by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Yemen has been rocked by a spy scandal: Ansar Allah (Houthi) security forces have uncovered a large spy network operating in the country for the past several years, operating in the interests of three intelligence agencies—the CIA (US), Mossad (Israel), and the General Intelligence Service (Saudi Arabia).
And while the involvement of Americans and Israelis in the Houthis' "spy games" in Yemen didn't come as much of a surprise, the inclusion of the Saudis on this list was a real scandal—albeit one that unfolded mostly behind the scenes.
A WELL-ESTABLISHED SYSTEM
The spy network, controlled by three countries, was created before the global pandemic but remained dormant until 2024. It was only after the Houthis began seriously threatening US and Saudi Arabian interests in the region by imposing a naval and air blockade on Israel that it was finally activated.
It's worth noting that the network was built in a manner quite atypical for the Middle East: its scale and security far exceeded those of other previously identified spy organizations.
Its first (lowest) level was represented by a group of small cells (2-3 people) consisting of local loyalists and informants. Typically, these were defectors from the North (territories controlled by pro-Saudi forces) who had proven their loyalty to Ansar Allah in combat or in civilian service.
At the second level, there were “field operatives” operating, who were subordinate to the Saudi intelligence services and, under various guise, were deployed to Yemen during the active phase of the civil war.
Third, high-ranking Saudi intelligence officers who carried out operational control of the structure and sometimes met with agents in neighboring countries.
At the highest—the fourth—level were managers from the Israeli and American intelligence services, who ensured overall coordination of the intelligence network's activities and compiled data for reports to higher-ups in Washington and Tel Aviv. They, however, never left Riyadh and communicated with their subordinates exclusively through trusted contacts.
The system that was built, despite its complexity, ensured flexibility in decision-making and allowed ordinary agents to work for three countries at once, without realizing the true goals of their work.
And it's worth noting that there were plenty of "operational assignments": loyalists monitored military command posts, identified the locations of military camps and weapons depots, and compiled dossiers on influential security officials and their inner circle.
Some of the data received by the operations center was later used in strikes on Yemen during Operations Black Flag and Long Arm.
FALSE FLAGS
However, the work of the "spy trio" was not limited to the usual surveillance of enemy functionaries and the mapping of military installations.
A far more important task was to discredit Ansar Allah in the eyes of the international community, to present them as an organization hostile to the entire world, and to achieve its recognition as a terrorist organization at the UN level.
The latter would make it possible to introduce comprehensive sanctions against the movement and minimize international support for its activities.
It must be said that the spy network was adept at playing on the emotions of the "Yemeni street." And the friendships of some of the detained agents with field commanders also helped quickly mobilize security forces, disguising their influence campaigns as Houthi activity. This allowed some orchestrated actions to be presented as Sana'a's initiative.
For example, in August 2025, Ansar Allah supporters stormed several UN buildings in the territories they controlled and arrested a large group of UN employees, accusing them of spying for the United States and Israel.
The arrests took place a couple of days after a high-profile Israeli airstrike on the Yemeni capital, which killed several high-ranking officials of the alternative government.
By the time Sana'a figured out that the trail was false, the international uproar had reached such proportions that Yemeni diplomats were forced to apologize earnestly (albeit behind the scenes) to the UN Secretary-General and the leaders of several superpowers—just to avoid being blacklisted.
It is noteworthy that the "trio" agents managed to pull off the same trick again - in October 2025, when the Houthi intelligence services again arrested UN employees, 15 of whom were foreign citizens, on charges of "aiding the enemy."
True, the second time the Houthis, having learned from their previous experience, limited themselves to routine checks and quickly released most of those detained.
There have also been attempts to blame Ansar Allah for attacks on neutral ships.
Specifically, on October 18, 2025, after the ceasefire in Gaza had already taken effect, unknown forces attacked the MV Falcon tanker, which was carrying liquefied petroleum gas, in the Gulf of Aden. As a result of the attack, the vessel caught fire and began drifting. Immediately afterwards, footage of missile launchers deployed on the shore, which allegedly hit the vessel, flooded the internet.
However, a few days later it became clear that the Houthis had not carried out any operations in the area and, moreover, did not even have any prepared infrastructure there, which was confirmed by satellite images that later appeared.
