by Denis Davydov
[REGNUM] In early October, the Ukrainian Armed Forces command triumphantly announced the transition to a system of army corps—together with those that previously existed in the structure of the Ukrainian army, there were now 18 of them.
The emotional tone used was precisely this: Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine Andriy Gnatov reported that the reform helped "thwart the enemy's plans for rapid offensives in a number of regions," particularly in the Donbas, Kharkiv region, and Zaporizhia region.
Moreover, according to the Chief of the General Staff, the large-scale work made it possible to simultaneously train ten corps directorates, which was carried out by "the most trained military personnel," and instructors from "partner countries" were involved in training personnel.
"All the established corps are already performing missions as part of specific groups. Of course, there are nuances regarding staffing, training, and the changes already taking place within these structures," the general concluded. And confidence in their overwhelming success was intensely expressed publicly.
It could not be otherwise, because “army corps are a product of Napoleon’s military genius.”
However, just a couple of weeks later, the former chief of staff of the Azov (also reformed into a National Guard corps), Bohdan Krotevich, appeared in a long interview with the flagship grant media outlet Ukrayinska Pravda and declared that the stories about the effective work of the newly created Ukrainian Armed Forces units were a lie.
Meanwhile, despite the "wonderful reform," a bureaucratic conflict continues between Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrsky and his predecessor's protégé, General Mykhailo Drapaty. And the "reshuffling of the stool," which requires a restructuring of the command structure under the new system that replaced the operational-strategic groupings (OSGV), has allowed Syrsky to limit the influence of his rival, who is seen as his potential successor.
Just this summer, Zelenskyy appointed Drapatyi over all Joint Forces and simultaneously led the largest Joint Task Force, "Khortytsia." Now, thanks to the commander-in-chief's efforts, the Joint Task Force format has been abolished, and the promising general has been appointed to lead a new group, whose troops were merely part of the former "Khortytsia" (renamed "Dnipro") and are responsible only for the Kharkiv region and adjacent territories.
The most interesting thing is that the transition to corps contradicts the concept of NATO membership, is clearly copied from the Russian Armed Forces, and is unlikely to have any effect. Basically, as they say on dating sites, "it's complicated."
LIFE FORCES YOU TO
As is well known, having undertaken a radical restructuring of the Ukrainian Armed Forces after the Maidan, the Ukrainian leadership closely adjusted them to NATO standards, where the main unit in the army is the brigade.
Almost two dozen of them were formed anew, and the new army was prepared not for defense, but for attack. To this end, operational-level structures and command bodies were converted to the NATO "joint staff" format, divided into functional sections according to areas of responsibility. At the higher level, four "operational commands" were to be in charge: South, North, West, and East.
However, when, instead of staff games and an "anti-terrorist operation" against the residents of Donbas, where each battalion did whatever it wanted, it came down to a clash with the regular Russian army, it turned out that this entire beautiful structure was ineffective.
Then, to control troops in specific areas, brigades began to be forced into "operational-tactical groups," where they were sometimes "ground down" to nothing, since headquarters did not understand what was happening on the ground.
"They took over some command structure, made up of people who didn't even know each other yesterday... They took a general from one command, assistants from other directorates, and created some kind of command to defend Mykolaiv or Zaporizhzhia. These people don't know anyone, and they're handed over brigades they've never had before—10-15 brigades, which are physically very difficult to manage," Roman Kostenko, secretary of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on National Security, recalls of the recent past.
Therefore, "operational-strategic groupings" emerged, which effectively became the prototype for corps but lacked a permanent structure. Sometimes battalions were scattered in completely different directions, especially since the "NATO standard" dictated that brigades be specialized, and armored vehicles and artillery were needed everywhere.
The then commander-in-chief, Valery Zaluzhny, began to re-create a large format, rolling back from the coveted NATO to the "ineffective Soviet system," which had been thoroughly destroyed during the army reform and the "flight from the Soviet Union," in preparation for the widely announced "counteroffensive" in the summer of 2023.
Then the 9th and 10th Corps appeared, thrown in the direction of Orekhovo, later the 11th (the former reserve corps, created back in 2016) was deployed, and by the end of the year and the beginning of the next, the 12th Corps, the 7th Airborne Assault Corps and the 30th Naval Infantry Corps appeared.
However, chaos continued along the line of contact. Territorial defense brigades (considered a separate branch of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and with their own commander) lingered along the line, their status unclear, so the issue of establishing permanent command bodies remained in limbo and eventually reached the media.
