by Kirill Semenov
Against the backdrop of a sharp escalation of tensions in the Middle East caused by Israeli airstrikes on Qatari territory in September, a significant event occurred that could reformat the entire regional security system.
The signing of a mutual defense agreement between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on September 17 was a direct response to growing threats and demonstrated a significant change in the approach of the Gulf Arab monarchies to their own security.
This pact, concluded at a time when the traditional ally of the Arab monarchies, the United States, is not only strategically reorienting itself toward the Indo-Pacific region but has also made a clear bet on Israel in the Middle East itself, demonstrates Riyadh’s desire to create a new security architecture based on cooperation with the most powerful Muslim states possessing significant military potential.
The current bilateral alliance may be only the first step towards the formation of a broader military bloc.
The Historical Roots of the Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Partnership
Diplomatic relations between the two countries were established almost immediately after Pakistan's independence in 1947. Since then, they have been united by a common religious identity—Islam—which has become the cornerstone of their foreign policy and mutual attraction.
Over the following decades, Riyadh became one of Islamabad's main economic sponsors, providing the country with financial and energy assistance during times of crisis.
Saudi Arabia also became one of Pakistan's most active supporters, providing it with comprehensive diplomatic and financial support during all its wars with India, especially during Islamabad's most difficult period, the loss of East Pakistan in 1971.
In turn, Pakistan, in line with its pan-Islamic ideology, has assumed the role of Saudi Arabia's protector from all external and internal threats. Therefore, it is often referred to as the kingdom's closest Muslim and non-Arab ally.
Military cooperation between Islamabad and Riyadh began to develop rapidly during the Cold War within the framework of regional security networks.
Pakistan, along with Iran, Iraq and Turkey, was a party to the Baghdad Pact, later renamed the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which represented the first attempt to create a "Middle East NATO."
It was precisely because of the lack of support Pakistan received from its CENTO allies in its wars with India that Islamabad became disillusioned with the alliance, which proved unviable.
For Pakistan, the main threat was India, not the notorious Soviet expansion against which CENTO was created.
At the same time, actual Soviet expansion, namely the deployment of troops to Afghanistan, led to the strengthening of military and political ties between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Financial aid flowed from the "Land of the Holy Mosques" to the Islamic Republic to support and organize the activities of the "Afghan mujahideen."
But an even greater role for Pakistan was sought by Saudi Arabia during the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and during the Iran-Iraq War in the context of containing Iranian influence and “exporting the revolution.”
Pakistani troops stationed in Saudi Arabia helped ensure security in border areas and protect strategic facilities from potential threats. Over the following decades, thousands of troops were stationed in Saudi Arabia.
During the Iran-Iraq conflict, their numbers in the KSA reached 15,000 people.
But Pakistan has previously provided extensive military training and support to Saudi security forces, including operational and technical assistance, as well as training for the Saudi air and ground forces.
Incidentally, in 1969, Pakistan Air Force fighter pilots provided assistance to the Royal Saudi Air Force during the Yemeni crisis.
Strengthening defense and participation in regional conflicts
Even before the 1991 Gulf War, Pakistani military engineers made significant contributions to Saudi Arabia's defensive infrastructure, particularly in the border areas.
Their experience, gained in the challenging conditions of Kashmir and Balochistan, proved invaluable in strengthening Saudi Arabia's borders. They participated in the construction of defensive lines along the borders with potentially unstable regions, the design and protection of strategic facilities, including oil fields and pipelines, and the creation of underground command posts and secure control centers.
The Pakistan Army Corps of Engineers' activities in Saudi Arabia, which traces its roots back to the Royal Indian Engineers of British India, have become a key element of military cooperation between the two countries.
Pakistani-built fortifications along the border with Yemen proved useful during the coalition war and provided defense against Houthi attacks on Saudi territory.
A major milestone in the development of military cooperation was the participation of the Pakistani contingent in the Gulf War in 1991.
Immediately after Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, Pakistan sent an additional 10,000 troops to Saudi Arabia, who played a vital role in defending Saudi territory from potential Iraqi aggression.
Pakistani units, including elements of the 7th Infantry Division and independent armoured brigades, were deployed along the border with Kuwait and Iraq, where they established defensive lines, fortified positions and controlled critical areas.
Their presence gave Saudi Arabia's leadership greater confidence in its security during one of the most tense periods of the conflict, even before American troops began their full-scale deployment as part of Operation Desert Shield.
Now, the changing geopolitical situation has provided Pakistan with an opportunity to strengthen its strategic ties and role in the Islamic world. The apparent deterioration in Saudi-Pakistani relations, stemming from Islamabad's refusal to support Saudi Arabia's operation in Yemen against the Houthis in 2015, is now a distant memory, and Pakistan's successes in the recent war with India have demonstrated its potential.
Saudi Arabia did not change its priorities and continued to develop its time-tested partnership.
At one time, the United Arab Emirates accepted Israel as a partner to counter Iran, and now, especially after the strikes on Doha, they are forced to urgently change this concept.
Saudi Arabia, however, was moving in a different, and now clearly correct, direction, attempting to rely on a military alliance with the most powerful Islamic states – Egypt and Pakistan, which represented the two “wings” of the kingdom’s military stability.
At the same time, both Cairo and Islamabad, having huge armies and forced to spend their budgets on them, were experiencing economic problems, and Saudi financial support was, as always, useful for them.
Bilateral nature of the agreement: mutual obligations
Pakistan's special role for Saudi Arabia is that it is the only Muslim-majority country with armed forces capable of providing security in the region.
