Text taken from an article posted at voicesevas.ru by M. V. Litvinov
The fighting that erupted between the Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) militia and the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Yampol on June 19-20, 2014 , is of particular interest. For the first time since the outbreak of hostilities in Donbas, one of the opposing sides appears to have had an operational plan and demonstrated sufficient consistency in achieving it. Equally intriguing are the reasons why, after a tactically successful battle, the Ukrainian Armed Forces retreated from their positions. Existing explanations for this retreat are varied, but they do not stand up to scrutiny.
The advance of Russian troops to the border (this version is maintained by DPR Defense Minister I.I. Strelkov), which allegedly caused the withdrawal of the Ukrainian Armed Forces strike group, does not fit the logic of actions demonstrated by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in other areas of the conflict. Currently, the command of the punitive operation, politically correctly called the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO), does not limit its actions in any way to Moscow's position. Just a few days ago, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel hesitated to destroy a detachment of Russian border troops when it prevented them from evacuating disabled armored vehicles from Russian territory. Currently, even the permanent fortifications of Russian security forces cannot protect Russian forces from Ukrainian Armed Forces strikes. The Ukrainian Armed Forces resolutely use Russian territory and airspace to pursue and destroy their actual and potential adversaries, both through maneuver and fire. The movements of Russian troops, however, do not disturb the peace on the Ukrainian side.
The theory that the Ukrainian Armed Forces strike force withdrew due to the unilateral ceasefire also appears unfounded. Firstly, the ceasefire, even officially, does not address the self-defense of Ukrainian armed forces in the punitive operation zone. Secondly, the ceasefire is not being observed in any of the areas of confrontation. And thirdly, the ceasefire certainly does not justify abandoning positions taken in battle. Finally, the retreat of the punitive strike force began before the ceasefire, which began at 10:00 PM Kyiv time on June 20, 2014.
The idea of ​​retreating to protect the so-called Ukrainian President Poroshenko's visit to the combat zone is nothing short of amusing. First and foremost, the best defense against enemy force is to tie down the enemy's combat-ready forces as far away as possible from the so-called Ukrainian President's location.
THE SITUATION AND BACKGROUND OF THE BATTLE OF YAMPOL.
To understand the true background of the events that unfolded on June 19-20, 2014, in the Yampol-Krivaya Luka-Seversk-Zakotne area, it is necessary to examine the historical developments. The situation in this area escalated sharply on June 3, 2014, when Ukrainian armed forces broke the resistance of the Krasny Liman company of the DPR militia, captured and cleared the town of Krasny Liman. This event created a direct threat to the only relatively safe supply route for the Slavyansk militia group. The bridges over the Seversky Donets River near Zakotne and Krivaya Luka were also at risk of capture. By crossing them, Ukrainian armed forces would be able to disrupt communications between the Slavyansk and Lisichansk militia groups through Seversk. The roads leading to these bridges from Kirovsk in the north and Krasny Liman in the northwest intersect outside the dense urban development southwest of Yampol. The roads run through wooded areas, making it difficult to control traffic and guarantee the protection of supply and reinforcement transports from attacks. Therefore, Ukrainian armed forces did not immediately exploit their success in Krasny Liman and advance south to take control of the important road junction. This junction was eventually seized by militias, who also controlled the town of Yampol, maintaining checkpoints on its northern outskirts, along the road to Kirovsk.
Ukrainian armed forces could not reliably control the road junction southwest of Yampol, the bridges in Zakotne and Kryvaya Luka, or cut the route from Rai-Aleksandrivka to Reznikovka without clearing Yampol and Seversk of militia supporters. Otherwise, this would have required a large force to counter the militia's constant attacks on communications. Meanwhile, the punitive operation command faces serious challenges in clearing large population centers.
It should be noted that Ukrainian Armed Forces units and subunits are rarely involved in cleansing operations. This is because the morale of Ukrainian army units is based on the belief that they are waging a war against Russian mercenaries and saboteurs. Murders and other extrajudicial reprisals against the largely unarmed residents of Donbas cities have an extremely negative impact on morale in army units, leading to desertion and surrender of weapons to the enemy. This trend has been confirmed in almost all cases of direct contact between Ukrainian Armed Forces units and the population of Donbas. Therefore, Ukrainian Armed Forces units do not enter populated areas. A virtually identical situation exists for most National Guard units, renamed from the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Ministry of Internal Affairs special forces and motorized patrol units avoid this role at all costs, citing the specific nature of their training.
