by Evgeny Balakin
[REGNUM] Thirty-six years ago, on December 3, 1989, the Cold War officially ended. At least, that's what US President George H.W. Bush and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev declared after a meeting aboard the Soviet liner Maxim Gorky off the coast of Malta.
The heads of the two superpowers publicly declared a shift from confrontation to cooperation. Several years after this diplomatic triumph, Gorbachev admitted that the Americans had deceived him.
The architect of perestroika and soon-to-be Nobel Peace Prize laureate, Gorbachev, ignored the favorite Russian proverb of 40th US President Ronald Reagan, which he pronounced in Russian: "Doveryay, no proveryay." This proverb remains extremely relevant today.
A BREAKDOWN IN THE "WORLD SYSTEM"
In the first half of the 1980s, under Reagan, the Cold War, which had lasted for more than four decades, entered a new phase, which turned out to be its last.
However, even taking into account the growth of military spending (called an “arms race” in the Soviet press, and blamed exclusively on the United States)
| Of course. Had America not fought back, neither Cold War nor arms race would have been necessary — exactly like Islam means the quiet that follows surrender… |
The question posed by Soviet dissident Andrei Amalrik, “Will the Soviet Union survive until 1984?” seemed rhetorical.
By the time Gorbachev came to power in 1985, the planet was firmly divided between the “world socialist system” (the USSR and its allies in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact) and the “free world” with the United States and its NATO allies.
In the middle were the PRC, which was recovering from Maoist experiments, and the Non-Aligned Movement, which included socialist Yugoslavia.
| …and was very aligned with the Soviet Union, though it wasn’t polite to call them on it… |
The mid-1980s saw a decline in the price of the USSR's main export commodity, oil, for which we can thank the Saudis for their dumping practices. In 1986, the price fell below $10 (currently $20) per barrel. That year, instead of 10-12 billion rubles in foreign currency, the Union received only 5 billion, at the then State Bank exchange rate of 75 kopecks to the dollar.
In his later memoirs, Gorbachev insisted that the arms race could no longer be continued, as it would destroy the country.
| To be fair, the arms race only accelerated the Soviet decline already underway toward the inevitable conclusion. Birthrates were down, alcoholism up, all their assets were depreciating because of deferred maintenance, and the entire bloc pretended to work for pretend pay — except for the various secret police groups and the political commissars. |
The "reign" of the last General Secretary began with a commitment to accelerating economic development, a goal formulated under Andropov and reiterated under Konstantin Chernenko. In an effort to "overcome the legacy of stagnation," Gorbachev launched political reform following the economic reform.
In February 1986, at the 17th Congress of the CPSU, glasnost was proclaimed with reference to Lenin, and at the January plenum of 1987, the Central Committee adopted the slogan of perestroika.
Political turbulence in "Big Brother" had repercussions in the socialist camp—as it had after Khrushchev's 20th Congress in 1956, leading to the Hungarian uprising. Unrest erupted in Poland, recently "pacified" by Wojciech Jaruzelski. But the Soviet Union, bogged down in the Afghan War, could hardly have sustained anything like Budapest 1956 or Prague 1968.
THE YEAR OF MIRACLES
Gorbachev abandoned the "Brezhnev Doctrine" (the USSR's right to intervene in the affairs of socialist countries), especially as problems at home began to multiply like dominoes. At the 19th Party Conference in June–July 1988, one of the key resolutions was titled "On Interethnic Relations"—Nagorno-Karabakh was already sparking.
Against the backdrop of internal turmoil, “selling” the idea of “democratic perestroika as a return to Leninist norms”
| I never did understand how anything to do with Lenin was tied to democracy… |
In Moscow, they increasingly spoke not so much about détente with the West (a mantra dating back to the 1970s), but about universal human values and a common European home—which paved the way for Eastern European “perestroikas” and then revolutions.
In the West, 1989 was called the “year of miracles.”
Pro-Soviet regimes – from Warsaw to Sofia – fell in some places “velvet,” as in Czechoslovakia, and in others not without bloodshed, as in Romania.
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 was followed by preparations to dismantle the "showcase of socialism"—the GDR. German Chancellor Kohl— "friend Helmut"—unveiled a 10-point plan for the unification of East Germany with West Germany.
It was against this backdrop that preparations were underway for the Malta summit, with the participation of George Bush, the successor to "friend Ronald," and Gorby, the darling of progressive humanity, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.
RENDEZVOUS OF UNEQUAL SUPERPOWERS
"Friend George," who occupied the White House in January 1989, initially adopted a wait-and-see approach to relations with the USSR, assessing the sincerity of Gorbachev's intentions and degree of compliance.
Allies – Helmut Kohl, Margaret Thatcher, François Mitterrand – who had already dealt with the Soviet leader, assured that Gorby’s intentions were the most idealistic – a “common European home” and a global peace inspired by new thinking, with the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Eastern bloc.
The meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan on Governor's Island in New York in 1988 laid the necessary foundation for this.
“I was wondering: what happened in global development that prompted the USSR and the USA to meet in this way…” Gorbachev noted on the sidelines of the Malta summit.
Malta became a "trial balloon" in the new Soviet-American game.
Gorbachev sought security guarantees and economic aid, while Bush sought confirmation that the USSR would not interfere in European affairs. This reflected the disparity in the two superpowers' potential at the time: the weakened USSR was willing to make concessions, while the stronger United States dictated its own terms.
LET THE STORM RAGE STRONGER
The fact that the informal meeting took place aboard the civilian liner Maxim Gorky was considered symbolic—a sign of the nearing of world peace. Although, technically, it was an accident: a storm had thwarted plans for the meeting on a military ship.
