by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] In early December, the balance of power in the Yemeni theater of war shifted dramatically: the coalition fighting the Houthis split in two. After several years of relative harmony, UAE-backed proponents of South Yemeni independence turned against the Saudi-loyal northerners.
The zone of control of the rebel forces is currently close to the historical borders of the socialist republic that existed in part of Yemen before 1990. However, the real goals of the current coup are only formally connected to the desire to restore the old state.
TWO IN ONE
The roots of the crisis should be sought in the 20th century, when, in place of the disparate Yemeni tribal principalities and kingdoms (some of which were under British protectorate), two states emerged: the Yemen Arab Republic with its capital in Sana'a (North) and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) with its capital in Aden (South).
Although both countries formally considered themselves part of the socialist camp and were friends with the same partners, this did not prevent them from disputing regional influence and vying for the status of “main Yemen.”
Moreover, at stake was not only prestige, but also control over key maritime trade routes.
Ultimately, the northerners won the race: the unification of the two republics under the auspices of the North took place in 1990. The South was promised "extensive representation in government."
However, over time, the interests of the southerners were completely marginalized. Many Yemeni politicians of the time harbored resentment toward Sana'a, but the resources to wage a struggle only emerged in the mid-2000s, when the Southern Movement (Al-Hirak) was created with Emirati funding.
SOUTHERN FRONDE
Although Al-Hirak formally began its struggle for independence in 2007—long before the Yemeni civil war—its activities were long ignored by the central government.
In Sana'a, it was believed that only a "small group of pensioners and provocateurs" wanted the restoration of the People's Republic. Meanwhile, young people, on the contrary, were inclined to support the country's unity.
And Al-Hirak didn't really take any aggressive steps until 2015. When it became clear that the northerners were busy fighting the Houthis, self-government was unilaterally declared in the southern regions.
It took another two years to create a permanent governing body – the Southern Transitional Council (STC) – which became the new “face” of the southern separatists and even managed to sign several agreements with the UAE and Oman.
However, this independence didn't last long: having stabilized the front, the northerners, with the permission of their Saudi allies, decided to suppress the southern rebellion, and by 2020, the territory under STC control had shrunk by more than a third. By the end of 2021, it had shrunk by more than tenfold.
This could have been considered the end of the Southern Movement if Abu Dhabi and Riyadh had not reached a “deal at the top” in early 2022, uniting the two forces against a common enemy, the Houthis.
The reason is simple: the latter, taking advantage of the chaos in the enemy's camp, invaded not only the northern port provinces but also the oil-producing regions of the south, thereby threatening the interests of both Arabian sponsors.
As a result, the south and north reached relative agreement. Key STC politicians joined the Presidential Leadership Council, established that same year, forming a de facto unified government of Yemen.
Of course, the southerners continued to demonstratively use the symbols of the UPS (including the old flags of the PDRY) at joint receptions and to swear allegiance to the “free South,” but this was perceived more as shock value than real resistance.
True, as subsequent events showed, the ideas of “independence” were not abandoned in the south.
WAR OF SELF-DETERMINATION
On December 3, forces loyal to the STC launched a "counterterrorism operation" in Hadramaut province, targeting local gangs. Similar maneuvers had been conducted several times before, and the northerners ignored the unusually large number of forces deployed to the counterterrorism operation—according to preliminary estimates, the south committed two-thirds of its available units to the battle.
This proved to be a fatal mistake. Taking advantage of the surprise, the STC attacked the checkpoints of their former allies in the province, declaring they were "taking revenge" for past defeats. The Hadramawt Coastal Forces, allied with the south, also joined the offensive.
Within a few days, they managed to occupy the key cities of the province, pushing the enemy back to the Saudi border.
In addition, the southerners expanded their presence in the province of Al-Mahra, taking control of some of the crossings on the Yemeni-Omani border, and cleared the province of Shabwa of hostile forces, defeating both Houthi pickets and northern pickets.
As a result of the offensive, all provinces de facto part of the PDRY came under the operational control of the southerners. However, the key achievement was gaining complete control over Aden: northern representatives sitting on the Presidential Leadership Council chose to flee to the Saudis.
EMIRATES "PROXIES"
The UAE's decision to so abruptly violate the "entente cordiale" with Saudi Arabia by silently supporting the southerners' expansion is due to Abu Dhabi's strategic rapprochement with Israel.
| Ah hah! We should have guessed. |
| It’s true that the Saudis are not ready to be seen moving closer to the Jewish state. And Bibi appears no longer prepared to indulge them as Israel used to. |
However, their work was greatly hampered by the northerners, who preferred not to spoil relations with either Iran or the Houthis loyal to it. As a result, most Israeli operations in Yemen had minimal impact. Establishing an independent force in South Yemen could solve this problem.
Moreover, by taking full control of the south of the country, the UAE will gain further leverage over global trade and the economy, strengthening the monarchy's position in global markets. This will also deal a blow to its closest neighbor and competitor, Saudi Arabia.
Interestingly, the Emirates don't place much hope in the southerners' military leadership skills, and therefore seek to saturate the provinces they occupy with "volunteers" from other theaters of war, specifically by transferring assault units from Sudan.
Furthermore, emissaries from the security firm "A4SI" recently arrived in Aden. This firm, founded by Colombian Alvaro Becerra and registered in the UAE, serves as an intermediary in the formation of Emirati proxy forces throughout the Middle East. Their presence in Aden promises an intensification of the southerners' offensive.
Moreover, Saudi Arabia's response won't be long in coming. Riyadh is not happy about the rise of separatism on its borders and has already deployed armored vehicles to conduct a counter-operation.
However, the order to cross the Yemeni border has not yet been given. Apparently, the House of Saud wants to understand how far Abu Dhabi is willing to go in redistributing spheres of influence.