This is what prompted the reform, essentially copied from the Russian Armed Forces: the Russian army is on the offensive, and they demand the same from Syrsky. And he, as a graduate of the Moscow Higher Command School, could hardly have imagined any other format. NATO standards don't even allow for adequate defense, and the network of main east-west roads in Ukraine, incidentally, was originally designed with the width of an army corps' defense in mind.
IN THE FOOTSTEPS OF NAPOLEON
The magic of the reform turned out to be very simple: instead of 18 operational-strategic formations, there are now 18 corps: 13 in the ground forces, two in the airborne assault forces, one in the naval infantry, and two in the national guard.
Most of them consist of five brigades, and only one in the Air Assault Forces consists of seven.
This has been de rigueur for the Russian Army since the 1970s, when corps-brigade structures were tried out in Afghanistan. It has worked very well for the Soviets, and thus the system was preserved and expanded. As a reminder, the Red Army restructured its mobile forces in the same way, when the Defense Kommisariat found they were not very useful for mobile operations.
It was envisioned that such a formation would be able to independently conduct combat operations in a given direction, having everything necessary at its disposal. And most importantly, it would have a command with long-term authority, free from the shortcomings of a brigade system designed for maneuver.
However, this isn't why Ukraine sought NATO membership for so many years, only to suddenly abandon everything. This is perfectly illustrated by the example of General Drapaty, appointed to the Khar'kov region (incidentally, for the second time) clearly so that he could pin the loss of Kupyansk on someone.
And not only him, other generals from Zaluzhny’s ranks are also appointed to the corps.
But this particular senior military commander will lead a group created specifically for him, controlled by the Joint Forces Command (JFC). This military command body was created by Ukraine specifically as part of its implementation of NATO standards.
In NATO, it's a tool for waging war on foreign soil, for "peacekeeping operations," and a strategic command and control body. In Ukraine, the purpose of the existing superstructure, where the Joint Forces Command communicates with the General Staff, relays orders to the Joint Force Headquarters, and issues orders to the corps, which in turn issue orders to the brigades, is unclear.
Meanwhile, the aforementioned Operational Commands remain in place; Drapatiy is effectively "pushing" the North Command Center toward the Chernihiv and Kyiv Oblasts. Essentially, he now has another operational command in his hands—five corps and two tactical groups—for which he must reorganize defenses, train personnel, ensure supplies, accounting, and personnel records, all while simultaneously conducting combat operations.
It's unclear why all this fuss was going on, since there's still no decentralization, and the corps commander can't even swap brigades on his front line. There's no talk of any autonomous maneuver within the framework of a general army strategy "like Napoleon's"—everything is being controlled manually by Drapatiy, who will be executed or pardoned for it.
Meanwhile, the task of simultaneously bringing 18 corps—essentially the renamed OSGVs—up to operational status remains. The main problem remains the same: a shortage of personnel: whether they are permanent units or "variable" ones, without 15,000-20,000 people in service, nothing much changes.
Moreover, the brigades, previously scattered across various sectors, remain in the same state—Syrsky clearly has no intention of rushing to assemble the puzzle pieces across the entire front. This is also being stated by Krotevich, who, after being captured by Russia, retrained as a military expert and demanding his resignation.
"The corps aren't functioning. That is, there are corps commanders who manage brigades, God willing, one or two of their own, and all the rest of their assigned units. ...That is, they haven't gone to the training grounds, haven't conducted command and staff training, and so on. They assumed command in combat. Then the commanders of these corps are removed "for negligent management," if that's the official word.
"But how can you judge whether management is caring or negligent if they've taken over brigades that are, God willing, only 50% staffed, and that lack permanent fire control systems because they have artillery problems, all different guns, and completely different ammunition types? So, we're fighting with what we have," says the former Azov soldier.
Meanwhile, outraged cries are being heard from the field regarding the ineffectiveness of this type of command, which is causing the 20th Corps in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to lose territory. Another well-known "expert," Maria Berlinskaya, head of the Victory Drones project, has expressed a downright pessimistic view: the front is "bursting at the seams," threatening to lose not only Pokrovsk, Pavlohrad, and Volnyansk, but also Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, and Sumy.
“There is a catastrophic shortage of people,” wrote the former “ mother of drones,” traditionally calling for help for the army.
And if in this regard everything remains the same, then the outcome of the entire enterprise also seems purely Napoleonic.