by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] For six months now, the Middle East has been suffering from a drought on a scale unseen in these parts for decades. A near-total lack of precipitation, coupled with record temperatures, has led to a rapid depletion of water supplies. Some countries have managed to adapt to the new conditions with minimal consequences. However, not everyone is so fortunate.
Among those suffering the most is Iran. Tehran faced its largest disaster in 60 years and was practically unprepared for it. At least, that's the impression outside observers have.
However, the Iranian authorities do not yet consider the threat fatal. Moreover, they see this "challenge of the times" as an opportunity to resolve one of their long-standing domestic political problems.
THE SHAH'S LEGACY
The water supply problem is a long-standing one for Iran and was inherited by Tehran from the Shah's regime.
Although the Pahlavi dynasty (Iran's last ruling family) laid the foundations of a new irrigation system and modernized water supply facilities, the work was uneven and focused on a few major cities, including the capital.
Gotta start somewhere
This created an infrastructure gap between the central and outlying provinces, the consequences of which Iranians are still feeling today.
After the revolutionaries' victory in 1979, the situation seemed to improve: the country began building dams and drilling wells en masse, and irrigation projects were developed to benefit the agricultural sector—similar to those being implemented in Israel. The situation between the center and the outskirts somewhat leveled out.
On the other hand, the country's water management system remained irrational. Iranian authorities relied excessively on rainfall as a natural source of moisture to fill reservoirs and continually postponed reform of the irrigation systems, apparently unwilling to disrupt what was already working.
And when a large-scale drought began in 2025, it was already too late to carry out modernization.
MOVING TIME
As the water supply situation continues to deteriorate, Iranian authorities are forced to take complex measures, such as restricting water supplies at night in major cities. Expert commissions have been established to seek solutions, but so far, without significant results.
But the most difficult decision is yet to come: Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian has stated that if rains do not begin by the end of November, Tehran will have to be "temporarily resettled." The population (approximately 9 million people) is expected to be evacuated to cities with better water supplies.
If the situation continues to worsen, the so-called "Greater Tehran"—an agglomeration near the Iranian capital with a total population of up to 15 million people—will also fall under the "temporary resettlement" regime.
Residents of Mashhad (approximately 4 million people) and Karaj (1.5 million people) are also teetering on the brink of mass displacement, with water reserves in their main reservoirs barely exceeding 3% and 7% of normal levels, respectively. Given the current trend of the crisis, other major cities are at risk of being added to the list.
Predictably, "water migration" is perceived by Iranians as an unpopular measure that will further exacerbate the domestic political crisis. Residents fear, among other things, that they will face a hostile reception in their new locations, as they will become competitors for resources for the local population.
Moreover, there is no guarantee that by the time the move to the new location is completed, these settlements will not also be subject to evacuation.
Against this backdrop, the Iranian president predictably became the target of widespread criticism. And not so much for his calls for evacuation, but for breaking his own campaign promises.
When they came to power, the reformists, led by Pezeshkian, promised a series of reforms, including modernizing the water supply and drainage systems. Meanwhile, Iran's drought has now entered its fifth year (almost two of which have been under the reformists' rule), yet the central government has failed to take action to mitigate the threat until the capital itself came under attack.
Unsurprisingly, discontent is fueled from abroad by supporters of the deposed Shah's regime, who promise Iran a "new modernization." However, Iranians themselves have barely responded to these promises, viewing them as empty promises.
RELOCATION OF THE CAPITAL
However, the Pezeshkian government is not giving up and is even trying to convert criticism into political victories. Specifically, it is lobbying for an "accelerated move" of the Iranian capital closer to the sea to solve water supply problems and open permanent access to sea routes.
The Iranian president has repeatedly mentioned this idea throughout his time in power, but time and again he has encountered opposition from other factions, who classify the capital move as a "manilovism" and consider it not particularly practical.
Or rather, they believed so until recently. Left without water in the capital, politicians have become more pliable and no longer perceive Pezeshkian's words as bravado.
Meanwhile, there is a grain of truth in these plans: even if the Iranian elites manage to overcome the current drought, the capital is threatened by subsidence (creating the risk of gradual collapse of local buildings) and air pollution that far exceeds all legal limits. It cannot be ruled out that reformists will seize the moment and lobby for the creation of a new capital.
The Makran region, located on the coast of the Gulf of Oman in the province of Sistan-Baluchestan, is being considered as a hypothetical location for the “New Tehran”.
It has a good water supply and the necessary potential for developing high-quality port infrastructure. Iran could hardly find a better location for a new capital.
However, there is one “but”: the “titular” population of the province is Sunni, while the majority of Iranians, including the top leadership, are Shiites, which creates the risk of religious friction and a surge in revanchist sentiments in Sistan-Baluchestan.
This is especially true given that there are also ethnic minorities living here who are not entirely happy with Tehran's policies and who periodically dream of their own state.
However, in the context of the water crisis, this problem is relegated to the background, and is most likely not taken into account by official Tehran.