Essentially, only the newly formed 1st and 2nd Volunteer Battalions of the National Guard, the Ministry of Internal Affairs' special battalions "Dnipro," "Azov," and "Donbas ," as well as the 24th Territorial Defense Battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine "Aidar" and the 25th Territorial Defense Battalion of the Armed Forces of Ukraine "Donbas," formed from Maidan activists and nationalist-minded Ukrainians living in Donbas, are suitable for the cleanup. However, even these battalions quickly become exhausted and lose morale, even with low casualties due to the nature of their contingent. In reality, their forces are only sufficient for one operation. The 1st Volunteer Battalion of the National Guard was exhausted during the failed assault on Kramatorsk, the Azov Battalion during the clearing of Mariupol, and the Dnipro and Donbas Battalions are essentially the oligarch Kolomoisky's personal army, supporting his business interests in the western Donbas, where they suffered significant losses. The Aidar Battalion operates in the Luhansk People's Republic. The 2nd Volunteer Battalion of the National Guard lost its fighting spirit in Krasny Liman. The 3rd and 4th Volunteer Battalions are still being formed and are unlikely to be ready before early July 2014. Thus, the Ukrainian armed forces were unprepared for the clearing of cities.
PREPARATION FOR THE BATTLE AND THE STRENGTH OF THE PARTIES.
After the loss of Krasny Liman, the militia consolidated its positions in the Yampol-Krivaya Luka-Zakotne area. Despite the Cossacks' withdrawal from the front on June 4, 2014, militia strength in this area grew, especially after the first combat clash occurred near Yampol on June 5. The "Yerema" (Krasny Liman direction) and "Prapora" (Kirov direction) detachments were concentrated in this area. The militia units in this area totaled 200 men (however, up to three-quarters of their number escaped fire). Their heavy infantry weapons included RPGs, AGS, and mortars, as well as one ZU23-2 anti-aircraft mount. Reconnaissance and combat security forces advanced directly to checkpoints of Ukrainian armed formations on the outskirts of Krasny Liman and Kirovsk.
However, the rear of this militia group was quite poorly secured. A fairly large garrison is stationed in Marinovka to block militia movements along the M03/E40 highway. Its strength is difficult to estimate. The DPR command's estimate of this garrison's ability to deploy 30 armored vehicles to the Seversk area appears overstated, as this garrison lacks direct communication and supply lines with the main group of Ukrainian armed forces. Nevertheless, this garrison poses a certain threat to the southern flank and rear of the DPR militia's Yampol battalion, as demonstrated during the battle on June 19, 2014. Furthermore, the Marinovka garrison ensures coordination with the Ukrainian armed forces garrison stationed at the Artemovsk armored vehicle storage base, which, in addition to the base's personnel, includes units of the 3rd Separate Special Forces Regiment of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Kirovohrad.
These garrisons cooperate with Artemovsk's criminal underworld forces, which managed to kill the city's militia commandant and wound the commander of the storage depot on June 7. These forces are unable to take control of Artemovsk, as the local population generally sympathizes with the militia and could receive support from Horlivka at any moment. Nevertheless, these forces provide the Ukrainian Armed Forces with a certain degree of maneuverability. The militia garrison in Seversk is extremely weak, numbering no more than a platoon armed with light weapons and RPGs.
The entire Yampol area is a weak point for the DPR militia. It serves as both the only relatively secure supply route for the Slavyansk group and as a junction between three de facto autonomous militia groups, all of which are only nominally subordinate to the DPR Minister of Defense. It's clear that an attack in this area poses a significant threat to the militia. Moreover, the main position at the crossroads is inherently extremely untenable.
In the event of tactical failure, the forces defending it would almost immediately be pulled in different directions—to Yampol, Krivaya Luka, and Zakotnoye—depending on the local preferences of individual soldiers and units. On the other hand, the threat in this area is intolerable for the Slavyansk garrison and, therefore, would likely lead to the withdrawal of significant garrison forces from the urban area of ​​Slovyansk. Thus, the necessary preconditions are created for the defeat of the Slavic group in the field, followed by a close blockade or an accelerated assault on the garrison, sharply weakened and demoralized by the defeat.
