, who recognized the new government in advance in exchange for promises to carry out democratic reforms and defeat terrorists, are looking expectantly at Damascus.
In the absence of visible results, the question of whether al-Sharaa is capable of justifying the trust placed in him is increasingly being raised in political circles.
Under these circumstances, the only way for the current Syrian authorities to remain in power is to resolve at least one of these long-standing problems. However, due to their interconnectedness, official Damascus has so far been unable to determine the best approach to renewing the country.