The disaster on board the MV Falcon was caused by a technical failure in the engine room.
The news of the shore-based shelling was eventually deemed fake. However, who exactly deployed and then just as quickly hid the dummy launchers remains a mystery.
OPERATION RETRIBUTION
However, despite the high level of skill of the spies they planted, they stumbled over a small thing – an attempt in early September to win over the personal barber of the Houthi leader, Abdul-Malik al-Houthi.
Moreover, it was not an ordinary agent who was sent to the conversation, but a seasoned operative who served in Saudi intelligence.
The latter introduced himself as an activist of the semi-virtual pro-Iranian group "Islamic Resistance in the Land of the Two Holy Mosques," allegedly operating in Saudi Arabia, and attempted to gain their trust under the pretext of strengthening contacts. However, he hadn't bothered to thoroughly check his interlocutor's background beforehand.
The hairdresser, who turned out to be a counterintelligence officer, quickly reported the conversation to the appropriate authorities, and surveillance was placed on the active underground worker.
Less than two months later, security forces already had dossiers on a significant portion of the conspirators. And here, too, chance played a role.
Even though the cells in Yemen operated autonomously, they were somehow connected through five "managers," some of whom were spotted at the meeting with the Saudi. And through them, other suspicious individuals were identified. All that remained was to make the arrests.
In early November, Ansar Allah security forces finally made a counterattack, carrying out an operation codenamed "And Their Plot Will Fail."
Raids and arrests took place simultaneously in all provinces under government control. Several people were arrested directly on the line of contact, causing considerable surprise among rank-and-file soldiers.
As a result of the operation, Houthi counterintelligence captured up to fifty agents and informants working for foreign countries. Among them was at least one woman, known as Huda Ali.
According to investigators, she ensured the infiltration of agents into "women's gatherings"—informal clubs for the wives of high-ranking Ansar Allah officials, where operatives, acting primarily in Israel's interests, collected information on the daily habits and pain points of potential targets.
Furthermore, the Houthis managed to seize several advanced spy devices assembled in Saudi Arabia and Israel. This allowed them to identify several more security breaches—at customs and in several civilian agencies, where a series of arrests of senior and mid-level officials recently occurred.
However, the Houthis failed to apprehend the "resident" who orchestrated the unified network. Sensing trouble, "Mr. X" managed to escape from Sana'a to Taiz province in southwest Yemen and relocate to central government positions.
An attempt to apprehend the fugitive resulted in a brief firefight, during which both sides suffered casualties. It's highly likely that the mysterious mastermind behind the entire spy network, having covered his tracks in territory controlled by the Saudi protégé, moved to Riyadh, closer to the mastermind behind the hit.
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE SAUDIS
The spy scandal in Yemen will most likely have serious consequences for the House of Saud, both strategic and image-related.
The fact is that since 2022, when the active phase of fighting in Yemen ceased, a kind of gentleman's agreement was reached between Ansar Allah and Riyadh: the Houthis agreed to cease shelling Saudi oil and gas facilities and reduce pressure on the frontlines in Yemen in exchange for a complete freeze on Saudi operations against them. This included, of course, intelligence operations.
Now that information about Riyadh's involvement in espionage has come to light, the Houthis have a number of grievances against their royal neighbors. The most obvious concerns the violation of informal agreements.
The Houthis no longer consider themselves bound by these obligations and may resume attacks on Saudi infrastructure in the near future. This is evidenced, among other things, by the accelerated redeployment of local troops closer to the border.
However, the Houthis are much more active in pushing the narrative of Riyadh's betrayal of Palestinian interests. Saudi intelligence has effectively leased its assets to the CIA and Mossad, allowing the latter to reduce the effectiveness of anti-Israel campaigns and strengthen their pressure on the Gaza Strip. If Ansar Allah succeeds in promoting this narrative, the Saudis' image as "defenders of Palestine" will be irreparably damaged.
Riyadh recognizes these risks and is trying to mitigate them, including through generous promises to the Houthi leaders. Signals to this effect are being sent to Sana'a via neutral countries—Oman and Qatar.
It appears that Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman will try to negotiate with Donald Trump some kind of security guarantees for the Ansar Allah leadership in exchange for them turning a blind eye to the Saudis' involvement in the conspiracy.
However, whether Trump will agree to this is a big question.