by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The Israeli airstrike on the capital of Qatar on September 9 alarmed the world community, becoming, on the one hand, a gross violation of international rules of conduct, and on the other, a demonstration of Tel Aviv’s strength and readiness to fight Hamas “to victory.”
True, in Israel itself it was interpreted not only as a demonstration of force and intransigence, but also as an attempt to distract the population's attention from the investigation into "Qatargate" - the case of the involvement of high-ranking Israeli officials in Doha's "shadow schemes".
Moreover, this time the traces of agents of influence were “turned” into foreign intelligence.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE CASE
The investigation into the involvement of employees of the Israeli Prime Minister's Office in whitewashing Qatar's reputation has been going on for almost a year - since November 2024. And in the last couple of months, there has been a feeling that something is "wrong" with the case.
On the one hand, as the corruption network unraveled, the number of suspects grew exponentially: “Qatari lobbyists” were found not only among PR people and officials, but also in the army and special services.
However, in contrast, most of the “clear defendants” in the case quickly ceased to be such.
For example, former press secretary to the Prime Minister Eli Feldstein (in the past, the main figure in the case of leaks of classified information from the chancellery, which later grew into “Qatargate”) was placed under house arrest in April 2025 and has every chance of soon becoming a witness.
Political strategist Israel Einhorn (the developer of the campaign to whitewash Qatar's reputation and the organizer of various shadow schemes involving Doha and Tel Aviv), who permanently resides in Serbia, enjoys the protection of Belgrade, which complicates the investigation of his participation in the scheme.
Lobbyist Jay Futlik, through whose firm the main tranches went to the participants of "Qatargate", despite the arrest warrant issued in August 2025, remains at large. He is saved by his American citizenship and connections in the US Democratic Party.
For a time, the prime minister's adviser, Jonathan Urich, became a kind of "scapegoat", through whom the information campaign "on the ground" was allegedly coordinated.
However, most of the charges against him were dropped by August 2025. And in early September, rumors began to circulate about Urich’s imminent return to the office.
There was gossip on the streets that the case was about to fall apart and would be closed as a cold case.
LEAK CONTROL
The dark spot in Qatargate has long been the status of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Despite the fact that the defendants in the case unanimously insisted that they worked with the prime minister’s approval and “on projects initiated by him” (and could not have carried out even half of their actions without his knowledge), Netanyahu managed to evade any accusations against him for a long time, attributing them to the opposition’s speculation.
The investigation also did not have any solid evidence in hand, except that orders to organize controlled leaks of confidential information from the chancery (the so-called “Bibilix affair,” part of “Qatargate”) were given with the participation of Netanyahu, which was recorded in several online correspondences.
However, this too, as the defense claims, was just a clever game to identify unreliable informants, and the leaks themselves were allegedly agreed upon with security officials.
Netanyahu had previously emerged unscathed from other corruption scandals in a similar manner. There was every chance of repeating the success this time around.
DANGEROUS GAMES
However, in early September it suddenly became known that the priority of the "Qatargate" investigation had increased. In addition to the "Israeli FBI" (the special police unit "LAHAV 433", which investigates particularly large corruption scandals), the General Security Service of Israel (Shabaq) was brought into the case.
And this became a rather clear hint of a change in the plot. Instead of a simple corruption scandal, the talk turned to threats to national security.
And although the main object of interest for Israeli security officials remained Advisor Urich, the frequency of requests for “confidential conversations” with Netanyahu began to grow rapidly.
The prime minister himself could very well end up among the accused. Especially since there are still many in the Shin Bet who dream of settling personal scores with the prime minister for the recent overthrow of counterintelligence chief Ronen Bar.
Against this backdrop, Netanyahu chose to act by accelerating the implementation of the operation against the Hamas leadership in the hope that a blow to Tel Aviv’s “shadow partner” would remove the issue of the prime minister’s possible corrupt interests from the agenda.
The calculation was justified, but only partially. On the one hand, there are now far fewer people willing to call Netanyahu a "secret friend" of Qatar. And the work of his close associates to establish business ties with Doha began to be interpreted through the prism of attempts to lull the vigilance of the sheikhs and get closer to the Hamas politburo.
However, after the attack on Doha, people started talking about "Qatargate" even more actively. True, its roots are now being sought not in the prime minister's office, but in foreign intelligence.
SUDDEN SOLIDARITY
Israel's foreign intelligence service (Mossad) came into the spotlight after it refused to use its agents in the "Qatari adventure", citing operational considerations. Even under pressure from the chancellery and the leadership of related departments. As a result, Tel Aviv had to hastily rely on an air strike, which ultimately ended in failure.
It is noteworthy that before this, Mossad had not shied away from operations against Hamas in third countries - for example, it quite successfully solved the task of eliminating one of the movement's leaders, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran in July 2024.
Intelligence has repeatedly carried out liquidations of underground supporters in Europe, the United States, Africa and the entire Middle East, regardless of the accompanying losses. However, when it came to Qatar, the agency suddenly refused.
Against this background, the conviction arose that the Mossad leadership had its own hidden interests. And soon circumstantial evidence was found, allegedly confirming the close ties between the intelligence agency and the ruling al-Thani family in Qatar.
For example, Yossi Cohen, who headed Israeli intelligence from 2016 to 2021 (that is, during the period when Qatar, according to the investigation, was most active in the Israeli direction), repeatedly interacted with Qatari sheikhs and visited Doha on “private visits.”
In the absence of formal diplomatic relations, he lobbied for a rapprochement between the two countries' intelligence communities. And his election campaign, which began almost immediately after his resignation, was generously funded by several companies with ties to the monarchy's authorities.
Cohen's successor, David Barnea, followed a similar path, serving as the main link between Tel Aviv and Doha, negotiating hostages and making "non-protocol" trips to the country under the pretext of discussing operational cooperation.
He defended Qatar's status as the main mediator in the Knesset (parliament) for the release of hostages even during the period when Netanyahu's office distanced itself from the issue.
The silhouette of the new “Qatari agents of influence” emerged by itself.
However, in practice, such behavior can be explained more simply. Mossad's reluctance to hunt Hamas on the ground is probably due to a "gentleman's agreement" between the intelligence service and Doha.
Israeli intelligence officers have pledged not to conduct operational games on Qatari territory and not to undermine its authority as a “safe haven” for various rebel movements, receiving in return information from their Qatari colleagues about various renegades and radicals acting on behalf of Hamas, but having no connection to the organization.
It may also be a matter of obtaining information about plans and sentiments within the ranks of Palestinian factions.
This means that the decisive factor in distancing itself from the attack on Doha was not the “shadow connections” of high-ranking officials, but the unwillingness of the Mossad to suddenly put on the line the trust it had built up over the years.
It is highly likely that the Qatargate-Mossad thread will continue to unfold. Especially in light of the fact that Cohen is going to run for prime minister and is directly challenging Netanyahu. And given that the common sore point for both is the issue of Qatari influence, the winner of the fight will be the one who turns the issue against his opponent first.
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