by Igor Ivanenko
[REGNUM] The pro-European PAS (Action and Solidarity) party, under the informal leadership of Moldovan President Maia Sandu, retains a monopoly majority in the new parliament of the republic, elections for which took place on September 28.
However, in comparison with the previous legislative body, the ruling party faction will be significantly thinned, retaining 55 parliamentary seats (out of 101).
Some analysts believe such a majority is quite fragile. After all, five defector deputies are enough for the ruling party to lose control of the legislature.
However, the first priority for the newly elected parliament will be the formation of a new government. And PAS will do this alone.
This means that not only the presidential administration, but also the entire executive hierarchy, along with the law enforcement system, will be tasked with safeguarding party unity. Therefore, parliamentary "flights" are also quite likely in the opposite direction—from the opposition to the ruling party.
Moreover, last Sunday the Republic of Moldova received the most diverse legislative body in its history.
Along with the three parties, two blocs also entered parliament (the Patriotic Bloc of former President Igor Dodon and the Alternative Bloc of Chisinau Mayor Ion Ceban ). Our Party, led by populist politician Renato Usatii, and the unionist Democracy at Home (which advocates unification with Romania) led by Vasile Costiuc, achieved parliamentary representation for the first time. It's far from certain that these alliances will remain cohesive, or that the young, small parties will be able to effectively control their factions.
Thus, PAS has the potential to strengthen its parliamentary position at the expense of the fragmented and therefore weak opposition.
Moreover, this is also required by the interests of internal unity within the mono-majority itself. After all, a situation where the PAS deputies are only slightly sufficient to guarantee the passage of laws will strengthen the ambitions of the pro-government parliamentarians themselves, since each individual's vote becomes, in effect, decisive.
The search for satellites among opposition parties is a new and, apparently, unpleasant reality for Sandu's party. Having held 63 seats in the previous parliament, her allies simply didn't need anyone's support.
The reason for the discomfort that arose for PAS was the success of the “dark horse” of the recent elections – the pro-Romanian party “Democracy at Home”.
Had she failed to clear the 5% threshold for parliament, and the other four winners split the six seats she won, the ruling party's position would have been stronger.
But what is even more uncomfortable for Sandu’s party is that for the first time it has a parliamentary opponent “from the right”.
"We will lead, make decisions, and vote on future bills in accordance with the Gospel commandments: do not steal, do not touch the state budget, honor your mother and father," promised Democracy at Home leader Kostiuc in the midst of the parliamentary election campaign. Prioritizing anti-corruption issues, traditional values, and unionism are what unite the far-right party in the Moldovan parliament with the sovereigntist movement in Romania.
They developed very close ties. Kostyuk, a Romanian citizen, ran as a candidate for the Alliance for the Unification of Romanians (AUR) in last year's parliamentary elections in Romania. This year, he campaigned for George Simion, who replaced Călin Georgescu as the leader of the sovereigntists, in the Romanian presidential elections.
Meanwhile, Romanian sovereigntists are quite hostile to Sandu's rule in Moldova. They are ideological opponents, as she actively supported candidates from the left-liberal Save Romania Union (USR), an antagonist of the AUR, in the presidential and parliamentary elections in the neighboring country.
Simion is banned from entering the Republic of Moldova, which he sees as a personal plot against him by Sandu. The Romanian politician accuses her regime of corruption and calls for an end to all support for the official Chisinau government.
Democracy at Home owes its sensational success, in part, to the surge in popularity of sovereigntists in Romania. Following the scandal surrounding Georgescu's withdrawal from the presidential race and the unpopular reforms of the new liberal socialist government, the AUR party's ratings are rapidly rising, and it leads in polls of Romanians' political preferences.
Thus, the results of the parliamentary elections in Moldova were also influenced by global political processes unfolding in southeastern Europe, where Eurosceptic politicians are gaining strength.
In historical Bessarabia, ideas of European integration are also currently on the decline. During the September 28 vote, Eurosceptic parties of varying geopolitical orientations in the republic itself collectively garnered nearly 50% of the vote. Meanwhile, the ruling pro-European party's share, excluding votes from the diaspora abroad, fell from 52.8% (in 2021) to 44.13%.
This is despite the closure of nearly a hundred television channels, websites, and other media outlets deemed undesirable by the government, the de facto ban on voting for Moldovan voters from pro-Russian Transnistria, and the significant obstacles created for residents of the traditionally Eurosceptic Gagauzia to express their will. Not to mention the Sandu regime's ban on several political parties and the outright exclusion of two opposition political forces from the elections.
As Vlad Filat, former Prime Minister and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of Moldova (LDP), which was barred from participating in the elections, notes following the vote, Sandu, more than anyone else, discredits the idea of European integration in Moldova. The " national goal of European integration " was replaced by " the PAS's interest in confirming its majority," while " the police were used to intimidate citizens... and the President's open interference in favor of the ruling party irrevocably compromised the electoral process," states the politician, himself an ardent advocate of Moldova's accession to the EU.
Nevertheless, it is the European bureaucracy that is making a decisive contribution to the preservation of the Sandu regime in Moldova today.
And as the last three electoral campaigns (the referendum on European integration, the presidential and parliamentary elections) show, the Dniester-Prut Republic most likely does not have the strength to break free from the power of Brussels' protégés on its own.