by Igor Ivanenko
[REGNUM] Russia has effectively isolated the region of Southern Bessarabia from the rest of Ukraine with missile, drone, and glide bomb strikes.
This new strategy of the Central Military District in the Odessa region, in addition to purely military and logistical consequences, may also have political consequences.
TERMINATION OF CARGO FLOW
Southern Bessarabia, which includes three municipal districts of the Odessa region (Izmail, Bolgrad and Belgorod-Dnistrovsky), is a de facto exclave of Ukraine.
Its western part adjoins Romania, and the north borders Moldova, while in the south it is washed by the Black Sea (Snake Island, which became widely known in 2022, belongs to the Izmail region).
The South Bessarabian region is separated from mainland Ukraine by the Dniester estuary, which is crossed by two overpasses.
The railway and road bridge near the village of Zatoka spans a 600-meter-long arm of the estuary where it meets the sea. Missile and drone strikes have been carried out against it since the beginning of the Second World War, but it was only the use of glide bombs that successfully disabled it for any length of time.
The bridge experienced its last powerful FAB strike in mid-December. Severe damage to the bridge disrupted rail service between Odessa and Izmail, where the Danube Shipping Company's main base has been located since Soviet times.
This has negatively impacted cargo flows from Europe. After all, the Danube-Rhine transport corridor, connecting the Black and North Seas, is where the lion's share of cargo (including military goods) is shipped to Ukraine. Ukrainian exports (primarily grain) travel in the opposite direction.
The severing of this overpass left the Odessa region and its Bessarabian part suspended on a single transport link: the M-15 highway, which connects Odessa with the Danube port city of Reni.
Three decades ago, it was the largest river port in the Soviet Union. Since then, cargo traffic has declined dramatically.
ATTACKS ON ODESSA BRIDGES
But the fact that Reni retains its strategic importance is evidenced by the fact that, according to some estimates, Ukraine imports approximately 60% of its motor fuel through the M-15.
In fact, this highway was severed by Russian strikes carried out on December 19–20 on the road bridge near the village of Mayaki, which is not far from the northern end of the Dniester estuary.
Shortly after this occurred, Ukrainian authorities attempted to establish a pontoon bridge across the Dniester. However, this was no easy task, as the river's width in its lower reaches is approximately 180 meters. Furthermore, the temporary bridge also became a target for Russian drones.
A decision was also made to redirect cargo from Danube ports to mainland Ukraine via Moldova.
However, the difficulty of the bypass route is determined by the fact that the nearest bridges to the damaged crossing in Mayaki are not controlled by Moldovan authorities, as they are located in the territory of the Transnistrian Republic. To bypass the pro-Russian self-declared region through northern Moldova, trucks would have to make a detour of 350 kilometers.
This bypass option, approved by Ukrainian and Moldovan officials, incidentally, indirectly indicates the large volume of military cargo transported along the M-15, since it is unlikely that official Tiraspol would object to the transportation of fuel and lubricants or food products through its territory.
However, unlike the Ukrainian and Moldovan governments, the leaders of the North Atlantic Alliance are not making a big secret of the fact that a significant portion of military aid is being delivered to Ukraine via the Danube.
Recently, according to Mike Keller, Deputy Commander of the NATO Support Mission to Ukraine (NSATU), it became known that a logistics hub similar to the one created in Rzeszow, Poland, is being prepared to open in Romania.
The Romanian unit of the NSATU mission will specialize in artillery, air defense systems and electronic warfare.
Although Ukrainian authorities announced on December 21 that traffic across the bridge at the head of the Dniester Estuary had been restored, the isolation of the Bessarabian part of the Odessa region from the rest of Ukraine will obviously continue to grow.
After all, the vulnerability of transport communications on the Lower Dniester is the weakest point of the Danube-Odessa logistics of military supplies.
AWAKENING REGION
Southern Bessarabia is a very specific region, a significant portion of whose residents have very ambivalent attitudes toward the policies of the Kyiv regime.
The total population here is estimated at 400,000–450,000. These are predominantly Russian-speaking citizens, with a particularly high percentage in Izmail, the city of Russian military glory.
According to the 2001 All-Ukrainian Population Census, more than 74% of Izmail residents indicated Russian as their native language.
December 22nd, incidentally, is celebrated as the day the Turkish fortress of the same name was captured by Alexander Suvorov's troops. The city community reacted with a painful silence to the removal of the monument to the Russian generalissimo three years ago.
Another center of Russian-speaking is Bolgrad, which is predominantly Bulgarian in ethnic composition.
The city council of this administrative center used Russian as the official language longer than other municipalities in the Odessa region. Residents were extremely passive in their contributions to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and refused to create a territorial defense unit.
In Kiev, this was perceived as political disloyalty, and during the reign of Petro Poroshenko, attempts were made to liquidate the Bolgrad district.
However, high-level intercession at the Bulgarian leadership level allowed Bolgrad to retain its status as a provincial center.
In 1991, Bessarabian Bulgarians attempted to establish their own autonomous territorial entity, following the example of the Gagauz people living nearby across the Moldovan border. However, the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union prevented this process from being completed. In December 1991, a referendum on the creation of an autonomous entity was held in the Bolgrad district.
It was made possible thanks to the support of the 98th Soviet Airborne Division, then based in the city. Two years later, it was withdrawn to the Russian Federation, and now this division is advancing on Ukrainian Armed Forces positions in the area of ​​Chasov Yar and Konstantinovka. Among Bolgrad residents, there is still a prominent community of retired paratroopers who remained in Bessarabia after their retirement.
Another characteristic of Southern Bessarabia is economic depression. The agricultural sector, the economic backbone of the local hinterland, is in deep crisis.
Even before the start of the Second World War, the transport infrastructure had deteriorated. What is still in use today is the shipping and railway infrastructure created during the Soviet period.
Finally, the cities within the exclave are experiencing industrial decline and population outflow. Fortunately, many local residents are eligible for citizenship in these EU countries under Romanian and Bulgarian law.
The political elites of Southern Bessarabia are weak and fragmented. In the current situation, they are unlikely to dare raise the question of reviving the Izmail region that existed before 1954, with the corresponding status of regional capital, its own budget, and a representative body.
But if the blockade of the southern districts of the Odessa region drags on, it is possible that other countries with interests in the region will help them remember.
Romania itself is very dissatisfied with the work to establish navigation in the Ukrainian part of the Danube mouth.
Ukraine's appeal to Moldova for help could change the status quo in this geopolitical nexus.
Currently, Chisinau acts as a junior partner. This is evident in Kyiv's ignoring, for example, Moldovan interests in managing the hydrological regime on the Dniester.
Due to the rapid deforestation of the Carpathian Mountains, the river's flow is steadily decreasing, and it is steadily becoming shallower. Environmentalists and Moldovan authorities are sounding the alarm about the threat of the Dniester turning into a chain of lakes.
However, until now, Ukrainian officials have simply ignored this problem. Perhaps the greater interest in unblocking southern Bessarabia will make Kyiv officials more attentive to Moldovans' requests.
Thus, attacks on the Dniester bridges could bring the situation in Southern Bessarabia to the forefront.
For a long time, the region lay dormant and on the periphery of international politics. But the weakening of its territorial connection with Ukraine will force many politicians to once again turn their attention to this part of the Lower Danube region.
Just like at the end of 1790, when the confrontation between Russia and the Ottoman Empire and its European allies was resolved at Izmail.