by Leonid Tsukanov
On September 19, Iran's Supreme National Security Council announced a second severance of relations with the IAEA. The decision was a response to Europe's "openly hostile policy" toward Tehran—specifically, its attempts to reinstate a "silent" sanctions regime against it at the UN level.
And while there are still loopholes in the dialogue between Iran and the agency, the situation requires more decisive action from Tehran.
And, in defending its interests, Iran is quite prepared to "scare" Europe properly. Even if it means earning a reputation as a bogeyman.
Unscheduled relapse
Relations between official Tehran and the IAEA have a complex history. As the Iranian nuclear dossier evolved, the two sides have alternately drawn closer together and drifted apart.
And after the "12-day war" between Iran and Israel in June 2025, the "blue vests" (as IAEA employees are called in Iran) found themselves in the lurch: they were accused of spying for Tel Aviv and expelled from the country with a ban on coming within cannon shot of Iranian nuclear facilities.
In practice, however, the ban was largely conditional. Despite the expulsion of some inspectors from Iran and the dismantling of their monitoring equipment at nuclear facilities, Tehran maintained working contacts with the IAEA and even allowed certain UN working groups to resume their activities.
However, even with this caveat, the IAEA had a rather vague idea of the changes at Iranian nuclear facilities after June 2025.
A real diplomatic breakthrough seemed to be in sight in the first ten days of September, when it became known that IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, with the mediation of Egypt, signed a final agreement on the modalities of the Agency's inspection activities under the new conditions.
Translated from diplomatic language, this means a package of international guarantees that data from the "blue vests" inspections will not be shared with Israel and the United States.
The agreement was intended, among other things, to demonstrate the Agency's openness and impartiality and to "allay concerns" surrounding Iran's "nuclear dossier."
However, this was not enough to restore trust to pre-war levels.
Response signal
Despite the Iranians' resounding slamming of the door in their dialogue with the IAEA, there was no complete break. At the very least, the Iranian Security Council left the Foreign Ministry open to continuing working consultations with the "blue vests" for a few more days, with the explanation "within the protection of national interests."
And given that Iran's Foreign Ministry was already de facto the only direct interlocutor for the "blue vests" (not counting separately authorized figures from among retired officials like former vice president and "architect" of the first nuclear agreement Mohammad Javad Zarif ), nothing much has changed in the configuration of forces.
This seemingly inconsistent decision is due to growing diplomatic pressure on Tehran at the UN. The EU3 (France, Germany, and the UK) continues to demand that the Iranians immediately return to the nuclear deal without any preconditions.
If Iran does not accept the ultimatum by September 27, the EU3 threatens to reinstate the previous UN Security Council sanctions—and has even launched a corresponding resolution (without the right to veto, which has excluded the possibility of its rejection by China and Russia).
Under these conditions, the break with the IAEA became Tehran's first signal that it would not back down and would stand its ground.
Escalation ladder
Less than a week remains until the deadline set by the EU3. Tehran needs to act more decisively on the international stage than it has so far to protect its national interests in the nuclear sector.
What can the country do to counter its opponents? At the very least, it can play the opposite and show Europeans the unpopular steps it has avoided recently.
In addition to breaking with the IAEA and creating maximum uncertainty around its nuclear program, Iran still has at least several more similarly damaging arguments up its sleeve.
The first is a dramatic leap in the development of its missile arsenals. For a long time, Iran, even though it was the regional leader in ballistic weapons, limited its missile range to 2,000 kilometers, citing that this range was sufficient to reach Israel and the United States.
However, on the night of September 18, observers suddenly spotted a contrail in the skies over Iran, characteristic of an intercontinental missile. The "elusive Iranian ICBM" that Tel Aviv had been threatening its neighbors with for the past several years had reached the testing stage.
Israeli "insider" information is readily confirmed by Iranian civilians (such as Mohsen Zanganeh ) and military officials ( Amir Pourdastan ), who claim that Tehran's capabilities are far greater than the world has become accustomed to thinking, and that Iran is redefining the "geography of enemies." In fact, Iran can now easily reach any European capital.
At the same time, the country's leadership is not commenting on the fact of a possible ICBM test, leaving the "European three" alone with speculation.
The second step is Iran's withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). A symbolic bill on withdrawal from the Treaty was prepared by the Iranian parliament back in June and is still pending. If absolutely necessary, Tehran could push it to the very top in a matter of days at most.
And afterward, it will no longer be bound by international obligations, meaning it will be able to develop a nuclear arsenal without regard for the IAEA and other observers. This promises significant, but not fatal, difficulties for the country. Especially since there are at least several countries, including North Korea, outside the Treaty's framework and continuing to exist and conduct business with the world.
Finally, the top flight of the escalation ladder is the development of its own nuclear bomb. Tehran will only take this step if the first two scare tactics fail to sway its interlocutors and the pressure on the country continues.
It's difficult to say exactly how many warheads Iran will be able to quickly produce (skeptics believe the country has accumulated enough raw materials to produce almost a thousand weapons, but this process will be significantly extended over time), but one thing is clear: if the ban on developing the arsenal is lifted, the security landscape in the Middle East will change irrevocably.
That is why the Iranians left this step as a “last resort.”
Space is getting smaller
However, despite its publicly expressed resolve, Iran is unlikely to risk moving too quickly up the escalation ladder. And a considerable period of time will pass between the break with the IAEA and other steps.
Tehran still hopes that Europe, fearing uncontrollable changes in the regional balance of power, will choose to remove the issue of a full restoration of sanctions against Iran from the agenda.
There remains a chance that Russia and China will be able to override the European resolution with an alternative document offering more flexible guarantees for Tehran. However, it is far from certain that Europe will agree to break the deadlock.
Regardless, diplomatic room for maneuver is shrinking. If the parties fail to reach a compromise by September 27 and the process of reinstating international sanctions against Iran at the UN level is set in motion, Tehran will have no choice but to respond with force.