These very considerations formed the basis for the operation by Ukrainian armed forces, which unfolded on June 19, 2014, in the Yampol direction. The objective was to dislodge and disperse the Krasnolimansk militia battalion, thereby triggering the advance of reserves from Slovyansk, blocking them on the northern bank of the Seversky Donets, and completely destroying them. To prevent militia reinforcements from approaching from Lisichansk, a screening force consisting of the garrisons of Marynivka and Artemovsk was deployed to the outskirts of Seversk.
The units were carefully selected with a long-term goal in mind: victory was to be achieved by the Galicians and the loyal vassals of the oligarch Kolomoisky from Dnipropetrovsk, thereby cementing the narrative of their racial superiority over Russians. The command of the punitive operation concentrated in the Krasny Liman area a mechanized battalion from the 24th Mechanized Brigade, a parachute battalion from the 25th Airborne Brigade, up to two tank companies, a self-propelled howitzer battalion, a MLRS battery—a total of up to 130 pieces of equipment and approximately 1,500 personnel. Support from attack aircraft was also provided.
The operation was clearly planned with the involvement of foreign advisers with combat experience. However, a weak point in the planning was the inaccuracy of both the combat capabilities of the militia and the morale of most Ukrainian Armed Forces units. This also supports the previous conclusion regarding the foreign authorship of the operation.
It was difficult for the militia to miss the enemy's reinforcements in this direction. On June 14, the first attack by Ukrainian armed forces, involving tanks, took place near Yampol, and on June 17, militia positions were shelled by multiple rocket launchers. However, the Yampol militia battalion's reinforcements consisted of only two SPG-9 mounted grenade launchers with extremely limited ammunition. This is likely due not only to limited resources but also to an underestimation of the potential consequences of an attack in this area.
This conclusion can be drawn from the fact that, after the defeat of the Yampol battalion, forces were eventually dispatched from Slavyansk to assist. According to the militia command, they managed to disrupt the main enemy force's advance to its starting positions near Krasny Liman and even inflict losses on it along the way. However, this information had no effect on the militia group - only half of the militia battalion's anti-tank weapons were concentrated in the direction of the main attack, and reserves were not deployed in advance to the area of ​​Krivaya Luka, Zakotnoye, and Seversk.
THE FIGHT, ITS RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS FOLLOWING THE FIGHT.
Despite significant superiority in virtually every way, the operation planned by the Ukrainian Armed Forces failed almost from the very beginning. The initial attack on the militia's main defensive line was not unexpected and fizzled out, despite the presence of a significant number of tanks and overwhelming numerical and firepower superiority. It's entirely possible that the failure of the initial attack was accidental.
It's highly likely that the commander of the mechanized battalion of the 24th Mechanized Brigade was killed during the initial stages of the battle. The tank and infantry fighting vehicle destroyed by the militia could have been his tank from the battalion's tank company or the combat vehicle of the brigade's reconnaissance company commander. The failure of the initial attack meant that time had to be wasted and the entire operation had to be started over.
Meanwhile, the Slavyansk garrison's reserves had no basis for advancement, meaning the likelihood of them being encircled was diminished. Daylight hours were no longer sufficient to destroy these reserves. The repulse of the initial attack not only delayed the Slavyansk garrison's reserve forces' advance, but also delayed the militia blockade from the Kirov direction from withdrawing until midday. It was this militia group that launched a flanking attack on units of the 25th Airborne Brigade, resulting in the destruction of four BMDs and significant losses among the brigade's personnel. Units of the "Bars" Brigade of the Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs' Special Forces apparently suffered losses in this same combat episode.
Following the success of the second Ukrainian Armed Forces attack, which dispersed most of the Yampol militia battalion, militia reserves began to move across Krivaya Luka to restore lost positions. Thus, the militia command acted as the enemy had intended. With a brief strike, Ukrainian tank units managed to capture both bridges over the Seversky Donets and cut off the militia's escape routes. However, not all militia reinforcements had managed to cross to the northern bank of the river by that time.
Furthermore, daylight was waning, greatly diminishing the ability to destroy the encircled militia in the wooded area. Finally, clearly overestimating the strength of the Ukrainian Armed Forces blocking group from Marynivka and Artemovsk that had broken through to the outskirts of Seversk, the Lisichansk militia battalion deployed significant forces into the city, which, together with the local population, easily overwhelmed the Ukrainian armed forces at that point.
