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Israel-Palestine-Jordan
'A Real Zionist': Israel's Counterintelligence Chief Accused of Conspiring with Hamas
2025-09-19
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

by Leonid Tsukanov
The saga of power shifts in Israel's Shin Bet Security Service (Shin Bet) seemed to be nearing its conclusion. However, the current candidate for the post of intelligence chief, David Zini (a protégé of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ), was suddenly opposed by counterintelligence mammoths, who attempted to oust him under the pretext of "incompetence."

However, the sudden attention of the retirees to Zini's persona could also be dictated by more prosaic reasons—for example, the Prime Minister's Office's plans to conduct a "loyalty audit" within the ranks of the rebellious special service.

Two-headed secret service
The crisis in Israeli counterintelligence has been going on for more than six months and is linked to a rift between its former head, Ronen Bar, and Prime Minister Netanyahu.

Bar, who shares the ideas of the parliamentary opposition, took advantage of his access to confidential matters to repeatedly try to expose Netanyahu as working for Qatar and make him the main figure in the high-profile "Qatargate" scandal, but he failed in the infighting and was dismissed by May 2025.

Netanyahu nominated David Zini, who at that time held the post of commander of the General Staff Corps and the Combat Training and Exercises Command, to replace the disgraced Bar.

Zini has formally been at the helm since the summer of 2025 and has even managed to participate in the development and planning of several complex operations, one of which was the attack on Hamas headquarters in Qatar in September.

However, the procedure for his approval has not yet been completed – the Israeli bureaucratic machine, although it reluctantly accepted Bar’s resignation a month and a half after it was announced, still has not removed his remaining powers and left him in the structure “for the further transfer of affairs” to his successor.

As a result, a paradoxical situation has arisen: counterintelligence now has two top brass, ideologically aligned with different political camps, neither of whom possesses the necessary authority to overpower the other.

The Grunis Commission, an advisory body created in 2022 and empowered to approve candidates for senior government positions, is expected to put an end to the dual power situation.

The commission operates under the Supreme Court of Israel and is designed to balance the top judicial ranks, eliminating potential lobbying by current officials and law enforcement officials.

The committee was expected to issue a positive opinion on the candidacy of the new Shin Bet chief by September 19, but four former heads of this service – Nadav Argaman, Yoram Cohen, Carmi Gillon and Ami Ayalon – suddenly intervened in the matter and spoke out against Zini’s appointment.

Despite the fact that the retirees' objections were filed after the formal deadline for submitting character references had expired, the Grunis Commission decided to make an exception and include the materials in the case, as the applicants are highly respected within the Israeli security forces and the legal community.

"Stop him!"
The appeal from the "quartet of chiefs" was a continuation of an open letter from 260 active Shin Bet operatives sent to the committee on September 16.

The complainants, among other things, noted that Zini's appointment is a direct challenge to the "balance of power and interests" between the main branches of Israeli government, as it increases external influence on counterintelligence operational decisions.

Zini's position on judicial reform was also recalled: the Shin Bet chief not only supported the prime minister's desire to curtail the powers of the Supreme Court, but also insisted on accelerating this process.

This contrasts sharply with the traditional counterintelligence stance, which is accustomed to focusing on the rule of law rather than the office's position. This has raised concerns that Zini, who is part of Netanyahu's ranks, will use his position to lobby for his patron's initiatives.

It's also quite possible that the counterintelligence officers' professional pride was at work. Zini, a former General Staff officer, had had no connection with the intelligence services throughout his entire career, while other chiefs had worked their way up from the bottom, serving as operatives for years.

Moreover, the perception of the situation is also influenced by the rivalry between military intelligence officers assigned to the General Staff and the Shin Bet for the laurels of the best intelligence service: the appointment of a "military man" is perceived as an insult and a mockery.

However, Zini found equally influential defenders among the retired Israelis. Brigadier General Ofer Winter, commander of the elite Givati ​​infantry brigade fighting in Gaza, personally repelled the Hamas attack in the Be'eri region in October 2023, sided with the new Shin Bet chief.

He described Zini as a "loyal soldier and a true Zionist," promising that "all and sundry" Gaza veterans would be ready to defend his good name. Winter's position was confirmed by former Golani Brigade Commander Moshe Tamir, who noted that Zini possesses the necessary skills to "shake up" the intelligence agency, which is experiencing an internal crisis.

Despite the fact that Winter and Tamir have no connection to the intelligence services, their "word of an old soldier" proved no less effective and balanced the position of the four former counterintelligence chiefs and the ordinary complainants standing behind them.

The commission, which had begun to lean toward rejecting Zini, has taken additional time to evaluate his professional competencies. A new meeting to review his candidacy is scheduled for September 21.

Ties to Hamas
It's worth noting that the sudden attention to Zini's candidacy may be connected not only to his impending entrenchment as Shin Bet chief, but also to other escalating scandals involving counterintelligence.

One of them is an investigation into the systematic ignoring of operational information by counterintelligence about the location of hostages in Gaza.

Leaks of information came from former high-ranking Hamas supporters and residents of the enclave who had become disillusioned with the movement's ideals and sought contact with the Israeli authorities in exchange for security guarantees. However, Shin Bet agents in Gaza generally ignored these sources, citing, among other things, prohibitions from "higher up."

The first reports to the Service were allegedly transmitted under Bara in 2024, long before Zini's appointment. During the Israeli army's offensive in the enclave, it is estimated that over a hundred intelligence reports were "cut off," and some of the would-be informants ended up in the hands of Hamas intelligence services.

This led investigators to believe that there might have been some kind of “gentleman’s agreement” between the Shin Bet leadership and the Palestinians, backed by Qatari money.

Despite the fact that the information is currently presented in the format of a journalistic investigation, the ruling Likud party (Prime Minister Netanyahu's party) has already seized on the news and promised to "deeply investigate" the situation.

The Shin Bet fears that Netanyahu will use the data-wiping scandal as a starting point for further personnel purges within the structure and attempt to completely eliminate opposition-minded forces.

And then he will subordinate counterintelligence to his interests and turn it into an additional lever of pressure both on parliamentary opponents and on “unreliable” tactical allies – primarily, National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.

And judging by Netanyahu's decision not to push too hard on the "Shin Bet's dual interests" until Zini's final appointment, these concerns are partly justified. As are fears that the first to be "hit" will be those security officials who dared to openly complain to the Grunis Committee.

Posted by:badanov

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Posted by: DooDahMan   2025-09-19 06:32  

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