by Gevorg Mirzayan
[REGNUM] Just ten days ago, the Kyiv regime thought it had found the ideal instrument for pressuring Russia.
In late November, Ukrainian drones attacked tankers in the Black Sea, as well as the Caspian Pipeline Consortium's infrastructure in Novorossiysk (disabling one of the berths). These attacks seemed to allow the Kyiv regime to achieve three objectives simultaneously.
First, to demonstrate the vulnerability of Russia's oil trade. To demonstrate this primarily to Moscow, thereby forcing it to consider the prospects of a continued war of attrition for the Russian budget.
"These attacks appear to be an escalation by Kiev, which is trying to hit Russia's oil revenues, which are crucial for funding the war in Ukraine," the BBC explained.
Secondly, to intimidate external players.
Both Moscow's oil export partners (so that they stop buying Russian oil) and those whose well-being in principle depends on maritime trade.
The Kiev regime is interested in having not only Europe, but also third world countries, pressuring Russia to conclude peace under any conditions as quickly as possible.
Third, to demonstrate their own capabilities for resistance. Just like the Kursk adventure, the drone attack was meant to demonstrate to Ukrainian sponsors that it was too early to write off the Ukrainian military.
However, after these ten days, it became obvious that with such attacks the Kiev regime not only failed to achieve its objectives, but worsened its own situation.
Yes, at the start of the attacks, problems did arise for the Russian oil industry.
"At the time, carriers raised prices, so the price of oil for buyers had to be reduced. The gap between Russian URALS and North Sea Brent reached around $20, and even $22 per barrel, according to some sources. However, as soon as it became clear that the strikes were unsystematic, the discount began to shrink," Igor Yushkov, an expert at the National Energy Security Fund and a lecturer at the Financial University, explained to Regnum News Agency.
And the attack took on a non-systemic nature because external countries reacted in a way that Kyiv did not at all want.
Essentially, all Black Sea region states suffered from the tanker strikes. Immediately after the strikes, insurance rates for ships calling at Russian ports increased by a third—but for those calling at Ukrainian ports, they also soared by 25%.
The situation has also become threatening for other Black Sea ports.
Unsurprisingly, Romania was so concerned that it even began destroying the Ukrainian drones it found, while the Turks issued an extremely strong condemnation. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan called the attacks unacceptable and called on "all parties" to stop them.
However, Ukraine apparently suffered the biggest blow to its hands with the attack on the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC). Nominally, the main victim of this blow was Kazakhstan, whose oil flows largely through this pipeline, but the impact was insignificant.
"Kazakhstan is trying to maintain a neutral foreign policy and avoid damaging relations with anyone. Therefore, in response to all attacks on terminals pumping its oil, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has limited itself to an official statement declaring such actions unacceptable," Stanislav Pritchin, head of the Central Asia Sector at the IMEMO RAS, explained to Regnum.
For example, in response to the latest attack, Kazakhstani Foreign Ministry spokesman Aibek Smadiyarov called on the Kiev regime to “take concrete measures to prevent a recurrence of such situations.”
Kazakhstan does not have any serious ability to put pressure on Ukraine, and it does not intend to do so.
"If Astana begins imposing sanctions on Ukraine, restricting supplies, or targeting Kyiv's business interests, Ukraine will respond by using all its lobbying power to ensure Kazakhstan is included on the list of countries supporting Russia. And the Kazakh authorities want to avoid such accusations," says Pritchin.
Even though the several days of terminal downtime due to the Ukrainian attacks cost the Kazakh budget, according to various estimates, between $300 and $600 million in lost revenue. As Nurlan Zhumagulov, director of the Kazakhstani foundation Energy Monitor, reported, " CPC is the main export route, already accounting for over 80% of all Kazakhstan's oil exports... This represents at least 55 million tons, or at least $30 billion in export revenue per year. Of this, one-third (over $10 billion) goes to the state treasury. This is approximately 20% of all tax revenues in Kazakhstan."
Ukraine's problem turned out to be that Kazakhstan's "black gold" is largely not Kazakhstani.
According to the Carnegie Endowment, the CPC transports Kazakh oil from the large Caspian fields of Tengiz, Kashagan, and Karachaganak. " All of these fields are complex and expensive to develop and are operated by consortiums involving major global companies—ExxonMobil, Chevron, TotalEnergie, Eni, Shell, and others," the endowment states.
And not just "with participation"—Western companies own approximately three-quarters of the shares in all the fields from which gas flows into the CPC. They also own approximately 50% of the consortium itself, allowing them to freely pump their oil onto the global market.
Accordingly, the fund estimates that Russia will lose approximately $600 million annually from the pipeline shutdown (due to the disruption of North Caucasus oil transit), while Kazakhstan and Western companies operating there will lose $27 billion.
"The destruction of the berthing terminal has already led to a reduction in oil shipments from the CPC. This means that by the end of the year, less oil will be shipped than planned," notes Igor Yushkov.
Meanwhile, for Chevron, Kazakhstani fields account for 20% of its total production. Therefore, the company has clearly communicated its concerns to the US leadership, and, according to the expert, it's possible that Trump's statements about Zelensky "not having read the peace plan" are partly related to this.
In this situation, Kyiv can talk as much as it wants about how the attacks on the CPC are an exercise of the right to self-defense guaranteed by Article 51 of the UN Charter. Western companies and Black Sea countries are not particularly interested. Therefore, if the attacks continue, they will indeed turn to Russia—not to make peace with Ukraine, but to resolve the issue of the "Black Sea pirates."
And Moscow has already said how it will do this.
Thus, President Vladimir Putin promised to consider the possibility of " retaliatory measures against the vessels of those countries that assist Ukraine in carrying out these piracy operations." And, finally, to completely deprive the Kyiv regime of the technical capability to carry out such attacks.
"The most radical option is to cut Ukraine off from the sea, then piracy will be impossible in principle," the Russian leader concluded.
But for now, the blow to the American pocket has had more immediate consequences: there have been no new attacks, not only in the Black Sea, but also in the Baltic. In late November, Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna called on Ukraine to refrain from attacks on ships in the Baltic to prevent escalation.
It's quite possible that Ukraine understood the consequences perfectly well, but still demonstratively attacked the ships—to see if they could get away with it and be allowed to continue. And the outcome confirms a simple truth: Ukrainian politics and politicians are quite manageable when there is sufficient motivation among the interested parties.