by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] Less than a week has passed since the signing of the "permanent peace" agreement between Israel and Palestinian Hamas, and both sides are already teetering on the brink of renewed fighting. This time, the Palestinian city of Rafah has become the flashpoint.
A battle broke out between Israelis and unidentified Palestinians near this settlement, which subsequently resulted in further bombing of the enclave.
However, behind the short-term escalation, there are signs of larger military-political work that the parties are carrying out to strengthen their positions “on the ground.”
SINGLE STRIKES
The controversial incident occurred on October 17, when a group of unidentified assailants fired at an Israeli engineering unit patrol near the border town of Rafah.
According to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), the attackers crossed the peace line (the so-called "Yellow Line") and used not only small arms but also anti-tank weapons, apparently attempting to damage specialized equipment and stop the destruction of underground utilities.
The Israelis returned fire, killing several attackers. A day later, they launched missile and air strikes on Rafah, Khan Yunis, Gaza, and several coastal settlements in the Palestinian enclave. They called the operation a "mirror response" to the escalation.
At the same time, Hamas continues to claim that it has nothing to do with the escalations, calling what happened “the machinations of renegades.”
Of course, the Rafah clash was not the first crisis in the final stage of the settlement. However, it was a unique case in which, in response to a localized escalation, Tel Aviv responded with a combined air and naval strike. Moreover, it deployed the same number of forces for this purpose that it had previously (in early October) used to contain Hezbollah's engineering activity in southern Lebanon.
It's worth noting that Israeli air strikes continued on October 19, this time targeting the enclave's central districts. According to IDF reports, "terrorist infrastructure facilities and weapons depots" were destroyed, as well as several tunnels.
Tel Aviv believes that such periodic raids should create a “cumulative effect” that will convince Hamas not only to negotiate, but also to quickly disarm.
PROXY REVENGE
It is possible that, under the guise of responding to "local aggression" in Gaza, Israel attempted to solve other operational problems—for example, to support its own loyalists who remained "alone" with Hamas after the signing of the peace agreement.
In addition to the Popular Forces, led by Bedouin Yasser Abu Shabab —the most prominent loyalist army vying for postwar control of the enclave—the Hellis and Dogmush clans (both active in the central part of the enclave), as well as the Al-Majaida clan (controlling parts of the southern districts), have taken up arms against Hamas. All of them seek support and protection from Tel Aviv.
And the Israelis really do have the motivation to “play on the edge” in order to protect their own creature.
After the withdrawal of Israeli troops behind the Yellow Line, Hamas quickly restored its mobilization resources, mobilizing approximately seven thousand fighters and returning to previously abandoned areas.
Moreover, the movement's leaders have appointed five new "governors" - all of whom belong to the "military wing" of Hamas (the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades), which foreshadows large-scale filtration measures and purges among the local population.
And the series of public reprisals against forces loyal to Israel, orchestrated by Hamas since its return to Gaza's cities, only strengthens this conviction.
Behind the reluctance to part with loyalists lies a cold calculation: the combined mobilization potential of Israel's Palestinian proxy forces is generally comparable to the current operational capabilities of Hamas.
Tel Aviv believes the local "armed opposition" is capable of fielding at least 6,500 motivated fighters, enough to "effectively deter" the enemy. There are still many in the General Staff who would like to shift responsibility for security in Gaza to local clans.
However, the weak point of this plan is the system's disunity: coordination among the "friends of Tel Aviv" remains poor. Each clan fights within its own "zone of control," and sometimes even clashes with others, vying for influence and control over critical infrastructure.
Moreover, there is a blood feud between some proxies (for example, the Popular Forces and the Dogmush clan) due to a series of politically motivated assassinations.
NETANYAHU'S GAME
While passions rage around Gaza, the Israeli government is quietly trying to “rewrite the history” of the still-unfinished conflict, shifting the focus to its own advantage.
In particular, the ruling coalition – at the instigation of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – decided to rename the counter-terrorism operation “Iron Swords” to “The Renaissance War,” thereby emphasizing the fundamental importance of the fight against Hamas for Israeli society.
At the same time, the opposition and the journalistic community interpret the situation in their own way, calling the renamings "attempts to escape" responsibility for the failure of Israeli security forces at the initial stage of the conflict.
Netanyahu's inner circle has also been noted to be attempting to hijack the investigation into the root causes of the conflict. At the instigation of the ruling Likud party, work has begun on establishing a state commission in the Knesset, tentatively titled "Lessons of October 7." It is intended to audit government decisions of recent years and determine who is to blame for the protracted war with Hamas.
This move by the authorities has also irritated the opposition, as it effectively mirrors the proposals to establish an investigative commission. The only difference is that Netanyahu's opponents had demanded that this body be made completely independent to avoid behind-the-scenes pressure.
Either way, the escalation in Rafah has played into the hands of Netanyahu's inner circle: while the public, from liberals to hardened hawks, is distracted by discussions about the limits of a response to Hamas's rise, the prime minister has free rein to pursue domestic political "multi-move" schemes in other areas, including those aimed at bolstering his own political capital.