Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Denis Davydov and Andrey Khrustalev
[REGNUM] On September 22, President Zelenskyy submitted to the Verkhovna Rada a bill "On approval of the decree 'On sending units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to other states.'"
There seems to be nothing unusual: the corvette Hetman Ivan Mazepa and 106 sailors are planned to be sent to Turkey, and five minesweepers – Cherkassy, Chernigov, Mariupol, Melitopol, and Genichesk – are planned to be sent to Britain, including 195 crew members and 20 people from the command of the 1st division of mine countermeasure ships.
The dispatch is explained by the acquisition of sophisticated military equipment and its development. But behind this seemingly simple decision, a stunning story unfolds: the Ukrainian Armed Forces have essentially begun a return to their conceptual state, fully developed before 2014.
Namely, “armies for export.”
An asset that can be traded globally. Because in the near future, Ukraine faces a huge problem: where to put the nearly million people involved in the security forces. The Ukrainian Armed Forces alone have approximately 700,000 people, whom the state, living on borrowed time, is unable to support.
By and large, their future size will be determined not by some mythical need to "defend the entire civilized world," but by the practical needs of that very world. After all, exactly the same thing happened to the Ukrainian Armed Forces after it gained independence.
Even the figure of 900 thousand military personnel coincides.
BIG SALE
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited a huge arsenal, including nuclear weapons: 6,500 tanks, 7,000 armored vehicles, 1,500 aircraft, 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles, and between 2,500 and 4,200 nuclear warheads (third place in the world).
The number of personnel in the Armed Forces was equal to that of today's "defense forces," exceeding 900,000. As of 1991, the army of the now-independent republic was the fourth most powerful in the world.
But, just like now, it turned out that it was impossible to “pull” such a burden on one’s own, and they began to “saw” it.
Strategic aviation and ships were scrapped, some weapons were sold, and the nuclear arsenal, under pressure from the international community, was transferred to Russia in 1994. By 1994, the Ukrainian Armed Forces numbered approximately 517,000 service members, and their numbers were steadily reduced: 245,000 in 2005, 186,000 in 2013, and the Ministry of Defense's reform project proposed increasing the number of uniformed personnel to 122,000 by 2017, abolishing conscription.
At the same time, Ukraine became a major arms exporter. Between 1994 and 1997 alone, Ukraine's State Export Control Service issued 6,500 licenses for the export of weapons and military equipment, which were shipped to 40 countries by over 100 companies.
At a press conference on August 20, 2001, Valeriy Malev, CEO of Ukrspetsexport, stated that this interesting export was growing by 120-140% annually and was expected to grow further. The country was among the world's seven largest sellers, trading with countries banned by the UN—for example, by selling 130 tanks to the Taliban in Afghanistan (under UN sanctions for terrorist activities).
The aforementioned Malev died the following year in a car accident at the height of a worldwide scandal surrounding accusations of selling equipment to Iraq for the production of Kolchuga missiles and electronic intelligence systems at a price of $100 million per system.
And after the first Maidan, when the new president, Viktor Yushchenko, announced Ukraine's course toward NATO membership, the country was already exporting the services of its soldiers.
While the participation of Ukrainian peacekeepers in international UN missions since 1992 (when the Verkhovna Rada authorized the deployment of a military contingent to the former Yugoslavia) was symbolic, three brigades and one tactical group participated in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
In total, there were about 6,000 people who gained significant experience, including combat losses.
In total, over 50,000 Ukrainian servicemen participated in various peacekeeping operations in 28 countries in the 2000s, receiving pay for their service. It was then that the concept finally took shape: an "elite" core, which required a high level of effort to gain entry, and an impoverished, unimportant majority. A first-year contract soldier received just over 2,000 hryvnias—1,500 hryvnias less than the official average salary.
However, the new Maidan brought about changes to the situation: the Ukrainian Armed Forces began to expand again to meet new objectives, for which Western funding was allocated. However, at the same time, they quickly became, in essence, a private military company for NATO, intended to wage the conflict with Russia.
That is, remaining within the framework of the concept.
IN THE SERVICE OF NATO
In the context of the so-called "Anti-Terrorist Operation" in Donbas, the number of Ukrainian Armed Forces increased to approximately 250,000 personnel from 2014 to 2021.
