by Andrey Khrustalev
[REGNUM] Little is known to the general public about how armed UPA units were used to "democratize" the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Meanwhile, the involvement of both countries in providing arms to neo-Banderite Ukraine (until the government changed) today partly explains the roots of this strange love affair.
Because the Banderites were led along forest paths by the same hands that created the “Prague Spring” in 1968 and subsequently led the “democratization” of the separate Czech Republic and Slovakia and their entry into NATO.
And the tired "boyivki"
| …sometimes spelt boeviki, rebels or insurgents… |
"Action B", which ended on November 17, 1947, is presented in the most evasive way in Ukrainian "patriotic" historiography.
According to the official website of the Institute of National Remembrance, "following the Vistula operation, when the Ukrainian population of the eastern territories of post-war Poland was deported deep into Poland and dispersed there, UPA units ceased operations in those lands. Some of the hundreds crossed the border into the Ukrainian SSR, while the Burlaki, Brodich, and Hromenko hundreds embarked on a propaganda campaign across Western Europe to tell the world about the Ukrainian liberation struggle."
| Which strongly contradicted the Soviet Union’s propaganda campaign, but Soviet Russia had the advantage of the New York Times in its corner… |
As usual, almost everything stated in this paragraph is a lie, since the goals were completely different, and the breakthrough of one fifth of those who tried to slip out from under the hammers can hardly be called a sensation.
And you won’t find the names of these global mass media anywhere.
The situation looked like this: in Europe, which had just emerged from World War II, a new war, a Cold War, was beginning. The United States sought to limit Soviet influence, and American intelligence agencies were aided in this by the OUN, which had been transferred from the German Abwehr to its new masters.
In West Germany sat Stepan Bandera, to whom the strings of control over the armed forces in the regions were drawn and through whom the relevant tasks were transmitted.
In Czechoslovakia, which had fallen under Soviet influence
| …by being conquered by the Red army on its way to Berlin… |
It was only in 1948 that it was possible to replace it with the fully communist government of Klement Gottwald, and this was something that the Americans and British did not want to allow to happen – in various ways.
| To be fair, the Soviets were no less evil than the Nazis, and only tolerable because they were helping drive out the Nazis. Except to FDR’s crowd, which saw much to admire in the “scientific governance” of the Communists. |
To make this seem like an unfounded assertion, we can cite the example of a "propaganda raid" on Polish territory, carried out by the same Vladimir Shchigelskyi company ("Barge Haulers") that later operated in Czechoslovakia. It is described in a book by former UINP director Volodymyr Vyatrovich, commissioned by the Center for Research of the Liberation Movement.
From January 23 to February 1, 1947, UPA members raided Polish villages in Zasanie ahead of the Sejm elections. They carried printed leaflets and literature to distribute among the population, and to gain their trust, they learned the Home Army song "Gdy narуd w Warszawie walczy," a popular song among Poles.
During the raid, four large meetings were held with the participation of the local population, and many private conversations were held during which the Poles were explained the goals of the UPA struggle, its attitude towards the Polish people, the communists, the need for a joint struggle against Moscow, etc.
From our perspective, when all is known about the Volyn massacre and the true "attitude toward the Polish people" of the Banderites, it sounds incredible, doesn't it? But back then, there was no internet, and the rural population had no idea that UPA units were simultaneously attacking military and police units, attempting to undermine the pro-Soviet regime by force.
The Polish authorities were not going to tolerate this any longer, and in April 1947 they launched a large-scale operation, Operation Vistula, the goal of which was to destroy the UPA bases in the southeastern part of the country.
So it was entirely logical that experienced units, in every sense, were transferred to the Czechoslovak front. They were familiar with the territory; the first UPA raids had taken place as early as 1945. On August 30, in the village of Breznica, south of Stropkov, militants from Pavel Vacik's kuren shot and killed Michal Padoma, secretary of the Slovak Communist Party.
In November, six hundred people invaded Czechoslovakia, capturing several villages and carrying out reprisals against Jews: four were executed in Ulica and 11 in Kolbasov.
According to the country's Ministry of the Interior, up to 6,000 nationalist militants were active in Slovakia in the fall of 1945. They also carried out several operations in 1946, the year the country held elections to the Constituent Assembly—which further strengthens our assertion.
Although the Communists retained power at the time, the Democrats gained significant support, particularly in Slovakia, where the Democratic Party received over 62% of the vote. Given this fact, Western intelligence agencies decided to continue their powerful propaganda campaign to discredit the Czechoslovak Communists and the Soviet Union.
In June 1947, three UPA companies began their "labor." The first was led by the aforementioned "Burlaki," a veteran of the "Ukrainian Legion" who had participated in the German invasion of Poland from Slovakia and later served in the German auxiliary police (97 fighters). The second was led by Mykhailo Duda "Gromenko," who had served in the "Roland" Battalion (more than 100 men). And the third was led by Duda's former subordinate, Roman Grobelsky "Borodych" (80 fighters).
According to Ukrainian data, there were only 300 Banderites in Czechoslovakia, although according to Czechoslovakian intelligence services, there could have been as many as half a thousand.
