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Israel-Palestine-Jordan

IDF fighters are ambushed by Hamas after receiving tips from Bedouins loyal to Israel.

2025-09-25

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
by Leonid Tsukanov

[REGNUM] It appears a dark cat has crossed paths between the Israeli military and the Gaza Control Committee, a group of pro-Israel Bedouin militias. Following a series of controversial incidents in the enclave, loyalists are suspected of leaking intelligence to Hamas.

Moreover, in some cases, it's not just leaks from the lower echelons. Several high-profile figures have come under suspicion in Tel Aviv.

LIBERATION MOVEMENT
A pro-Israeli militia emerged in the Gaza Strip in late 2024 as an anarchic formation fighting against all local factions. However, it only gained widespread notoriety six months later, when it transformed into the "Gaza Governance Committee" and directly challenged Hamas.

The head of the Committee, Yasser Abu Shabab, is a native of a local Bedouin clan who was arrested several years ago by Palestinian security services for drug trafficking and fraud and escaped from prison after the outbreak of hostilities in the enclave.

The group boasts of its ties to the Palestinian National Authority and positions itself as a Palestinian liberation movement, but in reality it is an Israeli proxy. And it seems to be making little effort to hide its external funding.

In particular, after the start of the active phase of Operation Gideon Bet's Chariots, Abu Shabab supporters warmly welcomed "Tel Aviv's determination" and expressed their readiness to join the "war of liberation." They also formed a combined force of up to 400 men, which joined the advancing Israeli forces.

GOOD PERFORMERS
Until recently, Israeli command had no major issues with the Bedouin militias. Despite their poor combat training and lack of coordination, the loyalists unquestioningly carried out Israeli command orders.

They were the first to be sent into dangerous areas to conduct reconnaissance in force, which allowed the Israeli army (IDF) to avoid using regular units and thereby reduce reported losses.

Another persuasive factor was the fact that among the Abu Shabab fighters there were many “former Hamas supporters” from among the disillusioned, who were aware of the location of camouflaged passages, additional underground communications, and caches of weapons and ammunition both in Gaza and in the satellite cities.

Thanks in large part to this, the Israelis were able to break through the Palestinian resistance's defenses in certain areas and quickly advance into the settlements of Jabaliya and Beit Hanoun.

Moreover, the "fee" for participating in the operation among Hamas' opponents was comparatively small. In exchange for aiding Tel Aviv, the Committee's supporters demanded monthly payments of $200-$300 (for comparison, the salary of a regular IDF reservist starts at $500), as well as land plots in the enclave for those who distinguished themselves.

Over time, loyalists practically stopped claiming to be part of the Gaza governing bodies and even began calling themselves “Popular Forces” (or “Populars”) instead of the “Gaza Governance Committee” in order to avoid awkward questions.

It's no surprise that the Israeli General Staff considered Bedouin militias good at dirty work. Therefore, they turned a blind eye to some of their activities, such as racketeering and looting in Israeli-controlled territories, as well as settling scores with civilians.

A SERIES OF LEAKS
However, despite their generally loyal attitude, the Israeli military doesn't demonstrate much trust in the Committee. And after a series of controversial incidents that have occurred recently, this suspicion has only increased.

Thus, during the advance of a joint IDF and loyalist group near the borders of the As-Sabra region (northern part of Gaza City), the unit fell into a well-planned Hamas ambush and suffered losses.

Although no Israeli soldiers were seriously injured (three Committee members were killed in the shootout, and another IDF soldier was slightly wounded), the group's leadership blamed the Bedouins for the failure.

A few hours later, another incident occurred: the platoon commander of the Shaked Battalion (part of the 162nd Armored Division "Ha-Plada") was seriously wounded. He was part of a group checking posts in an area that had already been cleared of Hamas and was patrolled by loyalist forces. Moreover, according to reports from the field, one of the Bedouins opened fire. It later turned out to be a disguised Hamas fighter.

The increasing frequency of crises involving militias forced the Israeli General Staff to involve the Shin Bet Security Service (Shin Bet). After analyzing the two incidents, Shin Bet investigators concluded that the incidents were the result of leaks of intelligence from the Shin Bet.

LOOKING UP
The Shin Bet is convinced that this incident was not a one-time leak. The rank-and-file soldiers involved in the operation were unaware of many of the details used by Hamas agents in preparing recent operations. They also could not have been aware of the IDF's plans to inspect patrols with an officer, as the inspectors arrived in the area without insignia. This means the "mole" was positioned much higher in the Shin Bet hierarchy.

Israeli security officials have placed Ghassan al-Dukhini, one of Abu Shabab's deputies, under suspicion. Despite being considered the most pro-Israel figure within the Committee and even personally congratulating Israelis on Rosh Hashanah, his biography is not without its murky spots.

Moreover, al-Dukhini's relatives were former members of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and at least two of them had connections to the security forces.

Al-Duhini is also credited with some questionable personnel decisions within the group, such as the appointment of Palestinian Ghassan al-Dani, who participated in the kidnapping of Israeli Sergeant Major Gilad Shalit in the early 2000s, to a command post.

The decision sparked further tensions between IDF personnel, some of whom belonged to the same brigade as Shalit, and loyalists—the incident nearly resulted in violence. Counterintelligence officials are inclined to believe that it could well be interpreted as a deliberate provocation.

However, it cannot be ruled out that the Shin Bet's interest in al-Dukhini among Israeli security forces arose not without the participation of his boss, Abu Shabab.

Using recent incidents as an excuse to blame a close ally, the head of the Committee preemptively removes a powerful and ambitious subordinate. Despite his blemishes, he has a far less criminal past than the current leader of the loyalists. Therefore, he could potentially take a position in Gaza's transitional government.

However, if al-Dukhini's innocence is proven, Abu Shabab may be in trouble.

Posted by:badanov

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