Furthermore, Pakistan is the only such state to possess nuclear weapons, making it a key strategic partner for its allies in the Middle East. Pakistan's armed forces are battle-hardened and possess the operational and tactical capabilities to significantly strengthen Saudi Arabia's defenses.
In turn, Pakistan can strengthen its military through Saudi investment and its commitment to defending the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the holy cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina.
Saudi Arabia, with a military budget five times larger, could redirect a significant portion of funds to Pakistan, say, if Islamabad were to establish a sustained presence of a significant contingent of Pakistani troops to defend the kingdom.
Under the agreement, these forces could be financed and maintained by Saudi Arabia, with the troops playing an additional role in training and advising the Saudi military, balancing American influence.
A key aspect of the new agreement is its reciprocity: not only does Pakistan commit to defending Saudi Arabia, but the Kingdom also undertakes to come to Pakistan's aid in the event of aggression against it. This provision is particularly significant in the context of the ongoing standoff between Pakistan and India.
According to the terms of the pact, "any aggression against one of the countries will be considered aggression against the other." This creates a fundamentally new reality in the regional security system, where Saudi Arabia is taking on such serious commitments outside the Arabian Peninsula for the first time.
The new Pakistan-Saudi Arabia defense agreement theoretically provides for the extension of Pakistan's nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia. Under the terms of the agreement, Pakistan undertakes to provide Saudi Arabia with all military support, including nuclear deterrence.
Saudi officials, commenting on the pact, also made it clear that Pakistan's nuclear defense was part of the deal and that it would use whatever defensive and military means it deemed necessary, depending on the specific threat.
This is a clear signal to Israel, with its hidden nuclear arsenal: Pakistani missiles are now aimed not only at India. But it is also a warning to Iran, with its nuclear program.
International reaction and global consequences
The pact's conclusion has raised serious concerns in India. Saudi Arabia's clear choice in favor of Pakistan has become apparent, despite the growing Saudi-Indian cooperation in all areas in recent years.
New Delhi is carefully assessing the implications of this development for its national security and regional stability. However, one can only speak of the emergence of a new fault line between the Indo-Israeli entente (informal "accord") and the already formalized Pakistani-Saudi military alliance.
An Indian Foreign Ministry spokesperson said the government would study the implications of this development for national security as well as regional and global stability.
Iran, a traditional regional rival of Saudi Arabia, will view increased military cooperation between Riyadh and Islamabad with caution. However, Tehran is on the path to strengthening ties with Saudi Arabia, and this alliance does not pose a direct threat. Furthermore, Pakistan openly supported Iran during the Israeli aggression, and both countries are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
The United States, meanwhile, found itself in a difficult position. On the one hand, it has traditionally been Saudi Arabia's main ally; on the other, its inability or unwillingness to restrain Israel after the strikes on Qatar undermined the trust of Arab monarchies.
As for Saudi Arabia, the list of its grievances against the United States has been growing like a snowball since the time of Barack Obama.
So, this is a senseless, from the Saudi point of view, second Gulf War after 2003, which ended with the defeat of the weakened Sunni regime of Iraq and the transfer of power to pro-Iranian Shiite forces hostile to the KSA.
This was followed by the US withdrawal from Iraq, despite Saudi Arabia's protests, which undermined security in the country and led to the threat of ISIS* strengthening.
Then came the US refusal to support Saudi Arabia in its war against the Houthis. Even after massive attacks on Saudi oil and gas infrastructure in 2019, the US continued to reduce its presence, withdrawing Patriot missiles, and so on.
Moreover, Washington's proclaimed Indo-Pacific strategy suggests a reorientation of resources and attention to containing China, which means further weakening of attention to the Middle East.
Therefore, Israel's strikes on Doha forced the Saudis to move from words to action.
And for Washington, this is yet another source of concern. Their pivot to the Indo-Pacific, at the expense of their reduced presence in the Middle East, is not, it turns out, containing China on its borders, but rather opening new doors and windows for China to enter the Gulf states, now through Pakistan.
After all, Islamabad is Beijing's closest ally and partner, and the Pakistani army is oriented towards Chinese technology and weapons.
Thus, the Saudi-Pakistani pact fits harmoniously into the Belt and Road Initiative as a covert security element, currently without China's participation. But now, Chinese weapons could have significantly greater prospects in the Saudi market, especially if Pakistan and Saudi Arabia advance standardization and develop joint military production.
Prospects for the development of a new security architecture
In the context of the formation of a new security architecture, Egypt's role as an important military partner of Saudi Arabia cannot be underestimated. A triple alliance between Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan is possible in the future.
Saudi Arabia may now be intensifying the formation of a new broad alliance, and the Pakistan-KSA agreement is only the first step in this direction.
Riyadh seeks to create a collective security system that could compensate for the growing unreliability of traditional allies and counter multiple challenges in the region, including aggressive Israeli actions and instability in various Middle Eastern countries.
This emerging bloc could include not only Pakistan and Egypt, but also other countries that share concerns about regional security and are interested in creating a counterweight to existing threats.
Thus, the signing of the mutual defense agreement between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in September 2025 marks a new era in the relationship between the two countries, potentially changing the regional balance of power.
This alliance represents a unique case of symbiosis: Saudi Arabia gains access to the military potential of one of the largest armies in the Muslim world and a nuclear arsenal, while Pakistan gains not only economic support and strategic depth in its confrontation with India, but also the opportunity to gain new positions outside the region and consolidate its leading role in the Islamic world.
The question of how effective this partnership will be in the face of growing regional instability and internal challenges facing both countries remains open.
But it is already clear: the strategic map of the Middle East and South Asia has been redrawn, and the consequences will be felt not only in the region, but also in world capitals – from Washington to Beijing.