by Leonid Tsukanov
| Even dumber than the Houthis takes some doing. |
The arrest of Ansar Allah's protégé was not a major sensation—since the active phase of fighting ceased in 2023, the two sides have periodically tried to probe each other's rear.
However, the surprises came a little later, when the interrogation of the saboteur commander began.
It turned out that the detainee (a member of the local terrorist underground) had not had any connections with the Houthis for several years and was acting on his own (which is extremely unusual for these parts).
And his biography is in no way inferior to that of the legendary anarchist Nestor Makhno.
THE NOMADIC COMMANDER
The detainee's real name is unknown. The few reports refer to him as Muhammad al-Maribi, which is likely a covert alias.
Al-Maribi's biography is full of blank spots: it is only known that he was born in the province of Marib, and with the onset of the Arab Spring in 2011, he joined the gang of the famous Yemeni jihadist Tariq al-Fadhli, side by side with whom he even managed to participate in the construction of the self-proclaimed "Emirate of Abyan" by radicals (it existed in the province of the same name from 2011 to 2012).
After the defeat of the Emirate by the government coalition, al-Maribi, left out of work, joined the ranks of al-Fadhli's ally, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)* and continued fighting against government forces there; he rose to the rank of commander of an assault unit.
However, towards the beginning of the 2020s, al-Maribi switched sides again, this time defecting to the Houthis. Contrary to expectations, they did not imprison the former radical, but instead hired him.
Moreover, his management talent was quickly recognized: yesterday’s radical first became a squad leader, then a platoon leader, and after some time he became a “battalion commander.”
By the time the multilateral ceasefire was signed in Yemen at the end of 2022, al-Maribi had earned a reputation as an experienced commander and had even received an invitation to take a minor leadership position in a Houthi-controlled town. His past exploits within AQAP* were no longer remembered.
AGAINST ALL
However, al-Maribi eventually parted ways with the Houthis. He most likely left the group in 2023, when relations between Ansar Allah and Saudi Arabia and the UAE stabilized, and Yemeni forces loyal to the Saudi monarchies ceased operations against the Houthis.
For a field commander accustomed to living in a state of constant war, a peace deal was clearly unacceptable.
After leaving Ansar Allah, his tracks were lost for several years.
In early 2025, the “Yemeni Makhno” suddenly returned to Marib accompanied by twenty fighters, where, under the guise of a “Houthi field commander,” he entered into negotiations with local AQAP* cells with a proposal to conclude a non-aggression pact between the two movements.
In exchange for the right to operate on their territory, he promised the radicals weapons, ammunition, and intelligence. He also promised assistance in attacks on remote checkpoints of the Yemeni army, which, he claimed, was a "common enemy" for both the Houthis and AQAP*.
Later, disillusioned former AQAP* fighters, as well as local Bedouins, smugglers, and others with questionable pasts, flocked to form al-Maribi. Its membership eventually grew to 100 members, a significant number by the standards of the Yemeni conflict.
Of course, this figure wasn't constant—new fighters would join al-Maribi, and then break away, forming new gangs and larger groups of "veterans." However, the "anarchist army" continued to exist.
Its fighters even managed to obtain several launchers, which they used to fire at merchant ships passing through the Strait of Aden even after Ansar Allah announced the end of the naval blockade of Israel.
Needless to say, such a valuable asset quickly became a subject of interest for foreign intelligence agencies—at various times, the Saudis, Turks, Iranians, and Europeans attempted to contact al-Maribi.
Rumors also circulated that al-Maribi's unit had pledged allegiance to the head of the "government in exile," Rishad Mohammed al-Alimi, promising to help retake Yemen. However, this is most likely speculation—given the biography of the "Yemeni Makhno," he would hardly have agreed to anything more than a tactical alliance.
THE ANARCHIST'S MISTAKE
For a long time, al-Maribi operated in his fiefdom with virtual impunity: AQAP* supporters observed the non-aggression agreement; the Houthis were certain that their own sabotage group (disguised as radicals) was operating—in any case, Makhno did not interfere.
Loyalists of the central government did not dare to engage in battle with such a large gang, although they carried out several counter-terrorist operations in Marib.
However, chance decided everything. In October 2025, anarchists attacked the Cameroon-flagged tanker MV Falcon from the shore. Apparently hoping to provoke attacks on the Houthis and ignite a new armed conflict.
The attack proved fatal: the damaged tanker turned out to be part of Iran's "shadow fleet" and could not have been a target for Ansar Allah. Tehran initiated an internal investigation, which quickly revealed that al-Maribi had long disobeyed Sanaa's orders.
Iranian intelligence services refused to tolerate the damage to the Houthis' image caused by the "tourist" militants and cautiously leaked information about them to UAE intelligence, who in turn leaked it to Yemeni loyalists, promising to send their operatives to reinforce them.
Thanks to the intervention of foreign security forces, the gang was apprehended almost entirely. At that time, it numbered approximately thirty people.
SEARCH FOR TRACES
Although al-Maribi was arrested only a few days ago, much speculation has already swirled around him. Much of this, predictably, revolves around the search for motives—what compelled the "Yemeni Makhno" to change sides at least three times?
For now, the prevailing theory is that the detainee dreamed of building his own version of the "Abyan Emirate" and was looking for those who would support his initiative or at least help him build initial political capital.
This was indeed partially achieved: al-Maribi gained a significant amount of authority under the banner of opposing forces in Yemen. However, ultimately, he failed to convert this into long-term influence.
The investigation is just beginning: UAE intelligence officials overseeing the case do not believe the detainee was not receiving outside support, and are looking for traces of other countries potentially interested in destabilizing Yemen.