by Kamran Gasanov
| How will Turkey respond? Lots of blustering but nothing concrete. |
On September 9, Israel radically expanded the geography of its confrontation with Hamas and the Iranian "Axis of Resistance." Whether Israel succeeded in achieving its goals is now completely unimportant. What is more important is the global resonance.
If earlier the battle was fought in Gaza, the West Bank and the capital of the Islamic Republic, where the head of the Hamas politburo Ismail Haniyeh was liquidated last year, then since yesterday the Persian Gulf monarchies have come under attack. The Israeli General Security Service and the Air Force have targeted buildings in Qatar, where the leaders of the Palestinian group were at that moment.
The airstrike killed Hamas leader Khalil al-Heyya's son and members of Qatari security forces.
The Israeli attack on Qatar can be seen in several geopolitical dimensions. It can be interpreted as: a) a confrontation between Hamas and the IDF, b) a violation of Doha's sovereignty, c) another challenge from Israel to Arab countries, since Qatar is a member of the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
But there is another dimension, no less relevant – the Turkish one.
Firstly, Turkey is one of Qatar’s main allies.
Ankara and Doha have long been pursuing a consolidated policy in the Middle East. Together, they stood at the origins of the "Arab Spring" and sought to bring to power the "Muslim Brotherhood" (banned in Russia), who are close to them in ideology, to power in Tunisia, Egypt, and partly in Libya and Syria.
The promotion of the Islamist model by the Turkey-Qatar tandem worried Doha’s neighbors. Therefore, very soon after the start of the “Arab Spring,” Qatar and the coalition of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt (after al-Sisi came to power) found themselves on opposite sides of the barricades. In 2017, the Gulf monarchies and Egypt imposed a blockade on Qatar, accusing it of supporting terrorists from Al-Qaeda and ISIS (terrorist organizations banned in the Russian Federation), of having ties to Iran, and criticizing the Al-Jazeera TV channel, which had become a mouthpiece for Islamist revolutions in the region.
In these circumstances, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan extended a helping hand to Qatar.
He sent humanitarian aid and 5,000 troops to the emirate. In 2018, the Turks began supplying the Qataris with Bayraktar TB2 drones. Türkiye and Qatar have not only become ideological allies, but have also built an alliance to counter the influence of the KSA, the UAE, and Egypt.
Along with Libya, the Qatar case has deepened the contradictions between Turkey and the other monarchies, and despite the normalization process launched after al-Sisi's handshakes with Erdogan at the 2022 World Cup in Qatar and mutual visits by Turkish and Saudi/Emirati delegations, a certain mistrust remains.
True, in the current global situation, the interests of the Turkey-Qatar and UAE-KSA-Egypt blocs coincide. They are all, albeit to varying degrees, unhappy with Israeli acts of aggression. The Arab League countries supported Qatar, calling the IDF attack "cowardly". However, the tandem of Turkey and Qatar is not blurred either by the coincidence of interests of Muslim countries or by the restoration of relations between Qatar and its neighbors after the lifting of the blockade in early 2021.
Economic ties between Turkey and Qatar form a separate layer.
Doha is seen as an important source of investment for Ankara. In 2022, when inflation in Turkey was breaking records, Qatar promised to invest 10 billion in the Turkish economy.
Despite Qatar's large gas reserves, the potential for cooperation in the energy sector has not yet been exhausted. Ankara relies more on Russia, Azerbaijan, and Iran for gas imports. At the same time, after the change of power in Syria, Turkish experts began talking about laying a Qatar-Saudi Arabia-Jordan-Syria gas pipeline. Doha is still denying this, but it is already working with Ankara in Syria.
The opening ceremony of the restored Kilis-Aleppo gas pipeline, which will supply Azerbaijani gas to Syria, was also attended by the head of the Qatar Fund for Development (QFFD) Fahad Hamad Al-Sulaiti. Doha is sponsoring the project, which they want to extend to Homs.
Secondly, the Turkish factor in Israel’s attack on Qatar is highlighted due to the fact that Ankara positions itself as a sponsor of Hamas.
Since the start of the Gaza war in 2023, Erdogan's government has expressed solidarity with the Palestinian group, which Ankara believes represents the people of Gaza and Palestine. Unlike Arab countries that support the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and approve of the transfer of power in Gaza to Mahmoud Abbas's people, Turkey clings to Hamas.
After Israel's operations against Hezbollah (the pager bombing, the 2024 invasion of southern Lebanon), the change of power in Syria, and the bombing of Iran itself, Tehran's ability to support Palestine has diminished. Therefore, in a situation of weakened Iran, Türkiye is trying to position itself as the main defender of Palestine, Gaza, and Hamas.
Before the 2023 Gaza war, support for Hamas had an impact on Turkish geopolitics. Just remember Erdogan's spat with Shimon Peres in Davos and the crisis over the sending of the Freedom Flotilla.
And thirdly, of the influential countries of the Middle East, not counting the weakened Iran, only Turkey opposes Israel more harshly, obviously and actively.
Moreover, the confrontation is not only along the Palestinian line, but also Syria, and in some cases Lebanon and even Iran and Yemen. Israel and Turkey act as direct competitors for influence in the Middle East. In the conditions of tense relations between the two countries, any attacks by one or the other country are perceived extremely painfully and delay any prospect of normalization.
Given the importance of the Turkish factor in the situation with the attack on Qatar, can we say that Türkiye will move to more decisive actions and come one step closer to a direct war with Israel?
Most likely not.
Of course, no one will restrain themselves in rhetoric. Criticism and threats against Israel have been and will continue to be poured in.
In a conversation with the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamed Al Thani, Erdogan promised "that Turkey will support the state of Qatar and its people with all its capabilities." The Justice and Development Party called the IDF strikes " a barbaric terrorist act" that "threatens the security of friendly and brotherly Qatar." Incidentally, according to the Türkiye newspaper, the Hamas leaders managed to escape thanks to information from Turkish intelligence.
Decisive action could, in theory, be tolerated if Israel were systematically attacking Turkey's ally Qatar or doing to it what it does to other Arab countries.
The Doha operation was probably a one-off. Benjamin Netanyahu simply wanted to disrupt the negotiations and move on to a large-scale military invasion of Gaza with the aim of occupying it. Trump has already promised that the attacks will not be repeated.
As for the new stage of escalation, Qatar is not a bordering Lebanon, Palestine or Syria. There is no immediate threat from Qatar to Israel.
Of course, Israel does not border Yemen either, but the Houthis and the IDF constantly exchange blows. But Qatar did not enter the war with Israel on the side of Hamas. Formally, the Hamas attack looks like a violation of Qatar's sovereignty, but Netanyahu did not aim to attack it.
For example, there are constant incidents between Iran and Pakistan due to one or the other country striking militants and separatists on each other's territory, but Tehran and Islamabad do not go beyond verbal criticism.
So, despite all the resonance, if the matter is limited to the fact that Qatar simply stops offering its mediation services for negotiations between Hamas and Israel, and the IDF no longer bombs targets in the emirate, then Erdogan will have no reason to put pressure on Israel because of Qatar.
At the same time, if the LAS and OIC countries ever decide to do something more against Israel than just another declaration, Turkey will obviously support such measures. The reason could be either a violation of Qatar's sovereignty or the death of Qatari security forces.
For all the importance of the “Switzerland of the Middle East,” as Qatar is often called, the more serious challenge in the context of the Turkish-Israeli confrontation remains the events in Gaza and Syria.