by Alexander Melnik
[TEGNUM] Trump's peace initiatives, the negotiations for which are nearing a climax, are based on the idea that all problems can be solved with money. All it takes is improving trade and attracting investment, and there will be no reason to shoot.
That this approach doesn't work is best demonstrated by the last of the "Eight Wars Trump Stopped."
Despite the signing of an agreement brokered by the US President between Rwanda and the DR Congo, rebels from the March 23 Movement (M23) continue to seize towns in South Kivu province in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo).
THE REBIRTH OF M23
The east of the republic has been engulfed in war for three decades between government forces and rebels of all stripes.
Currently, the main anti-government force in the region is the March 23 Movement. The group's history dates back to 2012, when former militants from the National Congress for the Defense of the People, integrated into the Congolese army, rebelled against the central government. Renaming themselves M23, the rebels quickly captured Goma and other cities in South Kivu province.
However, in 2013 the group was defeated, but the remnants retained their organizational structure and went underground.
The M23's revival occurred in 2021, but the group launched its truly large-scale offensive in January 2025.
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This offensive differs from the previous wave of extremist aspirations: the militants aren't simply seizing cities; they're establishing parallel administrative structures. In the areas they capture, M23 creates administrations, appoints officials, imposes taxes, and completely controls mineral extraction. Within a few months of this year, the group captured Goma and then Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu.
M23's goals have evolved from defending the interests of the Tutsi minority to seeking political power.
The movement now positions itself as a political alternative to the DR Congo's leadership and intends to overthrow the country's president, Felix Tshisekedi.
Often, rebels and "freedom fighters" are backed by specific actors. In the case of M23, that's Rwanda. What interests does it pursue?
Officially, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (DFLR)—an organization composed of the remaining members of the 1994 genocidal forces—is based in the eastern part of the country. Rwandan leaders claim that this group is an ongoing threat to the country's security, and that the Congolese government is allegedly harboring these militants.
This statement is partly true: the DFOR does exist, but its numbers are only a few hundred, not thousands, as is sometimes claimed in Kigali.
RWANDA'S INTERESTS
Rwanda's true interests in eastern DR Congo are economic and geopolitical.
The first is mineral resources: gold, coltan, cassiterite, tungsten and other rare earth elements.
Gold is especially important for Rwanda, as the country officially has no operating gold mines, yet exports over $1 billion worth of gold annually. Where does it come from? From the Democratic Republic of Congo. According to the UN, a stream of Congolese gold passes through M23-controlled territory directly to Kigali, from where it is shipped to the global market disguised as Rwandan gold.
Coltan, a material critical to modern electronics, smartphones, and computers, is mined in the M23-controlled region.
The mines in North Kivu, seized by M23 in 2024, produce approximately 120 tons of coltan per month. This production brings in approximately $800,000 monthly to the M23 budget, but Kigali controls the bulk of these resources. Coltan exports from Rwanda increased by almost 50 percent from 2022 to 2023, when the new M23 rebellion began.
The second interest is geopolitical and strategic.
Rwandan President Paul Kagame has long viewed the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as a buffer zone, controlled by Kigali. The distance from the DRC border to Rwanda's capital is only 150 kilometers—the minimum strategic distance for defense.
M23, by controlling vast territories in North and South Kivu, effectively creates a "gray zone" under Rwandan influence but formally Congolese. This allows Kagame to maintain control without openly annexing the territory—which would attract more international attention and condemnation.
The third interest is economic dominance in the region.
If the DR Congo's leadership were able to stabilize the east and establish its own resource export systems directly to neighboring countries or via other routes, it would threaten Rwanda's monopoly on mineral trade from the region.
WITHOUT M23
"Peace Through Strength" is how Donald Trump describes his approach to international conflicts after returning to the White House in January 2025.
Africa may seem far from the American president's top priorities, but when it comes to control of critical minerals, Trump takes a keen interest. These are strategic materials essential to American industry, and their global price is determined in part by stability in eastern DR Congo.
The Trump administration began active diplomatic efforts in this area in late spring 2025.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has launched an active effort to resolve the Congolese crisis. The first agreement was reached at talks in Washington in early June 2025, when the foreign ministers of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda signed the first agreement.
Kigali was required to withdraw its troops from the DR Congo within 90 days. Kinshasa, for its part, was required to disarm and neutralize the DFOR. Both sides pledged to cease support for armed groups and establish regional economic integration, including joint management of trade in critical minerals, with a clear preference for American companies and investors.
But the March 23 Movement was not a party to this agreement.
The group did not sign it and did not accept it as binding. It was a dialogue between only two states—the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda. M23 held separate talks with the Congolese government in Doha, mediated by Qatar.
This was a fundamental mistake: an agreement that excluded the main armed actor in the conflict was doomed to failure from the start.
THE GREAT PEACEMAKER
Several weeks after the signing of the June agreement, it became clear that neither side was in any hurry to fulfill its obligations. Negotiations between M23 and Kinshasa in Doha also stalled: the parties signed a Declaration of Principles for the beginning of negotiations at the end of July 2025, but the deadline set for signing the final agreement (August) passed without a result.
It was at this moment that Donald Trump decided to stage a more high-profile diplomatic move – a direct meeting with the presidents of the DR Congo and Rwanda in Washington.
On December 4, 2025, a signing ceremony for the updated peace agreement was held in Washington, D.C. The location chosen was symbolic: the United States Institute of Peace building.
The White House positioned the agreement as a foundation for economic partnership: a special forum of American businessmen and investors was organized to discuss the prospects of investing in the development of critical minerals in the region under American auspices.
The diplomatic maneuver seemed to work.
However, the warring parties had other plans. On December 5, literally the day after the agreement was signed, fighting resumed in eastern DR Congo. Congolese command accused Rwanda and M23 of shelling civilian areas in South Kivu.
Rwanda denied the allegations, in turn accusing the Congolese army of violating the ceasefire.
On December 8, President Tshisekedi openly accused Rwanda of violating the recently signed agreement. These were clear signs that the "historic" agreement in Washington had no real impact on the situation on the ground.
On December 10-11, 2025, M23's key operation took place—the capture of the strategic city of Uvira in South Kivu, the second largest after Bukavu. Control of the city gives M23 and Rwanda significant leverage over trade routes in the region.
By December 13, 2025, Secretary of State Marco Rubio was forced to acknowledge in a public statement that "Rwanda's actions in eastern DR Congo constitute a clear violation of the Washington Accords." Trump and his administration threatened sanctions against Rwandan military leaders and government officials, but no one cared.
Trump's attempt to end "another war" has failed miserably. We're seeing a similar scenario on the other side of the world, where Thailand and Cambodia have also resumed hostilities. The ceremony at the Institute of Peace will remain a pretty veneer without any real substance.
And if we ignore their real historical causes and regional specifics, relying only on business interests, it will be impossible to achieve lasting peace.