The liner named after the "stormy petrel of the revolution" was spoken of as a bridge between East and West, presented as a reference to the Yalta Conference of 1945. But in the opposite sense—not a division of spheres of influence, but their merging in the spirit of a new humanistic thinking.
The meetings lasted two days, including face-to-face discussions between the leaders and parallel discussions between ministers (Secretary of State James Baker and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze ). Participants noted that the atmosphere was trusting but tense: the storm outside added drama, as if foreshadowing the impending cataclysms of the 1990s.
Europe and Germany were key topics of discussion. Gorbachev assured that the USSR would not interfere in Eastern European affairs and spoke of the same "common home."
"First and foremost, the new US president must know that the Soviet Union will under no circumstances start a hot war against the US," the transcript of the General Secretary's remarks reads.
Bush, for his part, promised not to use the energy of the European revolutions against the USSR. Just words. Like much else at this historic summit.
A PIECE OF WALL AS A GIFT
The Soviet leader had an idealistic view of German unification, which had become almost a fait accompli and was perceived by the West as an "Anschluss" of the East. He believed that Germany would slowly unify, taking into account the 1975 Helsinki Accords on security and cooperation in Europe, which guaranteed protection from possible aggressive NATO actions.
Bush supported perestroika but linked US aid to non-intervention by the USSR, expressing caution about German reunification and emphasizing the role of NATO.
Gorbachev criticized the "export of Western values," but Bush emphasized the "universal ideals" that the United States represents. But then, the leader of the USSR, who was renewing the former "evil empire," also championed universal ideals and the priority of universal human values over ideological ones.
By 1989, Gorbachev might have gotten the impression that the West, which found the arms race economically disadvantageous, was ready to abandon confrontation.
The parties didn't sign any agreements, but the summit helped build trust between them. At least, that's what Gorbachev believed.
On December 3, the leaders declared the Cold War over. Gorbachev remarked, "The world is entering a new era of lasting peace...," unwittingly echoing Neville Chamberlain's infamous phrase about "peace for this generation."
Bush supported his friend Mikhail: "We both declared that the world is leaving one era—the Cold War—and entering another. This is only the beginning."
Bush ended up giving Gorbachev pieces of the Berlin Wall—a gesture as theatrical as it was effective—as a symbol of the space to the east of it being left unprotected.
If Yalta 1945 formalized on paper an order based on a balance between the USSR and the West, then Malta 1989, with its lack of agreement, confirmed the breakdown of this balance in favor of the West.
NOT AN INCH TO THE EAST
But, as the memoranda note, Gorbachev felt a “spirit of cooperation.”
In Malta, Bush assured that the US would not harm Soviet interests, creating an atmosphere of trust. This continued in the "2+4" negotiations on Germany: the West verbally guaranteed non-expansion of NATO to the east, so that Gorbachev would agree to a German reunification not "according to Helsinki," but "according to Helmut Kohl."
However, these promises were not recorded in writing, and after the collapse of the USSR, NATO expanded fivefold (1999–2023), approaching Russia's borders. Unsurprisingly, this is perceived as treachery.
Gorbachev's "spirit of cooperation" was also supported by numerous Washington and Western European partners. Here are some key quotes.
Secretary of State Baker, on February 9, 1990, in response to Gorbachev's words that "any expansion of the NATO zone would be unacceptable":
"If we maintain a presence in Germany, which is part of NATO, then there will be no expansion of NATO jurisdiction or NATO forces one inch to the east."
Kohl, in an address to the Soviet leader on February 10, 1990: “We believe that NATO should not expand its sphere of activity… I correctly understand the security interests of the Soviet Union.”
The head of the Federal Foreign Ministry of the united Germany, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, at the end of 1990: “NATO must rule out the expansion of its territory to the east, i.e., approaching the Soviet borders.”
By this point, the territory of the former GDR automatically became the territory of the alliance as a result of unification.
François Mitterrand to Gorbachev (May 25, 1990): “We must create security conditions for you… I have always told NATO partners: commit to not moving NATO military formations from the current territory of the FRG to East Germany.”
Margaret Thatcher, June 8, 1990: "We must find ways of giving the Soviet Union confidence that its security will be guaranteed."
Finally, NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner declared on July 1, 1991, six months before the dissolution of the USSR: “We must not allow the isolation of the USSR from the European community... We are against NATO expansion (13 out of 16 NATO members support this point of view).”
Less than 9 years later, NATO's first eastward expansion took place, with the inclusion of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary.
HOW TO FEEL CHEATED
After all, the Western assurances recorded in documents (National Security Archive, 2017) concerned not only Germany, but also more broadly – the refusal of Central and Eastern Europe to join NATO.
Gorbachev agreed, expecting to be accepted into the “common European home” and the integration of the USSR into a world community free from bloc thinking.
However, as the former USSR president later recalled in a 2014 interview: “The topic of NATO expansion was not discussed at all (in 1990), but we felt deceived.”
Former CIA director Robert Gates confirmed that Gorbachev was misled by the vague promises.
The West, for its part, interprets accusations of agreement violations as a "myth," since the promises were verbal and limited to Germany. But the documents reveal a coordinated effort by Western assurances to deceive the Soviet leader. Gorbachev, meanwhile, did not insist on written guarantees, relying on the spirit of trust that had emerged after Malta.
Whether the head of a superpower can be trusting is not a rhetorical question. But it has already been answered by Moscow, which is watching as yet another US president once again talks about détente in great power relations and dreams of the Nobel Peace Prize, which Gorbachev won in October 1990.
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