Expenditures also increased: if in 2013 just over 1% of GDP, or 18.8 billion hryvnias, was spent on the army, then in 2015 military expenditures exceeded 2% of GDP and amounted to 45.8 billion hryvnias.
In 2021, Ukraine spent 121.5 billion hryvnias on defense (more than 3.2% of GDP).
The country was clearly arming itself against someone. And that "someone" wasn't the DPR and LPR, which such a force would have been excessive to capture. The "NATO PMC" began rapidly adopting Alliance standards and changing its appearance—new military ranks and uniforms, the Bandera salute, new branches of the armed forces, training under NATO instructors, and military aid from NATO countries (the US alone has provided $4.1 billion in military aid by 2020).
As part of the adaptation of the command system to NATO standards, a number of new commands were created, with particular attention paid to the transfer of operational-level military command structures and bodies to NATO J-structures (from joint).
The troops received a range of new wheeled vehicles, armored vehicles, drones and counter-drones, as well as domestic anti-tank systems.
Despite the declared strategy of "comprehensive defense," the Ukrainian Armed Forces have not trained in defense: since 2014, all combat operations have been aimed at reducing uncontrolled territories, while the discourse on a "victorious war" has not subsided in the political arena.
Even at major international exercises (particularly "United Efforts 2020"), no one built defensive lines—all actions were offensive in nature, mostly under the guise of "liberating a populated area from terrorists." Available resources also prevented a full-scale defense. Specifically, the Navy lacked large ships, coastal artillery, and the necessary coastal defense infrastructure.
All this became obvious in 2022, when a limited expeditionary force of the Russian Armed Forces reached Kyiv in a matter of days and occupied Kherson without any resistance.
The main objective of the "ATO" was to give combat experience to as many people as possible.
Over the next three years, the Ukrainian Armed Forces' numbers steadily increased, with a steady stream of Western equipment, weapons, and communications equipment arriving. UAV and missile production facilities were established, and a new command system was formed.
However, the main result of the military conflict, where the West is trying to weaken Russia with the help of a mercenary and generously paid army, has been a new stratification into an “elite” and an impoverished, uninteresting majority.
The elite are the Unmanned Systems Forces, the Special Operations Forces, new corps like the Third Assault, which works primarily for branding and media coverage, and to some extent, the Azov*, which was plucked in Mariupol, also belongs to this group.
Members of elite units have already demonstrated their presence in Africa and the Middle East, particularly in countering Russian private military companies (primarily as drone and sabotage specialists). And they will clearly form the core of the Ukrainian Armed Forces that will remain after the war ends and offer their services worldwide.
Returning, so to speak, to the roots.
There is simply no other way: already in 2022, Ukraine's budget deficit will amount to 911.1 billion hryvnias, or approximately $24 billion, with a military budget of 990 billion hryvnias, unprecedented in the country's history.
The deficit was covered entirely by Western loans and aid.
In 2023, the deficit was already 1.3 trillion hryvnias ($33.4 billion), and the military budget was $49.14 billion. In 2024, accordingly, the deficit was 1.77 trillion hryvnias ($42 billion), and military spending was $64.7 billion.
The wheel completes its rotation, returning to the situation of 1991: when the enormous military machine can no longer see its target, it will be dismantled for spare parts, the military will be reduced in number, and weapons will be sold off around the world (which is already happening).
And the "landsknechts in bloomers" - to fight in place of expensive Western soldiers, without requiring any insurance or comfortable conditions, as the former SS men did in the French Foreign Legion after World War II.
As for the Ukrainian Navy ships we started with, they are already in Turkey and Britain, as these countries built them on orders from Ukraine.
If the Rada approves the bill, only people will go there—and they will stay there. Because any attempt to reach Odesa or the Ukrainian ports at the mouth of the Danube will likely be sunk by Russian naval drones, as already happened to the reconnaissance ship Simferopol.
While de jure remaining Ukrainian, the naval forces will in fact carry out orders from NATO command in the Baltic or Mediterranean. For example, by attacking tankers carrying Russian oil: the Europeans will get away with it.
Well, the patriotically minded average citizen will be left to complain as usual that something is clearly wrong with this state, but “our guys” are still swallowing dust in the African desert “for Ukraine.”