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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Syria's new authorities are trying to deal with foreign jihadists

2025-10-25

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] The new Syrian authorities have launched a military operation in Idlib province. Damascus' efforts are aimed against the growing Firqat al-Ghuraba group.

Although members of the ruling cabinet claim that the fighting is part of a campaign to combat organized crime, in reality it signals the beginning of a purge within the ranks of yesterday's armed opposition.

As we thought here also.

And, at the same time, attempts to prevent the emergence of a new opposition.

However, for now, Damascus is conducting the campaign extremely cautiously, with breaks for truces.

TOUCHSTONE
Although clashes between the new Syrian authorities and former allies in the armed opposition have been occurring almost since the first days of the "transitional cabinet" led by Ahmed al-Shara'a's establishment, the scale of hostilities has been minor until recently. The sides have limited themselves to brief firefights, mostly without casualties.

The situation changed dramatically in October 2025, when Syrian security forces launched a full-scale operation against the Firqat Al-Ghuraba group, based in the city of Harim (Idlib province), consisting of French-speaking militants and former members of ISIS and Al-Qaeda terrorist cells in Syria.

During the clashes, the Syrian army used heavy weapons and armored vehicles, and deployed a record number of fighters—according to various sources, between 300 and 800 people.

Low-intensity fighting continued for several days, but neither side could yet claim victory. Ultimately, on October 24, the opponents agreed to a temporary withdrawal of forces.

FORMER ALLIES
The official reason for the security forces' "visit" to Harim is an arrest warrant for several high-ranking members of the group on charges of corruption and sexual crimes. However, in reality, this is Damascus's attempt to restore order in the border provinces and crush the rebellion formed by former allies.

Following the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's regime in December 2024, Firqat Al-Ghuraba forces were integrated into the Ministry of Defense's 82nd Infantry Division—but only on paper. In reality, the group systematically ignored Damascus's orders and conducted covert operations in the border regions to mobilize forces disillusioned with the transitional government's policies.

Moreover, the leader of Omar Omsen's group began rapidly gaining influence, becoming one of the most feared figures in Idlib and could well become the leader of a new armed opposition. Especially since his authority was recognized by many commanders from African and post-Soviet countries hostile to Damascus.

The Katiba Tawhid Wal-Jihad and Jaysh al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar groups, as well as the forces of the Turkestan Islamic Party, have expressed interest in a “tactical alliance” with Firqat Al-Ghuraba.

The opposition's position in Idlib is strengthened by growing rumors that the al-Sharaa government wants to extradite the most notorious underground figures, most of whom face imprisonment in their home countries, to foreign partners in exchange for strengthening international ties.

Omsen, on the contrary, promises his supporters protection from persecution and support in defending their interests.

TIMELY RECONCILIATION
Damascus had long noticed the growing influence of the Idlib opposition, but until recently they had hesitated to openly respond to the challenge. This was primarily due to a lack of confidence in their own strength. The new Syrian leader was hesitant to send units into battle whose loyalty he doubted.

An attempt to resolve the problem using the "Uyghur Guard" (the 84th Special Forces Division, approximately 3,500 men)—a unit under the direct command of the president—was fraught with the risk of exacerbating relations with China due to the public demonstration of the combat readiness of people from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

Moreover, there was a risk of undermining the combat capability of the only unit in the new Syrian army that was loyal, from al-Shara's point of view, giving the enemy a chance to counterattack.

This prompted the interim Syrian leader to reconsider some past decisions. Specifically, in late September 2025, al-Sharaa suddenly reconciled with Abu Ahmed Zakur, the co-founder and former chief financier of the Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group.

In early 2024, Zakur fell into disgrace and, fearing for his life, fled to the West, where he launched a campaign against the future Syrian leader. For a long time, he was considered a “personal enemy” of al-Sharaa, even being included in the list of people for whose heads a substantial reward was promised.

However, by the fall of 2025, al-Sharaa pardoned his former ally: Zakur was appointed assistant to the president for tribal affairs and will be responsible for strengthening ties and supporting local clans. Although he, despite the pardon, prefers to remain in the United States for now, his subordinates (in particular, former HTS field commander Abu Abdo Taum ) have already begun work on the ground.

IDLIB THROW
However, Zakur's first task, including as an Idlib native, was in fact preparing a staging area for an operation against the rebels. And by all accounts, he accomplished this task well.

His agents managed to win over hesitant armed groups in Bittir, Haram, and Batt Mishla—all of these towns are located along Route 56 (Idlib's main thoroughfare)—and the militias were intended to slow the advance of government forces should a military operation begin. Similar efforts were carried out in other parts of the province.

As a result, by the start of the operation against Firqat Al-Ghurab, Syrian government forces had guarantees from local neutrals that they would not engage in combat and would not interfere with the arrests of jihadists.

Moreover, Zakur's return to power reassured many commanders who had joined the army from HTS and its allied groups and who feared reprisals from Damascus.

As a result, the invigorated loyalists, including Taum, became the core of the forces sent to Harim. They later served as the government's primary negotiators. Through Taum, the parties agreed to a ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

The case of Omsen and other high-ranking members of Firqat al-Ghurab, whom Syrian security forces previously attempted to arrest, will be heard in the Sharia court of Idlib, where the influence of al-Sharaa and his entourage is strong, but not absolute.

This somewhat calmed the new armed opposition, especially given that Damascus had vowed not to extradite foreign fighters to third countries, thus removing the main unifying factor within the new armed opposition.

Overall, the brief offensive in Idlib can be considered the first step by the Syrian transitional authorities toward consolidating their influence on the ground. However, a quick conclusion to the campaign is not to be expected: the defeat of the rebels will be gradual, with a steady consolidation of the captured positions.

The reason for this strange tactic is simple: Damascus is well aware of the specifics of the "Idlib rebellion" and will try to avoid the same mistakes as their predecessor. In particular, they will try to prevent the dissatisfied from consolidating around specific figures.

Posted by:badanov

#2 comments); ?>werwer

Posted by: Mercutio 2025-10-25 14:40

#1 comments); ?>werwer

Posted by: Mercutio 2025-10-25 10:14

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