The acknowledged losses of the armed formations of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the battle of June 19, 2014, amounted to 20 killed. It is highly probable that the number of wounded could have reached 100. Thus, the infantry units lost approximately a quarter of their initial strength. Such losses should be considered quite severe, significantly affecting the combat effectiveness of the group.
The admitted losses of the militia amounted to at least 10 killed, 15 evacuated wounded, and over a hundred missing. However, the lack of a clearing operation in Yampol allowed many militiamen to take refuge there, and some crossed the river during the night at convenient locations. By midday, the Ukrainian Armed Forces command in the area was able to soberly assess the enemy's losses. Of course, the report of 300 killed militiamen was purely propaganda. The actual count of militia losses on the battlefield is unlikely to have given the Ukrainian Armed Forces a figure of more than 30. Therefore, even with the greatest optimism, the punitive operation command could not estimate the enemy's actual losses at more than 150 fighters. Individual fighters and militia units remained in the rear, ready to strike at the punitive group's communications. Significant militia forces were operating in the Seversk area.
Finally, significant forces of the Slavyansk garrison were discovered outside the encirclement. In this situation, neither the assault nor the tight blockade of Slavyansk on June 20 offered any chance for the remnants of the militia to escape the city. There were too many of them left, and they maintained firm command. In this situation, the punitive operation command made the entirely logical and correct decision to terminate the operation and retreat to their starting positions.
On June 20, 2014, militia units attempted to regain lost positions. The attempt to destroy the bridge near Zakotne clearly demonstrated that certain conclusions had been reached by militia command regarding the fragility of the main defensive position at the road intersection. However, destroying a permanent bridge is extremely difficult. Rebuilding it is relatively easy. The only obstacle to the latter would be a permanent firing position near the destroyed bridge.
Since such a position was not established, it was entirely expected that on June 21, a battle involving tanks by Ukrainian armed forces occurred near Zakotne. And on June 22, militia command recorded shelling of Yampol from the Zakotne area, where a Ukrainian Armed Forces garrison had established itself after an initial, rather disorderly retreat on June 20. There is reason to believe that the bridge near Kryva Luka has also returned to militia control.
Overall, following the battle, the militia's situation in the Yampol area has significantly worsened. There is still no independent and effective command in this area. The area has shifted from the primary responsibility of the Sloviansk garrison to the primary responsibility of the Lisichansk garrison. This is a sound decision, as Lisichansk's communications with Seversk are undoubtedly better than those between Sloviansk and Yampol, but it is incapable of radically improving the situation in this area. The city of Yampol remains under militia control, but this control is elusive. This control is secured not by militia positions and units, but by the lack of Ukrainian armed forces' ability to clear the city of DPR supporters.
The establishment of a Ukrainian Armed Forces garrison in Zakotne has made the Sloviansk garrison's communications with the rest of DPR territory even more vulnerable. After the clearing of Yampol, these communications will be completely severed. This event is expected to occur in early July. The militia command acted under duress and in a manner predictable to the enemy, but the low quality of the Ukrainian Armed Forces' personnel, which inevitably resulted in heavy losses among its command staff, coupled with the militia units' decisive actions, albeit obvious to the enemy, prevented the punitive operation command from implementing its plan. It should also be noted that the militia's reconnaissance and sabotage groups prioritize sabotage operations over reconnaissance, or, for some reason, the militia command makes limited use of reconnaissance data when planning its operations.
The failure of the operation to defeat the Slavyansk garrison north of the Seversky Donets River and the accelerated assault on the city during the battle of June 19, 2014, will undoubtedly negatively impact the credibility of those who planned this operation. Their proposals will now face more reasoned resistance. The developments do not allow us to conclude that the punitive operation command has completely abandoned its original plan, as defeating the militia in the field holds very tempting prospects. Meanwhile, the alternative idea of ​​gradually cutting off the Slavyansk garrison's communications with the rest of the DPR territory requires a much greater investment of time and resources. It should also be acknowledged that the staff of the punitive operation has a very clear understanding of the decision-making logic of the militia command. Therefore, they will continue to provoke it into forced and predictable actions with the aim of defeating individual militia groups. The weakness of Ukraine's armed forces remains the inability of most units to carry out basic offensive tactical missions, even under overwhelming odds, as well as poor training and coordination.