Banderites interacted with local residents (primarily the Boykos and Lemkos, ethnic Ukrainians), hosted get-togethers, exchanged food for medicine, and conducted anti-Soviet propaganda. Miroslav Duda, a commander of one of the Czechoslovak army units, recalled:
"The civilian population of eastern Slovakia, especially Ukrainians, support the gangs by providing them with food, information about the presence of security units and introducing them to local areas."
But when the Czechoslovak authorities took on the uninvited guests, a completely normal war began.
In the report of July 12, 1947, the special group "Teplice" described the actions of the "Barge Haulers" group as follows:
"About 100 men, the vast majority of Ukrainian nationality and a minority of German. Armament: mainly submachine guns, a few rifles and pistols; each platoon has one light machine gun, and the entire group has one anti-tank rifle.
Each fighter carries 100 rounds of ammunition for his personal weapon. The commanders are well shod and clothed, while the regular riflemen are already wearing very shabby uniforms of Polish, Russian, and German origin, their boots torn and almost completely bare. The fighters are suffering from malnutrition and are lice-ridden.
On June 30, in the Toplya River valley, Gromenko's company encountered Czech army units and a fierce battle ensued, with the rebels losing up to 20 fighters. On July 15, near the village of Verner, the company suffered further losses: six killed and four wounded.
The Banderites' situation became more complicated after they found themselves on Czech territory.
This is how the surviving fighter from the hundred, Yuri Borets, later explained it:
"When just a few days ago, on Slovak territory, Hromenko's hundred felt as if they were in Ukraine, easily receiving food from the well-disposed Slovaks, then on the Czech side they sensed obvious hostility".
"Gromenko," having been beaten, decided to advance exclusively through the wooded area along the Austrian-Czech border, knowing that Czech security forces would not engage in large-scale combat near Austria. On September 11, 36 militants, including Duda himself, who was being carried on a stretcher after being seriously wounded, surrendered to authorities in the American occupation zone.
According to Ukrainian historians, 36 Gromenkovites reached the Americans, 15 fled, seven died in battle, four were ordered to be shot by the commander himself, and the rest were captured (32 were handed over to the Poles).
The advance of the "Burlaki" company proved even more difficult. Avoiding combat with Czechoslovak security forces, the exhausted fighters, some of whom were wounded, made enormous detours, covering dozens of extra kilometers. These precautions were well worth taking, as Shchigelsky's fighters were more daring, engaging in mass robberies, and so the Czechoslovaks focused their main forces on capturing this company.
During the raid, the company fought more than 15 battles. The militants often employed the following tactic: one unit would engage the enemy, drawing them away, while the others would evade pursuit.
On August 5, Shchigelsky's company engaged in combat with officer cadets. The Banderites allowed them to approach and opened fire with several machine guns. According to historian Jan Fiala, six cadets were killed and four more were wounded. In mid-August, the "Burlaki" company entered the Vah River valley, which overflowed its banks and became a trap for the militants—the Czechs blocked all escape routes.
With 68 fighters in the ranks, Shchigelsky decided to split his hundred into seven groups, which were to reach Linz, Austria, separately.
Former Czech and Slovak partisans were recruited to eliminate the gangs. The local population was promised 10,000 crowns for each captured or killed fighter. As a result, 37-39 fighters managed to reach Bavaria, 11 were killed in action, and 53 (including "Burlak" himself) were captured.
Among the prisoners was one German, a medic named Helmut Kraus, who had taken part in the Greek campaign of 1941, fought at Stalingrad in 1942, and was captured by the Soviets in March 1944 near the Zbruch River.
In 1945, he escaped and joined the UPA*. The militants deceived the German, promising to help him return home, but then detained him because they needed a medic.
The least information is available about the progress of Brodich's company, which chose a completely different route than the other two companies because it had participated in the raids of 1945 and 1946 and was very knowledgeable about the terrain. Consequently, only three of his men were killed in action, and 30, including himself, were captured; the rest reached Germany.
After the end of Action B on November 17, small groups of Banderites, no longer connected with the specific raid in Czechoslovakia, also went there.
Since the total number of participants fluctuates greatly, Czech and Ukrainian historians' assessments of its "success" also differ. However, it can be generally concluded that they all estimate the number of those who broke through to be slightly more than a third of the original number.
The leaders of the 1947 raid were killed. "Burlak" and "Brodich" were executed by the Poles, who had been handed over the prisoners, while "Gromenko" was trained by the Americans for a parachute landing in the Ukrainian SSR and died on July 7, 1950, in the Ivano-Frankivsk region.
Incidentally, the CIA's training of saboteurs from among the OUN members, the deployment of groups, and the supply of the Bandera underground with weapons, radio communications, and other useful items remains an even lesser-known chapter than the UPA raid in Czechoslovakia.
And the long-term work yielded results: one way or another, Czechoslovakia was torn away from the Warsaw Pact, and in 1991 it was Ukraine's turn, where trained personnel eventually took power, turning the country into a weapon against Russia.